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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation attempts to determine the effect of managerial Executive on healthcare supply 
chain risk management maturity. The healthcare industry is faced with constant risk to its supply 
chain and operates under the expectation that healthcare will continue to be delivered even under 
the most severe and disruptive of conditions. The effect of a manager, who operationalizes firm 
strategy, may impact the maturity level of a hospital’s risk management efforts. Through multi-
method research, this study seeks to understand the effects of management on healthcare risk 
management maturity. Survey and interview methods were used to understand the relationship 
between healthcare supply chain managers and the effect they have on a firm’s risk management 
efforts in their supply chain. The study’s value lies in the identification of a unique measurement 
of healthcare supply chain risk management maturity clusters and initial support based on 
qualitative findings.  
 
INDEX WORDS: Executive Style, Supply chain risk management maturity, Supply chain 
management, Survey, Cluster analysis, Interview, Multiple method 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE EFFECT OF EXECUTIVE STYLE ON RISK MANAGEMENT: A HEALTHCARE 
SUPPLY CHAIN CONTEXT 
by 
 
STEPHEN RONALD SPULICK 
 
B.A., Fordham University, 1990 
 
M.B.A., University of Phoenix, 2007 
 
A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Georgia Southern University in 
 
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
STATESBORO, GEORGIA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2015 
 
STEPHEN SPULICK 
 
All Rights Reserved 
4 
 
 
 
THE EFFECT OF EXECUTIVE STYLE ON RISK MANAGEMENT: A HEALTHCARE 
SUPPLY CHAIN CONTEXT 
by 
 
STEPHEN RONALD SPULICK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Major Professor:   Steve Rutner 
           Committee:           Karl Manrodt 
                Gerard Ledlow 
                Christopher Boone 
 
 
 
Electronic Version Approved: 
Spring 2015 
5 
 
 
 
 
DEDICATION 
 
 I would like to dedicate this work to my family. With your support I was able to make new 
discoveries about myself and what can be accomplished with perseverance, hard work and 
dedication. You make this effort worthwhile.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
 
 I would like to first thank God for providing whatever skill has allowed me the opportunity 
to undertake and complete this task. Any shortcomings are my own and provide proof that I am a 
work-in-progress. I would like to thank Karl Manrodt, who worked closely with me as my 
original Committee Chair, for the guidance, talks and occasional kick in the pants when needed. 
Your example of a strong work ethic, attention to detail and continued high standards make this 
work better. I would like to also thank the other committee members, Steve Rutner, Jerry Ledlow 
and Chris Boone. Your commitment to help me and mentor me keeps me in awe. Your insightful 
guidance and discernment of the research processes and pitfalls helped me avoid many barriers 
and sidestep many errors. Thank you, and as I have mentioned to Karl previously, your skill and 
knowledge are exemplars to strive for.  
 I would like to express thanks to my cohort who, as I look back, endured many discussions 
and presentations that were made better by your feedback. I hope you find some of the best of 
yourselves in my work. 
 I would like to also acknowledge the sacrifices of my family during this process. Without 
your support and willingness to do without an active Dad and husband this would not be 
possible. I will work to make sure your sacrifice was not in vain. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................ 6 
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................................ 10 
LIST OF FIGURES ...................................................................................................................... 13 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................ 14 
Research Objectives and Research Questions ....................................................................... 30 
Executive Style and supply chain risk management complexities ........................................ 33 
Research Approach ................................................................................................................ 40 
Contribution ........................................................................................................................... 43 
Dissertation Format ............................................................................................................... 45 
LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................................................. 46 
Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 46 
Contingency Theory .............................................................................................................. 46 
Supply Chain Risk Management ........................................................................................... 51 
Overview of the SCRM maturity framework ........................................................................ 56 
Risk ........................................................................................................................................ 70 
Risk management .................................................................................................................. 74 
Firm strategy .......................................................................................................................... 83 
Executive Style ...................................................................................................................... 88 
8 
 
Research Hypotheses ............................................................................................................. 98 
METHODOLOGY ..................................................................................................................... 103 
Multiple Method Research Overview .................................................................................. 103 
Study 1 - Quantitative Research Overview ......................................................................... 105 
Study 2 - Qualitative Research Overview ........................................................................... 117 
Multiple method integration ................................................................................................ 129 
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS ......................................................................................... 133 
Study 1 Quantitative Research Findings ............................................................................. 133 
Discussion of Quantitative Study One Results .................................................................... 191 
Study 2 Qualitative Research Findings ............................................................................... 193 
Summary of Qualitative Study Two Results ....................................................................... 209 
CONCLUSONS AND IMPLICATIONS ................................................................................... 212 
Overall Dissertation Contributions ...................................................................................... 213 
Study One Research Contribution and Implications ........................................................... 214 
Study Two Research Contribution and Implications ........................................................... 220 
Combined Research Implications ........................................................................................ 222 
Research Limitations ........................................................................................................... 225 
Future Research Directions ................................................................................................. 226 
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................... 227 
APPENDIX A ............................................................................................................................. 268 
9 
 
APPENDIX B ............................................................................................................................. 270 
APPENDIX C ............................................................................................................................. 271 
APPENDIX D ............................................................................................................................. 272 
APPENDIX E ............................................................................................................................. 278 
APPENDIX F.............................................................................................................................. 290 
APPENDIX G ............................................................................................................................. 292 
APPENDIX H ............................................................................................................................. 294 
APPENDIX I .............................................................................................................................. 299 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1: SCRM maturity framework enablers and attributes (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013) ............. 57 
Table 2:  SCRM maturity classification model (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013) .................................. 58 
Table 3: Comparative supply chain risk management frameworks .............................................. 62 
Table 4: Supply chain risk management risk maturity (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013) ....................... 70 
Table 5: Risk management definitions ......................................................................................... 78 
Table 6: Generalized Capability Maturity Classifications .......................................................... 107 
Table 7: Common method bias sources of control ..................................................................... 113 
Table 8: Trustworthiness considerations in grounded theory (Flint et al., 2002, p. 106) ........... 126 
Table 9: Barriers to integration of quantitative and qualitative findings (adapted from Bryman, 
2007) ........................................................................................................................................... 130 
Table 10: Missing Value Univariate Statistics............................................................................ 137 
Table 12: Cronbach's alpha - Executive Style ............................................................................ 144 
Table 13: Risk Management Variables Correlation Matrix ........................................................ 149 
Table 14: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy and Bartlett’s Test ................ 151 
Table 15: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Adequacy Standard ................................................................... 151 
Table 16: Executive Style Classification Statistics ..................................................................... 152 
Table 17: Executive Style Distribution ....................................................................................... 153 
Table 18: Risk Management Maturity Models ........................................................................... 154 
Table 19: Risk Management Variables Correlations .................................................................. 157 
Table 20: Hierarchical Clustering Agglomeration and Stopping Rule Ward’s Method Euclidean 
Distance....................................................................................................................................... 161 
11 
 
Table 21: Hierarchical Clustering Agglomeration and Stopping Rule Centroid Method Squared 
Euclidean Distance...................................................................................................................... 162 
Table 22: Initial k-means Cluster Centroids ............................................................................... 165 
Table 23: Change in Cluster Centers from Hierarchical Solution .............................................. 166 
Table 24: Final k-means Cluster Centroids ................................................................................ 166 
Table 25: k-means ANOVA Table ............................................................................................. 167 
Table 26: Final Number of Cases by Cluster .............................................................................. 168 
Table 27: Cluster Membership Comparison ............................................................................... 169 
Table 28: Healthcare Supply Chain Risk Management Cluster Membership ............................ 170 
Table 29: Full Canonical Model, Correlations and Cumulative Effects ..................................... 173 
Table 30: Redundancy of Dependent and Independent Variates ................................................ 174 
Table 31: Canonical Weights, Loadings and Cross-Loadings for the Canonical Function ........ 175 
Table 32: Independent Variables Normality Test ....................................................................... 177 
Table 33: Independent Variables Descriptives ........................................................................... 177 
Table 34: Dependent Variable Correlations ............................................................................... 178 
Table 35: Multinomial Logistic Regression Case Processing Summary .................................... 179 
Table 36: Model Fitting Information .......................................................................................... 180 
Table 37: Goodness-of-Fit Measures .......................................................................................... 180 
Table 38: Pseudo R-Square Values ............................................................................................. 181 
Table 39: Likelihood Ratio Tests ................................................................................................ 181 
Table 40: Individual Parameter Estimates .................................................................................. 182 
Table 41: Classifications ............................................................................................................. 183 
Table 42: Observed Executive Style Frequencies by Cluster ..................................................... 184 
12 
 
Table 43: Hypothesis Findings ................................................................................................... 185 
Table 44: Case Processing Summary .......................................................................................... 186 
Table 45: Executive Style and Years of Healthcare Supply Chain Experience Comparison ..... 187 
Table 46: Executive Style and Current Position Comparison .................................................... 188 
Table 47: Executive Style and Facility Size Comparison ........................................................... 190 
Table 48: Interview Participant Demographics .......................................................................... 194 
Table 49: Qualitative Trustworthiness Criteria ........................................................................... 196 
Table 50: Recap of Results ......................................................................................................... 212 
Table 51: Contributions .............................................................................................................. 214 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Supply Chain Risk Map – Qualitative Interview Focus Area ....................................... 36 
Figure 2: Executive Styles (Håkonsson et al., 2012) .................................................................... 94 
Figure 3: Executive Style congruence with supply chain risk management, adapted from 
Håkonsson et al., (2012) ............................................................................................................. 101 
Figure 4: Scope of research adapted from Håkonsson et al., (2012); Simchi-Levi et al., (2013)102 
Figure 5: Research purposes in multiple methods research designs (Davis et al., 2011) ........... 104 
Figure 6: Methodological process ............................................................................................... 105 
Figure 7: Executive Style Classification ..................................................................................... 108 
Figure 8: Sample completed supply chain risk map ................................................................... 123 
Figure 9: Summary of Missing Data Values for Retained Responses ........................................ 135 
Figure 10: Missing Value Patterns .............................................................................................. 136 
Figure 11: Hierarchical Cluster Agglomeration Scree Plot ........................................................ 159 
Figure 12: Proportional Change in Cluster Heterogeneity Ward’s Method Euclidean Distance 162 
Figure 13: Proportional Change in Cluster Heterogeneity Centroid Method Squared Euclidean 
Distance....................................................................................................................................... 163 
Figure 14: Supply Chain Risk Map ............................................................................................ 198 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Every manager possesses and employs personal attributes at work as they execute their 
daily tasks and responsibilities (Fiedler, 1965; Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Håkonsson et al., 
2012). Among these responsibilities is the management of risk, which has depended on a 
subjective (March and Shapira, 1987) and complex (Christopher and Lee, 2001; Juttner et al., 
2003; Christopher, 2012) approach often rooted in behavioral and psychological contexts 
(Gephart, 1993). Not simply a personal attribute, this style, referred to as either leadership style 
(Crowe et al., 1972; Bass and Yammarino, 1991) or Executive Style as termed by Håkonsson et 
al., (2012), is a multifaceted set of traits that provides a foundation on which managers build 
their actions and interactions (Bolman and Deal, 1991; Burton and Obel, 1998; Håkonsson et al., 
2008).  
Important relationships 
Previous research indicates there are relationships between managerial attributes, such as 
Executive Style, and effective managerial performance (Crowe et al., 1972; Dahl et al., 2012) 
and firm performance (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Håkonsson et al., 2012). Simchi-Levi et al., 
(2013) note that the strategic choices involved in supply chain risk management maturity can 
lead to improved post-disruption resilience and firm performance as the maturity level increases. 
Coupled with calls for understanding managerial style in decision-making (March and Shapira, 
1987; Stewart and Roth, 2001; Khan and Burns, 2007) and the assertion by Nutt (1986) that 
“style  may  explain  why  managers make  different  strategic  decisions  when  faced  with  
similar  choices” (p. 39), additional investigation into the effect and impact of managers and their 
Executive Style on supply chain risk management maturity appears necessary as often it is the 
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supply chain manager who will interpret the environment and deploy resources to support the 
firm’s goals.  
Supply chain risk management maturity 
 Recent research by Simchi-Levi et al., (2013) of 209 international firms with global 
supply chains found that companies with more mature supply chain risk management capabilities 
performed better both operationally and financially following a disruption than firms with less 
mature capabilities. Supply chain risk management maturity is a framework that “assesses the 
degree to which companies are applying the most effective enablers of supply chain risk 
reduction and their associated processes” (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013, p. 2). There is no settled 
definition of risk management, however, Al Mannai (2008) suggests it is “the process of 
understanding risk and deciding upon and implementing action to achieve an acceptable level of 
risk at an acceptable cost” (p.12). Given the complexity of supply chains and the presence of 
multiple risks, a manager, who possesses a certain Executive Style, may decide to address these 
risks. Of firms surveyed by Simchi-Levi et al., (2013), managers in 59% of the companies had 
immature processes in place to face potential supply chain disruptions. Their choices made an 
impact on preparedness and their style impacted their choices.  
The impact of style and the manager 
Executive Style (Håkonsson et al., 2006, 2008, 2012) is an extension of Burton and 
Obel’s (2004) broad based examination of contingency fit within organizations. This managerial 
attribute, Executive Style, influences decisions that a manager makes daily, whether incorporated 
knowingly or unknowingly (Heller and Yukl, 1969; Lok and Crawford, 2003) in the process. Its’ 
importance is recognized by Mangan and Christopher (2005) who note the growing awareness 
that “people, knowledge and talent” (p. 179) are critical to a supply chain’s success. This builds 
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on a concern expressed by Kirby (2003), following interviews with supply chain thought leaders, 
that “supply chains, it seems, are really about talent, not technology, especially as the 
marketplace grows ever more complex” (p. 65).  This would begin to answer why, “despite years 
of process breakthroughs and elegant technology solutions, an agile, adaptive supply chain 
remains an elusive goal” (Kirby, 2003, p. 64). The leadership of a manager, within the context of 
firm operations, can have either beneficial or detrimental effects on firm performance and 
outcomes (Slater, 1989; Christopher, 2012). Early understanding of supply chains viewed the 
environment as stable and linear, ideal for prescriptive and positivistic approaches, yet more 
recent understanding notes the changing and transformative networks in use requiring leaders 
capable “of coping with complexity and nonlinearity” (Christopher, 2012, p.5). The variations in 
managers and styles, expressed through their Executive Style, therefore presents a key area to 
examine to better understand the decisions made by key managers, particularly in the complex 
environments of risk and supply chain management.  
Style has an impact and has been the subject of research, variously described as 
leadership styles or traits. Ultimately, these studies seek to define influential attributes of a 
manager that were previously undefined or poorly defined. Styles have been seen in 
examinations of successful naval officers’ performance and promotions, with managerial traits of 
charisma, inspirational leadership, contingent promises and rewards, active and passive 
management-by-exception as elements predictive of success (Bass and Yammarino, 1991). Dahl 
et al., (2012) further found that male CEO values and behaviors changed upon transitioning to 
fatherhood. Specifically, their research indicated that the manager’s attitudes toward stakeholders 
changed in terms of reducing subordinate compensation and increasing their own (Dahl et al., 
2012). A leadership style that employed consideration, a less structured approach to 
17 
 
management, was found to be an important antecedent to executive job satisfaction in western 
firms (Lok and Crawford, 2004) but not in Asian firms, indicating differences exist in styles of 
managers across cultures. Slater (1989) found support that certain aspects of style were related to 
business performance. One aspect that was examined, a ‘thinking mode of decision making’, 
improved performance regardless of the overall firm strategy and Slater (1989) noted the future 
necessity to explore other relationships between managerial style and performance. Slater (1989) 
found this information would be useful “for making selection, development and placement 
decisions regarding current or potential” (p. 452) managers. Again, style matters and may be 
context dependent.       
Executive Style, as defined by Håkonsson et al., (2012), measures a manager’s style as a 
two dimensional construct that consists of uncertainty avoidance and preference for delegation. 
Uncertainty avoidance is defined as the avoidance of “correctly anticipating events in the distant 
future by using short-run reaction to short-run feedback, i.e. solve pressing problems rather than 
developing long run strategies” and of “anticipating the environment by negotiating with it” 
(Cyert and March, 1963, p. 119). Preference for delegation describes the range between which at 
one end a manager prefers to make decisions alone and at the other end the manager involves 
others in the decision-making process (Håkonsson et al., 2012).  When Executive Style is aligned 
with firm strategy, performance was found to improve, leading Håkonsson et al., (2012) to note 
that “executives matter when implementing strategy” (p. 196). The results indicate a complex, 
nuanced relationship between Executive Style and firm strategy leading Håkonsson et al., (2012) 
to call for continued research in this area. As a CEO's Executive Style influences firm strategy 
and structure, so a supply chain manager's Executive Style may influence the strategies and 
structures within their purview (Burton and Obel, 1998), to include the supply chain risk 
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management context. The Executive Style of a supply chain manager becomes more apparent 
when planning for and addressing a supply chain disruption. 
Disruption as a risk context 
“Unplanned and unanticipated events that disrupt the normal flow of goods and materials 
within a supply chain” is a recent definition of disruption (Craighead et al., 2007, p. 132). The 
context of disruption and the attendant risk must be addressed by managers (March and Shapira, 
1987; Gephart, 1993; Stewart and Roth, 2001; Juttner at al., 2003; Norrman and Jansson, 2004; 
Khan and Burns, 2007). Disruptions have a discernable pattern and a multi-phasic disruption 
sequence has been identified by Turner and Pidgeon (1997) in their discussion of disaster 
disruptions. A manager will be involved in all of the phases from “notionally normal starting 
points” through the “precipitating event” to “full cultural readjustment” as part of their 
responsibilities to the firm (March and Shapira, 1987). The scope of this research, however, will 
be limited to the time period prior to the “precipitating event”. The scope is purposefully narrow 
to isolate actions taken under routine operations regarding planning for a supply chain disruption 
risk. The presence of a precipitating event introduces a separate stream of activities that are built 
upon preparation but which are, in effect, validations of the preparation effectiveness, which is 
outside the scope of this research as well and can be found in the stream of disruption 
management literature (Drabek, 1986; Tierney et al., 2001; Handfield et al., 2007; Atwater et al., 
2010; MacDonald and Corsi, 2013).  
The supply chain manager and disruption risk 
The interface, therefore, between pre-disruption actions, supply disruption risk and the 
firm is often the supply chain manager. These managers take varied approaches, interpret 
environmental information and disruption data differently and control resources for deployment 
in support of the firm’s mission, often in a subjective and complex manner, rooted in behavioral 
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and psychological factors (Manuj and Mentzer, 2008). Therefore, not all managers are equal in 
their Executive Style and approach to their work as Fiedler (1965) notes in a call to adjust or 
“engineer the job to fit their leadership style” (p. 115).  Barney (1991) notes the importance of 
human resources, such as managers, as a resource to provide inimitable advantage, especially 
when utilized in a socially complex context such as interpersonal relations, culture and firm 
reputation to improve a firm’s efficiency and effectiveness. In discussion of the difference 
between theory and practice in current risk management thought and driven by managerial 
decision-making, choice and leadership, Stulz (1996) notes the need to adjust away from a 
simple variation-minimization approach and perhaps use a strategy rooted more in probabilities. 
Bertrand and Schoar (2003), to yield greater insight, introduce the managerial unit of analysis to 
explore aspects of corporate practices that are unexplained when examined at the firm or industry 
level of analysis, concluding that differences in mangers yield differences in corporate 
performance (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003).   
Managing supply chain disruption risks is challenging and complex, as risks may ripple 
throughout increasingly complex systems. Recognizing this, Kleindorfer and Saad (2005) note 
challenges for managers including visibility across the supply chain, partnerships to manage 
disruptions and joint problem solving, all while balancing investment and insurance costs both 
prior to and post disruption. While these are prescriptive suggestions, managers with various 
styles must execute them.  Manuj and Mentzer (2008) note that in relation to risk management 
strategies, managers must “fully understand” the strategies, and “understand the advantages and 
disadvantages” of managing “the myriad of global supply chain risks” (p. 216). Speier et al., 
(2011) found that firms with more mindful leaders, that is leaders creating a sense of culture, 
were more likely to invest in risk mitigation strategies to include process management, 
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information management and partner and service provider management initiatives” (p. 732). A 
manager and their style, therefore, may bear on actual implementation of strategies (Håkonsson 
et al., 2012), when other considerations are held constant.  
The supply chain manager and firm strategy 
Managers work for firms that have semi-fixed strategies and missions which the manager 
is expected, by virtue of his or her position, to support, to champion and about which to make 
decisions (Chopra and Sodhi, 2004; Papke-Shields and Malhotra, 2001; Hamner and Tosi, 1974). 
As businesses experience cycles of change through variation in internal or external 
environments, in time the firm will face disruptions and face the attendant risk to their strategy. 
The more extreme disruptions, magnifying the impact (Woo, 2011) beyond normal operational 
variation, are where managers themselves may show their personal differentiation (Christopher, 
2012) through their pre-disruption choices and activities with which they support firm strategy 
and the continued success of the firm (Mangan and Christopher, 2005). Therefore, a manager’s 
actions may support continuation of firm strategy through cycles of variation and threats from 
multiple types of disruption, if the actions are timely and anticipate future events appropriately 
(Burton and Obel, 2004). 
Multi-faceted disruption risk 
Disruption to firm operations, including pre-disruption actions, the focus of this research, 
has been examined from multiple directions. These include understanding the financial, cash and 
asset based influence of a disruption and, in the event of a previously unexperienced disruption, 
managing through severe challenges due to bounded rationality issues (Altay and Ramirez, 2010; 
Kahneman, 2003) for the manager who has little frame of reference based on prior knowledge or 
experiences. Disruptions may impact transportation routes and in extreme situations such as 
serious to catastrophic incidents, the social fabric of a firm or community (Wood et al., 2013) 
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may feel the effect. These types of risks have been characterized as low-likelihood, high impact 
risks (Oke and Gopalakrishnan, 2009). Disruptions can further impact insurance costs or the 
availability of cutting edge products and customer retention (Tang, 2006). Several characteristics 
have been identified as important to a reaction to a disruption.  These aspects include the event 
risk (of occurrence and/or failure), agility (of a firm’s reaction) and resilience (the return to the 
previous or an improved state) (Christopher and Peck, 2004). Yet, actions may be taken prior to 
the precipitating event as an effort to mitigate or eliminate the potential impact.  
Pre-disruption action and performance 
The scope of this research falls within the narrower frame of pre-disruption events. Faisel 
et al., (2006) notes that risk mitigation enablers exist in the form of specific activities in a supply 
chain. Having plans and structures in place may diminish business impact and may be vital as 
Hendricks and Singhal (2005) found recovery to pre-disruption performance levels may take two 
years or more. A complication, Tang (2006) notes, is the challenge a manager may encounter 
justifying preparation costs to senior management for a disruption that may not occur.  Yet, 
Simchi-Levi et al., (2013) note that, post-disruption, firms that plan and implement greater levels 
of supply chain risk management maturity pre-disruption outperform those with lower levels of 
maturity. To provide context within this research for managerial action, framing pre-disruption 
research in the context of potential effects and risk is appropriate and a supply chain risk map 
will be employed as part of this exploration. While managerial impact occurs post-disruption as 
well, that is beyond the scope of this research. 
Reasons for the research 
This dissertation answers calls for supply chain management research that is multi-
disciplinary, multi-method and relevant (Sanders and Wagner, 2011; Fawcett and Waller, 2011a; 
Ellram and Cooper, 2014), and examines assumptions and seeks to identify new characteristic 
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interactions (Fawcett and Waller, 2011b). The research incorporates studies from supply chain 
risk management (Norrman and Jansson, 2004; Christopher and Peck, 2004; Wagner and Bode, 
2006; Tummala and Schoenherr, 2011; Simchi-Levi et al., 2013), leadership and strategy fields 
(Håkonsson et al., 2012) as well as the risk management field (Bernoulli trans. Summer, 1954; 
Tah and Carr, 2001). A multi-disciplinary, multi-method approach enhances rigor and reliability 
and provides greater insight into a phenomenon than a more focused and myopic examination 
(Sanders and Wagner, 2011) and this research will incorporate both a survey and semi-structured 
interview as multiple methodologies. The use of a qualitative interview portion will provide 
depth and nuance (McGrath, 1982) that a survey instrument may not be able to capture, while the 
survey instrument allows generalization to a larger population from the sample set and 
investigation of behavior free of contextual bias (McGrath, 1982). Relevance is gained through 
increased opportunities to explore linkages that a strictly quantitative approach may exclude 
(Ellram and Cooper, 2014). While the quantitative exploration of supply chain risk management 
is based upon Simchi-Levi et al., (2013), a semi-structured interview will allow exploration of 
specific instances to understand if there are factors and interactions not captured by the survey 
instrument (McCracken, 1988; Kvale, 1996; Fontana and Frey, 2000; Juttner and Ziegenbein, 
2009). 
The framework of Contingency theory 
Contingency Theory (Fiedler, 1964, 1967, 1978; Hofer, 1975) provides a framework to 
interpret the fit between Executive Style and supply chain risk management approach. 
Contingency Theory has been characterized as providing an interpretation of fit as an interaction 
effect (Van de Ven and Drazin, 1985) between internal and external contexts of an organization 
which are important for decision-making (Wagner and Bode, 2008) but in the context of an 
individual firm. As such, the findings may lack a degree of generalizability, which is a known 
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weakness (Trkman and MacCormack, 2009; Van de Ven and Drazin, 1985) yet is appropriate to 
explain the observations. In the context of this research, Executive Style is an internal factor and 
the supply chain risk may be a factor either internal or external in nature. Trkman and 
McCormack (2009) note that “there is no single best way of organizing supply chains to manage 
uncertainties and risks, firm-to-firm risk comparisons are therefore the result of environmental 
demands and attributes that tend to be firm-specific” (p. 248). This echoes Fiedler’s (1964) 
seminal work in Contingency Theory that stated there may be multiple best ways to organize and 
lead a business, as well as the assertion that there is no leadership style or set of universal 
decisions that will be best for all businesses. Yet Singhal and Singhal (2012) note that some 
contingencies “can cover a set of industries” (p. 247) and there may be styles best for certain 
contingencies (Fiedler, 1965). The unit of analysis will be the manager within a specific industry, 
to both control for cross-industry bias and to determine if within a specific industry and context 
Executive Style has an impact. Specifically the industry is healthcare and the context is supply 
chain risk management maturity. As Håkonsson et al., (2012) noted, Executive Style that is 
aligned with firm strategy can lead to improved performance. This research seeks to determine if 
there is alignment between Executive Style and supply chain risk management maturity as well 
as understanding more nuanced aspects of supply chain risk management through interviews. To 
gain an improved understanding, this research examined risk, risk management and Executive 
Style within the context of healthcare supply chains. 
Risk and Risk Management 
Although supply chain risk management is a relatively new field, risk management has 
been considered in business since at least 1738 when Bernoulli (trans. Summers, 1954) sought 
first to understand the utility costs of risk choices and then shifted focus to the realm of 
insurance. Ellis, Shockley and Henry (2011), in their literature review of supply risk 
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management across seventy nine periodicals, to examine the seemingly fragmented nature of risk 
management, found the research in this area disjointed. Risk management, they found, has been 
used to mitigate operational contingencies, natural hazards or man-made events. Each of these 
types of disruptions has generated research pertaining to severity, responsibility and a 
broadening of the risk management field.  
Risk and severity 
Risk has been characterized by its severity (Tah and Carr, 2001; Norrman and Jansson, 
2004; Christopher and Peck, 2004; Wagner and Bode, 2006; Tummala and Schoenherr, 2011), 
and Wagner and Bode (2008) further provide a dimensional illustration of risk that begins with 
an exceptionally severe supply chain trigger event with subsequent negative consequences and 
expands to include catastrophic impact which can threaten business continuity. This degree of 
risk is characterized by an abnormal negative impact on a firm’s supply chain and may be 
triggered by a natural “force majeure”, political instability, epidemic or other factor. The impact 
may be additionally affected by time pressure or capabilities degradation and may further 
develop to the point where operations cease altogether. These disruptions have a wide impact on 
a supply chain and may extend beyond the local to include a global impact. As mentioned 
previously, risk is the responsibility of a manager (March and Shapira, 1987; Gephart, 1993; 
Stewart and Roth, 2001; Juttner at al., 2003; Norrman and Jansson, 2004; Khan and Burns, 
2007), who possesses traits termed style. The manager may choose to take action or not when 
faced with a risk or potential risk. Yet, addressing risk in a supply chain presents certain 
situational aspects a manager must understand and face. These complex aspects include lack of 
ownership or responsibility, chaos and inertia from the organization (Christopher and Lee, 2001; 
Juttner et al., 2003). 
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Risk and responsibility 
Risk has also been characterized by the level of responsible manager who must address 
the risk, whether strategic risks addressed by senior managers or more tactical risks addressed by 
more functionally focused managers. March and Shapira (1987) note however, that managers fail 
to follow classic theoretically anticipated responses to risk, and rather respond according to 
“individual taste” and “social norms and expectations” (p. 1415). Gephart (1993) notes that 
assignment of this responsibility for addressing risk, imposed at a macro level by the 
organization as part of the job description, can ultimately lead to positive outcomes (“credit”) or 
negative outcomes (“blame”) (Gephart, 1993, p. 1506) and risk sensemaking may vary between 
managers within an organization. Stewart and Roth (2001), in their examination of the 
differences in risk propensity between entrepreneurs and managers, found entrepreneurs often 
focused more on profit and growth, and possessed higher risk propensities, often to a greater 
degree than subjects who were more income oriented. A possible source of confusion regarding 
risk may be the managers themselves, who were found by Juttner et al., (2003) to consider risk to 
be a multidimensional construct, making subsequent cross-respondent comparisons more 
difficult, i.e. Manager A interprets a catastrophic risk impact differently than Manager n. In 
general, Khan and Burns (2007) found an area of agreement in that risk among managers carries 
a negative connotation, but is also seen as a topic to be confronted by either objective means, 
such as risk management tools, or by subjective means, such as human judgment. In sum, risk 
management approaches taken by managers are varied, subjective and complex, often rooted in 
behavioral and psychological contexts while being influenced by organizational context (Manuj 
and Mentzer, 2008). As such, the topic remains a prime area for continued academic exploration. 
Risk in other fields 
Risk has been characterized in other fields as a broad, enterprise-wide task or set of tasks 
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which function to reduce negative impacts to the firm. Recent developments have seen risk 
management conceptualization branch out to specific fields and a subsequent reevaluation of 
field specific definitions. As such, overarching techniques have been developed to address risk in 
the enterprise (COSO, 2004; Purdy, 2010) to enable firms to achieve their objectives, treat risks 
and manage incidents, among other relevant tasks. This research seeks to understand the role of 
Executive Style in supply chain risk management maturity decision-making, which is an ongoing 
challenge for researchers. This research further answers calls for more specific managerial 
behavior analysis (March and Shapira, 1987) in the risk management domain, seeks to develop 
an understanding of how risk management maturity differs or corresponds between managerial 
styles (Stewart and Roth, 2001) and the call for “broad and in-depth empirical research into how 
risk is managed in supply chains” (Khan and Burns, 2007, p. 211). 
Executive behavior and psychology 
The understanding of a manager’s strengths and weaknesses, as measured by Executive 
Style and as then understood by both manager and supervisor, provides insight into overall 
managerial capabilities and can be related to a manager’s risk management practices. These 
managers, as individuals, possess unique combinations of attributes that form the basis of their 
intended behavior in a given context.  Each manager has developed, through inherent 
predisposition and experiences, their own personalized approach to how they function in their 
supply chain role. Such discussions move research into a neighboring area of managerial 
behavior and psychology (Tokar, 2012).       
Behavioral psychology is an established field with early recognition of the need for 
systematic examination of human experience (Skinner, 1938). Research of the human behavior 
and the style of managers and executives has continued since Skinner's call for alignment of firm 
strategy (Skinner, 1938).  Top management practitioners have been studied through multiple 
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lenses to include Executive Styles (Håkonsson et al., 2006, 2008, 2012) and east-west cultural 
and demographic differences (Lok and Crawford, 2003), role conflict and role ambiguity 
(Hamner and Tosi, 1974), the universality and context dependence of some managerial 
characteristics (Slater, 1989) and an examination of the relationship between managerial 
characteristics, strategy and small business unit (SBU) performance (Gupta and Govindarajan, 
1982).  
Executive style and fit 
Several authors (Fiedler, 1965; Heller and Yukl, 1969, Wofford, 1971; Covin and Slevin, 
1988) suggested that success of a manager, which yields a positive influence in the firm, is based 
upon the contingent factors of fit and context, where fit describes the conjunction of a manager 
with a job and both are contained in an environment that is defined by the context of operations 
and the benefits gained by both the manager and the firm. With fit, the firm benefits from 
optimal use of the manager-as-resource it employs to achieve its objectives and the manager 
benefits from a reduction in friction between their own goals and activities and those required by 
the firm (Fiedler, 1965). The context defines the dimensions within which an executive operates 
and may reflect organizational structure, firm culture or other exogenous characteristics (Covin 
and Slevin, 1998).  Porter (1996) lays a further foundation with his assertion that “more 
sustainable” strategic fit is built on entire systems of activities whose strength is epitomized by 
the strongest link in the chain. At the core lies the individual leaders in the firm. These individual 
leaders will, of necessity, be located at different positions within each company, but all have 
made decisions that “implemented” a strategy, “built” a system of activities or maintained or 
avoided a strong linkage as part of their success or failure. 
Earlier studies have also examined how managerial behavior is malleable. The effect of 
subordinate behavior on managerial behavior was investigated by Crowe et al., (1972) and more 
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recently even the effect of fatherhood on managerial style and subordinate compensation (Dahl et 
al., 2012) has been explored in management literature. An approach focused on self-perception 
by Bass and Yammarino (1991) discussed the differences between self-reported and subordinate 
reported leadership style, finding a leader self-inflates their evaluation when compared to 
subordinates. Understanding the current Executive Style in a given context is a first step to 
understanding the possible impact of a manager and their choices. These become amplified in 
contexts with great complexity and the manager becomes a critical crux and bridge between a 
firm and management of risks to ensure continuous operations in support of the firm’s strategy 
and goals. The healthcare context, with multiple suppliers, exposure to multiple and multi-
faceted risks and a goal of restoring health to those who arrive at a facility provides a suitable 
setting for further exploration of  how managers approach supply chain risk management. 
The healthcare context – complexity and uniqueness 
The complex relationship between overarching firm strategy, managerial characteristics 
and performance has been empirically examined (Gupta and Govindarajan, 1982; Deverell and 
Olsson, 2009; Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007; Miles et al., 1978, Williamson, 1999) and a 
determination offered that strategy can encompass many variables and in itself can be complex 
and situation dependent. Porter (1991) stressed that improved empirical testing is desirable as 
well as an understanding of the chain of causality when developing theory. While it is useful to 
understand how executive strategy impacts risk management, there may also be causal forces 
present through the impact presented by firm strategy.  
The healthcare supply chain, with its exposure to disruption risk, coupled with an 
expectation that firm strategy includes business continuity (Rodriguez et al., 2006) during a 
disruption, is positioned as an ideal example from which to begin to explore these relationships. 
 Several authors have pointed out the unique nature of the healthcare supply chain (CSC 
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Consulting, 1996; Burns, 2002; Schneller and Smeltzer, 2006; Chang And Wittemore, 2008; 
McFadden et al, 2009; Dobrzykowski et al., 2014). The aspects of the healthcare supply chain 
are well illustrated by Burns (2002), who draws on Porter’s value chain work, to characterize the 
healthcare value chain as the unique flows of money, product and information in support of 
product movement, and places this framework on the existing supply chain actors of the 
manufacturer, group purchasing organizations (GPO), distributors and hospital systems or 
hospitals. Burns (2002) notes that this occurs for eight distinct areas, including “pharmaceuticals, 
medical-surgical supplies, (that is, disposables), radiology and laboratory supplies, medical 
devices (for example stents or implants), critical equipment (durable and expendable), food and 
dietary supplies and services, office forms and supplies, and cleaning supplies and services” (p. 
43). 
Pre-disruption managerial behavior 
When the structure of a healthcare supply chain faces a disruption event of great 
magnitude there is increased opportunity for failure (Nates, 2004; Prezant et al., 2005; Dolan and 
Krug, 2006; Powell et al., 2008). This failure occurs simultaneously with a breakdown in part or 
all of the environmental fabric in which a healthcare facility operates, adding additional pressure 
to sustain performance. The risk management planning, conducted by firm executives and with 
the influence of exogenous forces from the firm and environment, provides the underpinnings for 
post-disruption activities. While many studies have examined disruption risk (Sheffi, 2001; 
Blackhurst et al., 2005; Chopra and Sodhi, 2004; Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005; Hendricks and 
Singhal, 2005; Craighead et al., 2007; Handfield et al., 2007; Braunscheidel and Suresh, 2009; 
Zsidisin and Wagner, 2010; Ellis et al., 2011; Waters, 2011) and post-disruption supply chain 
operations (Natarajarathinam et al., 2009; Skipper at al., 2010; MacDonald and Corsi, 2013) 
fewer have focused on the pre-disruption behavioral aspects of the executives charged with 
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supply chain operations. MacDonald (2008) has called for further research in this nascent 
intersection between risk decisions and behavioral factors to build on the work begun by Manuj 
and Mentzer (2008) while Lorentz and Hilmola (2012) note the benefit of understanding 
behaviors as part of risk related decision making and how pre-disruption supply chain decisions 
are made. Tokar (2010), in a focused discussion of behavior in supply chain research, notes the 
substantial contribution to be made by such future research into managerial judgment and 
decision making, to include possible extension of the supply chain management field into 
behavioral areas. In turn, this may lead to improved understanding of operational decision 
making and result in improved accuracy in understanding and anticipating managerial actions.   
Research Objectives and Research Questions 
This research has several goals. These include developing an understanding of supply 
chain risk management behaviors as well as Executive Style influence on supply chain risk 
management decision-making. This dissertation specifically addresses the relationship between 
Executive Style and supply chain risk management activities. Justification is rooted in several 
recent calls for new research topics. For instance, Waller and Fawcett (2012) urge researchers to 
combine “ideas or paradigms that are not typically combined” (p. 261).  While firm strategy, 
Executive Style and risk management have been previously examined separately, the underlying 
psychological aspects as they relate to variation in strategic decision-making previously have 
been mainly examined from an economic, general management and behavioral psychology 
perspective (Ben-David et al., 2010; Ben-David et al., 2007).   
The first objective is to develop an understanding of the interactions between Executive 
Styles and the risk management approach taken by managers. To address this gap in current 
research, a multiple method approach has been used. Use of a multiple method approach 
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incorporating both a survey of healthcare supply chain managers and semi-structured interviews 
allows for a more rich examination of the topic (McGrath, 1982) and addresses weaknesses that 
each research method possesses while providing complementarity between them. Multiple 
method research utilizing survey and interview techniques has been used in management studies 
involving uncertainty (Pagell and Krauss, 1999) where qualitative interview findings were used 
to explain survey results, and has been advocated to increase the validity of the overall research 
to ensure results are a reflection of the findings versus the method (Jick, 1979). Further, this 
research seeks to answer the recent call by several researchers for additional, rigorous, 
qualitative research in the supply chain field to compliment quantitative work (Gammelgard and 
Larson, 2001; Mello and Flint, 2009; Fawcett and Waller, 2011a; Kaufmann and Denk, 2011; 
Gligor and Autry, 2012) and is designed to uncover attributes of supply chain risk management 
that may remain unknown (Kaufmann and Denk, 2011). 
Executive Style and supply chain risk management relationship 
Gligor and Holcomb (2012) call for increased research into the behavioral/relational 
antecedents that can impact supply chain efficiency and effectiveness during disruptions. This, in 
part, encompasses the first aspect of Executive Style, risk avoidance, and echoes Knemeyer and 
Naylor (2011) who note the critical need to understand nuances of decision-making in supply 
chains as “problem solving approaches by logistics and supply chain managers might be 
influenced by an individual’s risk avoidance” (p. 296, emphasis added). The second aspect of 
Executive Style is willingness to delegate, about which Sungul et al., (2012) note that 
“delegation of decision making to managers is efficient when managers allocate resources, 
including their own efforts, in ways that do not divert from owners’ objectives” (p. 376, emphasis 
added) however they also note that while previous delegation work, “focused on the complex 
reality of intraorganizational structures, incentives, and processes that shape many organizational 
32 
 
choices” (Sungal et al., 2012, p. 376) these were focused internally. Supply chain risk 
management maturity, at more advanced levels, incorporates a tightly entwined internal and 
external focus (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013), a focus currently missing from delegation studies 
(Sungal et al., 2012). Actions to address risk “such as organizational structures, task design, 
explicit and implicit incentives, and management assignments” (Sungal et al., 2012, p. 376) 
shape outcomes and apply a contingency view to the managerial context (Sungal et al., 2012).  
Contingency Theory of leadership (Fiedler, 1964) notes that leaders and their styles may be 
compatible with certain conditions and that leaders can be trained to recognize this fit and 
understand if their style meets the needs of the firm.  
In the context of supply chain risk management, Braunscheidel and Suresh (2009) point 
out that there is a close relationship between “agility, risk preparedness and better response to 
foreseen and unforeseen disruptions” (p. 135). Therefore, understanding the behavioral/relational 
aspects of supply chain risk preparedness as measured with a supply chain risk maturity index is 
important as it may benefit or detriment risk posture through managerial choices. Although 
research has proposed prescriptive approaches to supply chain risk management (Ritchie and 
Brindley, 2007; Tummala and Schoenherr, 2011) and professional organizations have developed 
risk management guidelines for both broadly defined business ventures (ISO, 2009; AIRMIC et 
al., 2010) as well as supply chain management (Cranfield University, 2003; Supply Chain 
Council, 2010), March and Shapira (1987) find managers return to “individual taste” and “social 
norms and expectations” (p. 1415) when responding to risk. This reliance on personal techniques 
may be troubling to firms who already acknowledge that up to sixty percent of them “pay only 
marginal attention to risk reduction processes” (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013, p.2) of any kind.  
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Simchi-Levi et al., (2013) note that supply chain operations in the 209 global firms they 
surveyed were most sensitive to the skill sets and experiences of managers, scoring ahead of 
commodity prices, energy reliance and regionalization of manufacturing, indicating that 
managers and the attributes they bring indeed matter.  In the risk management maturity domain it 
is less well understood how this interaction is operationalized and what impact Executive Style 
has on risk management.  
Research Question 1: “How does Executive Style impact a manager’s approach to risk 
management?” 
Executive Style and supply chain risk management complexities 
The second objective was to understand the complex influences encountered by supply 
chain managers as they address risk management. Quantitative approaches such as the survey 
technique allow researchers the opportunity to test hypotheses and theories directly, however, 
this approach may fail to capture aspects of the inquiry that are beyond the scope of the survey 
items presented to the respondents.  Cronbach (1975) recognized the correlational benefit of 
researchers incorporating analysis of controlled variables as well as information gathered in 
specific contexts and which then take on a more important role. Understanding complex 
interactions between managerial choices and external influences, such as those surrounding risk 
management choices, may require dense, vivid data that is simultaneously clear in meaning.  
This analysis of behavior is addressed by examining examples of specific topics or events of 
interest; analysis of a specific topic across respondents allows for cross-case comparisons to 
determine both similarities and outlier circumstances between respondents.  
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The current topic of risk management is ideal for more nuanced research for several 
reasons. As Tokar (2010) notes, assumptions about human behavior in quantitative research in 
logistics and supply chain management must facilitate a more broad understanding and rely less 
on assumptions such as “people are independent and unaffected physically or psychologically by 
one another” and “people are not a major factor for the focal issue, people are deterministic and 
predictable” (p. 93). Rather, behavioral categories such as those suggested by Bandoly et al., 
(2006) of personal “intentions, actions and reactions” (p. 94) provide a straightforward and 
effective approach to explore behavior. Ritchie and Brindley (2007) also note that decision-
makers are influenced by “perceptions, attitudes, experiences, rewards and penalties” (p. 1403). 
These factors in risk management may reveal previously unknown “intentions, actions and 
reactions” (Bandoly et al., 2006, p. 94) as often, managerial behavior fails to follow normative 
suggestions (March and Shapira, 1987) based on previous academic findings or practitioner 
guidance, suggesting there are other factors to be discovered (Tokar, 2010).  Therefore 
exploration of managerial approaches to risk management are seen as complex and remain at an 
early stage. 
Tang (2006b) differentiates degrees of risk as those inherent in operations such as 
“uncertain customer demand, uncertain supply, and uncertain cost” (p. 453) and those more 
serious disruptions, “major disruptions caused by natural and man-made disasters such as 
earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, terrorist attacks, etc., or economic crises such as currency 
valuation or strikes” (p. 453). “In most cases, the business impact associated with disruption 
risks is much greater than that of the operational risks” (Tang, 2006b, p. 453) and has been 
selected as the focus area to increase validity of the findings. A possible remedy to significant 
negative impacts to performance indicators, noted by Simchi-Levi et al., (2013) is an increase in 
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supply chain risk management maturity. Firms with more mature supply chain risk management 
procedures drive disruption resilience and perform “better along all surveyed dimensions of 
operational and financial performance than immature companies” (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013, p. 
22). Action to adjust supply chain risk management maturity levels will be executed by supply 
chain managers, yet managers and their Executive Styles are varied and may yield varied 
outcomes for the firm. 
These aspects of complexity and risk management were examined specifically in the 
context of risk management for a respondent-determined notional, serious-to-catastrophic supply 
chain disruption that also occurs with medium-to-very low frequency (See Figure 1). The self-
selected disruption that has the scope of serious to catastrophic impact to the firm may include 
events such as tornadoes, earthquakes, technological or man-made disasters or other firm specific 
events ultimately addressed by the supply chain practitioner and the influences that affect them. 
Between this disruption and the supply chain is the supply chain manager and their Executive 
Style as well as other influences.  
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Figure 1: Supply Chain Risk Map – Qualitative Interview Focus Area 
 
Knowing the probability an event may occur in the future, knowing the potential damage 
that may occur, perhaps having already experienced a major disruption firsthand and with the 
knowledge of firm strategy, priorities and resources, managers make the decisions to prepare or 
not prepare their supply chains for risk. Normative frameworks exist yet are often not followed, 
with a reliance instead on human judgment that itself seems to follow specific and systematic 
patterns (Stanovich and West, 1998; Kahneman, 2003). Bendoly et al., (2006) note the lack of 
rational activity of managers when compared to classical models of behavior that gave rise to 
research in behavioral economics seeking to explain the anomalous behavior. Over forty percent 
of respondents recently indicated supply chain vulnerabilities would increase in the future 
(Juttner, 2005), yet supply chain risk management continues to require focus within specific 
fields and industries (Juttner, 2005) to continue refinement and understanding. Added exigency 
exists when the supply chain disruption occurs in a healthcare context, as the surrounding 
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community, in a time of great disruption, may require medical services and requisite supplies to 
ease their suffering; supply chain risk may extend beyond the focal firm if suppliers are also 
negatively impacted by an extreme event. Comparison of healthcare supply chain manager 
approaches to similarly scoped risks, i.e. very low-to-medium probability and serious-to-
catastrophic impact, may reveal previously overlooked behaviors (Knemeyer and Naylor, 2011) 
or relationship complexities (Juttner, 2005) that drive decision-making and lay the foundation for 
future empirical investigation. 
Research Question 2: “What are the complex influences encountered by supply 
chain managers as they determine their risk management approach?” 
The third goal was to develop an improved understanding of how supply chain managers 
approach risk management for serious or catastrophic disruptions and determine if there are 
homogeneous similarities or heterogeneous dissimilarities among supply chain managers. 
Development of an appropriate understanding is a first step to develop and bolster future 
theoretical development. Understanding the foundation that underlies managerial decision 
making will inform stakeholders who are interested in addressing supply chain risk management 
issues (Dobrzykowski et al., 2013) as well as researchers seeking to develop theory. Previous 
studies have indicated that there may be differences in outcomes and effects based upon 
specified managerial traits which vary across managers (Slater, 1989; Eagly and Johnson, 1990; 
Rotemberg and Saloner, 2000; Eagly and Johannesen-Schmidt, 2001; Bertrand and Schoar, 
2003; Oreg and Berson, 2011) and these variances may impact operations and the firm 
differently. 
Cavinato (1999), building on work by Gluck et al., (1980) and Bowersox et al., (1992), 
developed rankings of fit between five stages of strategic management and supply chain logistics 
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across seventeen attributes. Consistent patterns developed as the strategic management of supply 
chains matured from “very basic” to “very mature” (Cavinato, 1999, p. 167). This development 
of strategy maturation is similar to that of Simchi-Levi et al., (2013) and their examination of 
supply chain risk management maturity which develops from “less mature” to “more mature” (p. 
16).  
Cavinato (1999) determined that managers who function successfully at a particular level 
possess certain traits and characteristics. Although firms may span levels of maturity overall, the 
attributes ranked the second and fourth highest in maturity level were management style and key 
personnel skills (Cavinato, 1999). Stages of higher maturity built upon lower levels of style and 
skill and distinct differences were readily noted at each stage from Stage 1 managers described 
as task oriented and technically efficient to Stage 5 managers who were described as team 
leaders, resource providers, consultants, small business unit partners and entrepreneurial 
employees who learned for “personal, team and firm advantage” (Cavinato, 1999, p.171; Gluck 
et al., 1980). Bourgeios and Brodwin (1984) discuss qualities of senior leadership across five 
firm strategy models. They briefly describe the roles of these senor leaders across the range of 
models. These include the Commander Model where the manager is the “’rational actor’ issuing 
directives from the seat of power” (Bourgeois and Brodwin, 1984, p. 243) to the mid-range 
coordinator who structures “interactions among the decision-makers in such a way that all good 
ideas are entertained” (p.248) and finally the premise setter and judge who encourages a 
subordinate “manager to develop, champion, and implement sound strategies” (p. 254). This 
description of managerial engagement is similar to the scope of delegation preference found in 
Executive Style (Håkonsson et al., 2012). Differing styles in the same conditions make a 
difference as Waterman, (personal communication in Bourgeios and Brodwin, 1984) notes that 
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among geological prospecting crews in New Zealand using identical methods, “the most 
successful crew was the one with the boss who was to make frequent visits in his pick-up truck 
to the men in the field” (pp. 250-251). The difference driving success appears to be, in part, style. 
Waterman et al., (1980) include Style as one component of their 7-S framework and describe its 
importance based on examining what managers do, what they spend time on, patterns of action 
and symbolic behaviors during days often marked by disorganization rather than by the 
compartmentalized and prescriptive modes of “planning, organizing, motivating and controlling” 
employees and situations (Bourgeois and Brodwin, 1984, p. 22) that is often discussed. Style 
embodied in actions and as discussed above differentiates successful managers in strategic and 
tactical contexts. In the context of managerial responsibility for risk management activities, 
understanding who may outperform another has direct bearing on success of the firm, post 
disruption (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013). 
Research Question 3: Do supply chain managers possess similar or dissimilar 
Executive Styles? 
Based on the previous discussion set in a supply chain context, managerial activities in 
relation to risk do not always follow normative models, implying that a still unknown factor or 
factors are present. Understanding these behavioral underpinnings between Executive Style and 
an executive’s subsequent approach to risk will develop findings for future research and will fill 
a gap in current knowledge that may have great impact on a firm. The questions will be 
addressed through the use of a multiple method study of supply chain managers. 
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Research Approach 
     This dissertation will explore several concepts related to risk management that occur prior to a 
disruption trigger event and is designed to understand the issues that currently affect choices 
made by those responsible for supply chain operations and continuity. These broad areas may 
span studies of behavior, anthropology or philosophy/ethics as some managerially relevant 
behaviors may be the result of long-standing personal beliefs (behavioral) or industry/regulatory 
standards (anthropological) as well as a healthcare facility’s unique capability to provide an end 
to or a reduction of suffering during a time of civic and social upheaval (ethical).  
As pre-disruption areas of concern, such a behavioral attributes and the interaction 
between managerial behavior and risk management approach, have not been explored in the 
literature, this research conducted a multiple method research strategy consisting of both 
quantitative and qualitative examination of healthcare supply chain managers to provide 
appropriate scope. These exploratory examinations included interviews with material managers 
(at the daily operation level), and administration of a questionnaire to better understand 
Executive Style. This was designed to understand what supply chain risk management means 
from a healthcare practitioner context and what it means from an action perspective at a key level 
of control and influence. Additionally, this research seeks to understand present versus future 
direction for risk management choices. 
  Multiple method use in research is encouraged to gain information about problems using 
“means that do not share the same weaknesses” (McGrath, 1982, p. 80). This convergence of 
techniques works toward addressing the three-horned dilemma (McGrath, 1982) where research 
seeks to maximize generalizability, precision and realism yet is hindered by use of any one 
particular approach. Benefits of employing multiple method research include reduction of single-
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source and common method biases (Craighead et al., 2007) and improvement in synergies across 
methods (Jick, 1979) and has been suggested as the best way to study logistics (Boone et al., 
2007) as it increases the breadth of insights and potential for breakthroughs and improves rigor 
and reliability of the results (Sanders and Wagner, 2011; Fawcett and Waller, 2011).    
The use of surveys allows for generalizability from a small population of respondents to a 
wider population (Mentzer and Khan, 1995) while providing a numeric description of constructs 
under examination (Creswell, 2007). Currently there are over 5,700 registered hospitals 
throughout the United States (American Hospital Association, 2014). Analysis of a representative 
sample of healthcare supply chain managers was facilitated through survey methodology as the 
respondents were geographically dispersed, could complete the web-based survey at their 
convenience and at relatively low cost to the researcher (Larson, 2005). The results strengthen 
understanding of complex supply chain issues (Fawcett et al., 2014) such as Executive Style 
impact on supply chain risk management and surveys are widely accepted in the supply chain 
management field (Fawcett et al., 2014; McGinnis et al, 2010). Sachan and Datta (2005) found 
that the majority, thirty-seven percent, of articles published between 1999- 2003 in Journal of 
Business Logistics (JBL), Supply Chain Management: An International Journal (SCMIJ) and 
International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management (IJPDLM) were survey 
based, with other techniques trailing in frequency. A survey of healthcare supply chain managers 
was also appropriate as other no other method (such as experiment or use of secondary data) 
could capture the specific information required. In conjunction with a more rich qualitative 
portion of research, a survey allowed for context free determination of Executive Style as related 
to SCRM maturity which was integrated with the qualitative portion for further analysis 
(Creswell, 2007).  
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While some forms of qualitative research stress beginning with no set theory (Creswell, 
2013), there are opportunities for theory building when “a previously identified theoretical 
framework can provide insight, direction and a useful list of initial concepts” (Corbin and 
Strauss, 2008, p.40).  This research incorporated the constant comparative technique which 
provides validity and that stems from the Glaser and Strauss (1967) grounded theory method. 
Recent usage examples include Randall et al., (2010) who incorporated the constant comparative 
technique of grounded theory as part of a multiple method examination of the US trucking 
industry and Pettit (2008) who used the systematic techniques of grounded theory to validate 
findings from associated quantitative research. Golicic and Davis (2012) highlight four recent 
multiple method studies using surveys and interviews as techniques.  
Pagell and Krause (1999) listed two reasons for their approach that supports the current 
proposed methodology, a) “to provide a benchmark comparison with the non-randomized depth 
interviews in the primary study” (p. 311) and b) to provide statistical power for inferences drawn 
from the interviews. Gammelgaard and Larson (2001) compared similarities and differences 
between survey and case study interview results and determined knowledge gaps that would 
have been unnoticed with only one method.  Fawcett and Magnan (2002) used interview results 
to contextualize survey results, finding that, often, supply chain management practice did not 
match theory. A study of the specific process of configuration management in the aerospace 
industry by Burgess et al., (2005) used interviews from a cross-section of industry respondents to 
aid the interpretation of otherwise shallow and “inflexible” survey results. This research was 
likewise designed to elicit information regarding the relationship between Executive Style via 
survey and explore similarities and differences with interviews to determine if there were gaps 
and provide appropriate context. 
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 Contingency Theory was used in this research to understand the fit between Executive Style 
and risk management approach.  Contingency Theory seeks to explain the fit between 
organizational structure and context (Van de Ven and Druzin, 1985). This research focused on the 
manager as the aspect of organizational structure and the context as that of supply chain risk 
management activities. The performance outcome was the level of supply chain risk maturity 
that is in place. No research could be found that examined this aspect of fit. This is key as a 
manager implements activities in support of the firm, yet often does not adhere to norms 
(Bandoly et al., 2005) and maturity of the supply chain risk management function has been 
shown to directly impact firm financial performance following a disruption (Simchi-Levi et al., 
2013).  
Contribution 
This research and the subsequent research stream were designed to make several 
contributions to extend the body of knowledge. Research surrounding behavioral aspects of 
supply chain management are beginning to emerge as multi-disciplinary research gains a 
foothold among academics. Through exploratory research, a clearer conceptualization of 
Executive Style at work in supply chain management decision making will develop. 
The first contribution will be a more complete understanding of the relationship between 
Executive Style and risk management. The assimilation of behavioral studies with operational 
studies is an area where additional interdisciplinary research has been called for and represents a 
current gap in the literature (Davis and Golicic, 2012; Fawcett and Waller, 2012).  This research 
explored this behavioral dimension between manager and supply chain risk approach in order to 
establish an understanding of how Executive Style, as measured through the survey instrument, 
may influence critical pre-disruption decision making as part of risk management.  
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The second contribution will benefit practitioners and researchers through development of a 
previously unexplored, yet critical relationship between management style and risk management.  
The human manager is often the decision maker and point of action or inaction when 
implementing any of the myriad approaches to supply chain management. Academic research 
and theory development as well as practitioner focused guidance are dependent upon a manager 
to execute them. A formative understanding of actual supply chain risk management decision 
making will provide contrast to normative studies of risk management found in the literature 
(Juttner et al., 2003; Ritchie and Brindley, 2007; Tummala and Schoenherr, 2011) and which 
direct risk management activities as a strict process. This will further extend understanding of 
this function to incorporate the critical behavioral managerial input and influence on supply 
chain risk maturity.   
A third contribution answers several calls for interdisciplinary theory building in supply 
chain management (Fawcett and Waller, 2012; Katsikopoulos and Gigerenzer, 2013; Sanders et 
al., 2013). Development of emergent topics, themes and processes, previously unknown, may 
provide foundation material for further behavioral research in the area of critical decision 
making, managerial calibration through a synthesis of behavioral psychology and the relationship 
between a manager and their information environment. The complexities of human behavior 
coupled with the complexities of supply chains may yield commonalities at certain levels of 
understanding, such as taxonomy, typology, class or other subset. Identification of those 
attributes extend behavioral psychology studies of Executive Style to the supply chain 
management domain and extend risk studies to understand the behavioral influences that drive 
risk management related managerial activities. 
Håkonsson et al., (2012) advise that managerial attribute and firm strategy “misalignment 
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leads to opportunity losses for the firm” (p.196). While the concept of risk management of itself 
may seem to introduce bias, that is, if one doesn’t manage risk one is making a mistake, this 
research seeks to understand why such trade-offs occur, without prejudgment of the activity 
itself. If an executive decides not to prepare for risk, it occurs in a context that should emerge. 
This understanding of choices in context will inform future multiple method and empirical 
studies of the complexities of managing a supply chain. An attempt to prejudge an executive’s 
choice not to prepare excludes other factors such as firm strategy, resources or complex 
exogenous variables not easily discovered through normal procedures. This research will provide 
needed context and illumination. 
Dissertation Format 
Chapter Two will discuss relevant literature as well as identify gaps in the literature. It will 
also introduce a proposed methodological framework for data gathering. Chapter Three will 
discuss specific aspects of the research design and methods used. Chapter Four will discuss the 
results of the research. Chapter Five provides a discussion of conclusions and positions the 
results within current knowledge while anticipating future research opportunities.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
          This chapter introduces key concepts and definitions that serve as the foundation on which 
the research builds. Specifically, this chapter introduces Contingency Theory as the theoretical 
lens, and examines the key concepts of supply chain risk management, risk, risk management, 
firm strategy, and Executive Style (ES). The goal is to provide a comprehensive understanding of 
the research concepts under investigation. 
Contingency Theory 
 Contingency Theory, as introduced by Fiedler (1965) addresses the unique relationship 
between a leader and the performance of their group as contained in a unique group-task 
environment. Fiedler (1965) suggested several key aspects of manager placement within the firm 
were important. The first is that many different types of individuals can effectively lead across 
many types of circumstances and situations, however the challenge lies in placement, training 
and self-recognition of their leadership style. Fiedler (1965) found there are better fits between 
certain conditions and particular leader styles and further notes that a leader can be trained to 
self-awareness of the most compatible fit between conditions and their style. That fit, as part of a 
larger contingency of the firm, will often drive the resulting success of the leader. 
 Burton and Obel (2004) utilize the contingency model in their examination of an entire 
organization through building upon examination of individual strategic factors and incorporating 
analysis of strategic influences, including leadership style, as a means of understanding the role 
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that a manager’s style plays in an organization, as one part of an all-encompassing model. 
Combined with other identified contingency factors such as size, technology, environment and 
strategy (Child, 1972), leadership style was found to “explain a good portion of the variance not 
explained” (Burton and Obel, 2004, p. 107) by the other factors.   
 
Characterizing fit 
Van de Ven and Drazin (1985) discuss how fit has expanded in the ongoing development 
of Contingency Theory and provide two approaches to define fit. The first is through Selection 
fit which occurs at the micro or managerial level. This approach to fit examines how contexts 
interact with design to impact an outcome. This can be as discreet as a manager being selected 
for a particular job to be successful.  The second is through Interaction fit which seeks to 
understand how the interplay and dependence of organizational structures affect an outcome of a 
choice and provides an understanding of how context and design characteristics explain part of 
firm performance (Van de Ven and Drazin, 1985). As discussed previously, strategic firm 
performance is partly addressed through a firm’s supply chain risk management approach, where 
context is important.  
 
Contingency in a dynamic context 
Donaldson (2006) discusses the continued appropriateness of contingency theory to 
dynamic business contexts. Contingency theory, as a formulation of how structures fit 
circumstances, allows for business strategy adaptation, as circumstances of a business 
environment are rarely static. Trkman and McCormack, (2009) noted this dynamic impact due to 
environmental turbulence and Park (2011) noted risk taking propensity, a firm’s willingness to 
commit resources to address risks, ranging from risk-taking to risk-avoiding activities, as a 
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dynamic antecedent to supply chain resiliency. Fit enables growth, and change that then arises 
from growth may trigger a misfit in strategy, requiring a reexamination of what is the proper fit. 
Periodic managerial revisitation of organizational design and decisions may be required to 
maintain or increase performance levels, and is understood to be part of the dynamic process 
(Donaldson, 2006) to attain a higher performing organization that realizes a competitive 
advantage, based in part on strategies. 
 
Contingency and strategic risk 
The dynamic context of contingency approaches to strategic risk taking has been partially 
addressed by Baird and Thomas (1985). Their research acknowledges the complexity of risk 
taking by individual managers and notes that previous examinations of strategic risk either 
ignored the individual impact altogether or extrapolated individual human behaviors to that of an 
organization. Ideally, research that encompasses individual human behaviors and the interactions 
among those traits and firm risk postures will aid future development of the topic. This is echoed 
by Wagner and Bode (2008) who note “matching or aligning organizational resources with the 
organization's context, and especially to environmental opportunities and threats, is a major task 
for decision-makers” (p. 309) with the manager being the organizational resource of interest 
(Barney, 1991). Wagner and Bode (2008) encourage further empirical study of a firm’s risk 
strategy process and context in a supply chain setting. Context is one approach to contingency 
theory and decision-making that is advocated by Nutt and Wilson, (2010). Context, as defined by 
both external and internal boundary conditions and attributes, may influence how decisions are 
made (Perrow, 1967). These unique internal context attributes include organizational approaches 
to complexity and uncertainty such as “surprise, confusion and threat” (Nutt and Wilson, 2010, p. 
17), as well as decision-maker traits such as “propensity to take risks, tolerance for ambiguity” 
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(Nutt and Wilson, 2010, p. 17) and decision style (Nutt and Wilson, 2010; Håkonsson et al., 
2012). Based on this, Nutt and Wilson (2010) call for studies at the managerial level that are 
context specific to continue development of contingency theory and its relationship to strategic 
risks to the firm, which can include hazards, disruptions and managerial choices. 
 
Hazards to the firm 
Hazards exist within most all activities, technologies and nature (Turner and Pidgeon, 
1996; Tierney et al., 2001; Weick and Sutcliff, 2001; Blair et al., 2004; McDaniel, 2004; United 
Nations, 2004; Rush and Runyon, 2007; Woo, 2011; Homeland Security, 2012). These hazards 
are often classified as risks and can vary from the unremarkable to risks that are serious or 
catastrophic in impact. The desire to understand risk impacts has led to practitioner and academic 
risk research, in particular from an economic perspective and specifically in the areas of profit, 
insurance and finance. These research efforts initially related to goods (Smith, 1863; Knight, 
1921) and more recently have broadened to include national security (Adams, 2013, GAO, 
2013), severe weather impacts (McClure et al., 1999; Woo, 2011) and supply chains 
(Christopher, 2000; Zsidisin et al., 2000; Sheffi, 2005; Manuj and Mentzer, 2008). Of late, 
behavioral aspects of approaches to risk have been studied, notably in the work of Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992) which explore decision making under 
risk and Slovic (1987) which examines how the public examines, characterizes and responds to 
risk. Most individuals and groups have been found to possess differing preferences for risk 
(Slovic and Weber, 2002) and this understanding begins to bridge an individual gap between risk 
and managerial performance and reaction to risk, based upon an individual’s personal beliefs.  
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Impact of individual Executive Style and potential risk 
Executives, as humans, are each unique and manage their affairs while simultaneously 
connected to their own feelings, beliefs and values. However, as such, they are subject to 
variability, limitations and the effects of personal traits in a number of areas such as decision-
making, awareness and understanding (Payne, 1976). Crowe et al. (1972) found that a manager’s 
personal trait, described as style, may adjust when dealing with subordinates who possess a 
differing style. Covin and Slevin (1988) found that organizational structure may impact the 
entrepreneurial style of managers. Likewise, managerial style may impact business unit 
performance (Slater, 1989), while Bertrand and Schoar (2003) found manager fixed effects are 
significantly related to a wide range of corporate decisions and these can be tied back in part to 
fixed effects of managerial characteristics or style. Executive Style, therefore, matters to a firm. 
When a firm operates in an environment of risk, Executive Style may possess a greater impact 
than previously understood, yet little empirical work has been done to understand the connection 
between Executive Style and risk. When the potential impact of risk falls in the serious-to-
catastrophic range, managerial choices may likewise become amplified in effect and outcome. 
Risk should be studied, therefore, through the systematic identification and 
characterization of managerial risk management attributes. Risk to firms may be affected by 
interaction with risk antecedents through managerial decision making and action/inaction (Park, 
2011). These same risks may extend beyond firm boundaries due to the interconnected nature of 
contemporary business and may pose threats to other firms in the supply chain either directly or 
indirectly. 
A means to control these risks in a supply chain is termed supply chain risk management 
(SCRM) (Juttner at al., 2003; Norrman and Jansson, 2004; Ritchie and Brindley, 2007; Tummula 
and Schoenherr, 2011). However, SCRM operates in an environment subject to other influences. 
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In the context of this research, these include firm strategy and the particular attributes of the 
managers executing the SCRM processes (March and Shapira, 1987; Burton and Obel, 2004; 
Håkonsson et al., 2006, 2008, 2012). 
Building on the intersection of SCRM and managerial attributes to address risk, the 
remainder of the chapter will discuss the key concepts of supply chain risk management, risk, 
risk management, firm strategy, and Executive Style as well as identify the research hypotheses.  
 
Supply Chain Risk Management 
Supply chain risk management (SCRM) is a recent construct, and as such development 
continues towards a more clear definition. Early attempts at definition (Normann and Lindroth, 
2002; Christopher, 2002) acknowledge SCRM’s roots in the broader field of risk management 
and identify SCRM as a partner enabled collaboration to deal with risks that impact logistics 
activities. Changes to the definition have been incremental with Kajuter (2003) noting that a 
structured approach that is embedded in planning to reduce vulnerability as a whole (Juttner et 
al., 2003) is important. Tang (2006) adds that serious supply chain risk may lead to business 
failure and that continuity of the business must be a consideration. Carter and Rogers (2008) 
extend the understanding beyond the normative and prescriptive when they stress the firm must 
understand the variety of risks present in the supply chain. Understanding moves the process 
from simple identification into a preliminary stage of analysis. Although there was an effort by 
the Supply Chain Council (2008) to provide a comprehensive practitioner-driven definition, 
Skulte and Wilkerson (2011) and Zeng (2011) continued development of academic SCRM 
definitions with the additional requirements of ensuring reliability and building resilience (Skulte 
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and Wilkerson, 2011), and implementation of an all stakeholder inclusive, holistic approach that 
identifies all supply chain failure points (Zeng, 2011).  
 
Supply chain management scope, complexity and variability 
The scope of supply chain management is widely varied and supply chain influence 
reaches within and across multiple business functions and firms as well as major academic fields 
including finance/economics, psychology/sociology, strategy and information/communication 
(Frankel et al., 2008). Accompanying this wide scope is increased complexity (Juttner et al., 
2003). Wilding (1998) likens this increase in the number of channels and echelons as 
representative of degrees of chaos in the supply chain which can be triggered by uncertainty, for 
instance uncertainty regarding supply availability (Wagner and Bode, 2008). This complexity 
maintains a state of variability in the supply chain (Cooper and Lambert, 1997; Peck et al., 
2003). When a process leaves a state of control the cumulative variability may be increased as it 
passes through subsequent stages. Although several processes may be performing individually at 
a 99% performance level their cumulative performance deteriorates. A series of ten processes 
operating each at .99 effectiveness, together yield a much reduced 90.4% (0.99)10 effectiveness. 
Therefore the potential for a negative outcome in the supply chain is a function of scope, 
complexity and variability (Juttner et al., 2003; Cooper and Lambert, 1997; Peck et al., 2003; 
Wagner and Bode, 2008), however many firms do not address the potential negative effects 
(Simchi-Levi et al., 2013).  
 
SCRM and low adoption 
Allianz (2014), a global insurance firm, in a yearly ranking of global business risks and 
business interruption, found that supply chain risk remained as the number one identified risk for 
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both 2013 and 2014 among 43% of survey respondents, followed by natural catastrophes (33%) 
and fires or explosions (24%). The World Economic Forum (2014), in its ninth edition of insights 
into global risk, listed increased incidents of extreme weather such as floods, storms and fires as 
the sixth risk of highest concern, yet in an era of global supply chains, with the accompanying 
perception of risks held by CEOs, implementation of SCRM techniques remains low. In a recent 
study, Curkovic et al., (2013) examined the congruence of ISO 31000:2009 with extant SCRM 
frameworks. ISO 31000:2009 is a global standard to aid firms in development of enterprise-wide 
risk management processes, structures and strategies and SCRM is a support function within 
such a framework. The authors found that, while firms desired to implement risk management 
processes, “relatively few firms indicated that their company takes a proactive risk management 
approach” (Curkovic et al., 2013, p. 626). Despite increases in budgets for SCRM there was a 
feeling among respondents that budgets were not high enough and in times of great economic 
pressures, the supply chain manager may need to make a stronger case. One respondent to 
Curkovic et al., (2013) noted regarding SCRM that “we take the approach that it’s everyone’s 
responsibility. Good in theory, but during very busy parts of the year, other commitments may 
take the focus off risk management, thus leaving us open to issues” (p. 628).  
Particularly left out are small organizations who were found to lack widespread adoption 
of SCRM compared to larger firms (Ritchie and Brindley, 2007). Christopher et al., (2011) found 
that among fifteen case studies in seven industries where global sourcing occurs that there is high 
variability between adopted risk practices and, when risks were known, there was no systematic 
or holistic application of risk management principles. Likewise, Manuj and Mentzer (2008) 
noted that firms with a short term focus bestowed less importance to supply chain risk 
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management tasks, tasks the authors acknowledge as continual in nature that require “long term 
dedication of supply chain members” (Manuj and Mentzer, 2008, p. 202).  
 
Managers and SCRM planning 
Yet, as one recent study found in their qualitative review of severe event management, 
two factors were identified as key to maintaining formal plans to deal with such disruptions. 
These included “the individual manager’s personality and his/her previous experiences” 
(Macdonald and Corsi, 2013, p. 277). Given that planning relies on the idiosyncrasies of 
individual managers, the findings of a recent study that 60% of companies pay marginal attention 
to risk reduction efforts seem understandable (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013). When more robust and 
mature supply chain risk management capabilities were present, the firms were more resilient to 
disruptions and operational and financial performance was better than peer companies (Simchi-
Levi et al., 2013). However, the role of the individual managers in planning for disruptions 
through SCRM activities is poorly understood.  
 
Definitional understanding of SCRM 
A first step is a common definition. For this dissertation we will use that provided by the 
Supply Chain Council (2008) which states SCRM is  
“The systematic identification, assessment, and quantification of potential supply chain 
disruptions with the objective to control exposure to risk or reduce its negative impact on 
supply chain performance. Potential disruptions can either occur within the supply chain 
(e.g. insufficient quality, unreliable suppliers, machine break-down, uncertain demand, 
etc.) or outside the supply chain (e.g. flooding, terrorism, labor strikes, natural disasters, 
large variability in demand, etc.). Management of risk includes the development of 
continuous strategies designed to control, mitigate, reduce, or eliminate risk.”  
 
This definition has built upon one of the earliest definitions developed by Wilding at 
Cranfield University (2003) of “the identification and management of risks within the supply 
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chain and risks external to it through a coordinated approach amongst supply chain members to 
reduce supply chain vulnerability as a whole” (p. 26). 
 
Tang (2006) notes key findings from examinations of previous research that, even with 
definitions readily available,  
• Managers are quite insensitive to estimates of the probabilities of possible 
outcomes. 
• Managers tend to focus on critical performance targets, which affect the 
way they manage risk. 
• Managers make a sharp distinction between taking risks and gambling 
• Most companies invested little time or resources for mitigating supply 
chain risks 
• Good estimates of the probability of the occurrence of any particular 
disruption and accurate measure of potential impact of each disaster are 
difficult to obtain 
• Firms rarely invest in improvement programs in a proactive manner 
because ‘‘nobody gets credit for fixing problems that never happened.’’ 
(Tang, 2006, pp. 479-480). 
 
 
Lack of understanding of a formal definition by some practitioners does not preclude use 
of SCRM approaches, and some firms have become very mature in their application of SCRM 
(Simchi-Levi et al., 2013). Although adoption of an agreed upon definition is currently ongoing 
and  employment of formal processes, as mentioned previously, is often low, supply chain 
managers’ approach to risk management can be contrasted through comparisons to a maturity 
level on a supply chain risk management maturity framework (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013). 
 
Framework 
 Simchi-Levi et al., (2013) in their recent examination of supply chain risk management 
practices in global firms that have exposure to high risk scenarios developed a framework that  
“Assesses the degree to which companies are applying the most effective enablers of 
supply chain risk reduction (e.g., flexibility, risk governance, alignment, integration, 
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information sharing, data, models and analytics, and rationalisation) and their associated 
processes. The model depicts where a company stands in relation to its competition and 
the rest of the industry” (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013, p. 2).  
 
Supply chain risk management frameworks are an extension of risk management (RM) 
frameworks. Risk management frameworks are the end product of a process that occurs prior to 
the risk or disruption event start point. As a process, they have received normative treatment and 
discussion in multiple disciplines. As with the various definitions, there are certain key risk 
management steps that occur across most of the risk management processes. These include 1) 
identification or awareness of the risk, 2) assessment and evaluation of the risk, 3) 
implementation of a strategy for management, mediation or treatment, 4) monitoring the process 
or learning through feedback loops (Omenn et al., 1997; Normann and Jansson, 2004; US 
Department of Defense, 2006; Waters, 2011). Key incident reports have focused attention on the 
ability of a firm to manage risk, often focusing on the post-disruption activities that occur 
(Sheffi, 2005; Atwater et al., 2010). Often a firm’s risk management process is considered in 
hindsight and weighed against an actual risk event, particularly when the risk event is very 
public. Less frequent is it understood how those plans or approaches are developed and the 
managerial impact that is present, particularly in regard to the impact of Executive Style on 
attaining a specified maturity level. 
Overview of the SCRM maturity framework 
 Seven enabling areas of concern were identified by Simchi-Levi et al., (2013) and form 
the basis of their framework rankings (see Table 1). The framework divides into four levels of 
maturity across both supply chain management as well as risk management and are 
complimentary at lower levels and closely tied together at higher maturity levels (see Table 2). 
The goal is not to reconsider the rich stream of literature that seeks to explicate the necessary 
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steps to move a firm from unmanaged to managed (Hallikas et al., 204; Kleindorfer and Saad, 
2005; Ritchie and Brindley 2007; Manuj & Mentzer, 2008; SCOR, 2010; Juttner and Ziegenbein, 
2010; Supply Chain Risk Leadership Council 2011; Tummala and Schoenherr, 2011). Rather the 
focus is in understanding the stages of maturity from basic to those found to produce improved 
post-disruption resilience and performance and how a manager’s Executive Styles influences 
achievement of a maturity level. 
 
Table 1: SCRM maturity framework enablers and attributes (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013) 
Enabler Attributes 
1. Risk Governance The presence of appropriate risk management structures, 
processes and culture 
2. Flexibility and redundancy in 
product, network and process 
architectures 
Having the right levels of flexibility and redundancy 
across the value chain to be able to absorb disruptions and 
adapt to change 
3. Alignment between partners 
in the supply chain 
Strategic alignment on key value dimensions, 
identification of emerging patterns and advancement 
towards higher value propositions 
4. Upstream and downstream 
supply chain integration 
Information sharing, visibility and collaboration with 
upstream and downstream supply chain partners. 
5. Alignment and integration 
between internal business 
functions 
Alignment and integration of activities between company 
value chain functions on a strategic, tactical and 
operational level. 
6. Complexity 
management/rationalization 
Ability to standardize and simplify networks and 
processes, interfaces, product architectures and product 
portfolios and operating models 
7. Data, models and analytics Development and use of intelligence and analytical 
capabilities to support supply chain and risk management 
functions. 
 
Level I 
 Supply chains categorized as Level I are generally described as functional in operation 
and ad-hoc in their management of risk and are the least effective as characterized by level of 
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maturity (see Table 3). Functional supply chains are considered stove piped and show little sign 
of integration and often display disconnected processes, duplication of activities and fail to use 
techniques such as business analytics, which have been shown to improve performance in a 
supply chain (Trkman et al., 2010; Simchi-Levi et al., 2013). Risk management approaches at 
this level are often reactive in nature with no visibility into potential risks and a lack of a 
coherent structure to drive risk governance (Hillson, 1997). Berg et al., (2008) further describe 
this level as chaotic, with a reliance for success based on key people and their personal initiatives 
who possess a “just do it” approach with no leadership present (SCRLC, 2013) and inflexible 
processes (De Oliveria et al., 2011). 
 
Table 2:  SCRM maturity classification model (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013) 
 Supply Chain Management Risk Management  
Level I Functional Ad-hoc Less Mature 
Level II Integrated Buffer planning 
Level III Collaborative Proactive More Mature 
Level IV Dynamic Flexible 
  
Level II 
 Firms must use a building block approach to achieve increased effectiveness as processes 
improve. Oliveira et al., (2012) found higher levels of maturity must build on previous 
accomplishments to be effective. Level II firms are generally described as integrated in operation 
and employ aspects of buffer planning and redundancy in their risk management approach, when 
they implement plans at all. As such, limited cross-functional organization can be observed that 
is aided by integrated internal processes and some alignment with internal planning (Simchi-Levi 
et al., 2013) is present, although meetings are often coordinated with functional representatives 
focused only on their traditional functions (Lockamy and McCormack, 2004). Some basic supply 
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chain processes are documented and the change process may be formalized, yet low customer 
service, high costs and missed targets are frequent occurrences (Lockamy and McCormack, 
2004).  Supply chain coordination is hampered by boundary concerns and competing goals of 
various functions and some improvement in customer service can be seen compared to Level I 
(Locakmy and McCormack, 2004). Risk management at this level also begins to document 
processes and integrate internally with other functional areas. Adjustments to demand signals are 
explored using postponement or design considerations and basic disruption threats may be 
countered with capacity and inventory buffers (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013). Visibility beyond the 
firm may remain low and although not always present, (Hilson, 1997), some uniform processes 
are applied across the firm utilizing defined tasks around a basic risk management infrastructure 
(Berg et al., 2008).   
 
Level III 
 Level III approaches are described as collaborative from a supply chain perspective and 
utilize more proactive approaches to managing risk. This is also the first level considered more 
mature and where collaboration outside the firm is regularly found. As a result, information 
sharing and visibility between partners is high (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013). Also described as the 
‘breakthrough level’ (Lockamy and McCormack, 2004) as more advanced maturity processes are 
employed, risk management processes and performance become more predictable, costs begin 
decreasing and risk management activities can be seen to be prepared to address appropriate risks 
(IACCM, 2003; Oliveira et al, 2012). Firms are seen to develop business response plans and 
firms proactively use sensors and predictors as part of risk management processes (Hilson, 1997; 
Simchi-Levi et al., 2013).  Supply chain functions between partners include increased visibility, 
information sharing and rationalisation of the supply chain, with strategic foci (Simchi-Levi et 
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al., 2013; Lockamy and McCormack, 2004). Benefits realized in the supply chain at this level 
include achievement of performance goals both internally and externally, SC planning processes 
are formalized and both procurement and strategic teams, to include customer involvement as 
appropriate, meet regularly to develop strategy, own the plans and make firm commitments to 
goals (Oliveira et al., 2011; Lockamy and McCormack, 2004; Simchi-Levi et al., 2013). Results 
may include an increased sense among partners of esprit de corps and falling SCM costs as 
customer satisfaction rises (Lockamy and McCormack, 2004). 
 
Level IV 
 Level IV is the highest level of achievement in the Simchi-Levi et al., (2013) framework 
and operations at this level were reported by the lowest percentage of firms (9%).  This 
performance level finds firms fully aligned with partners with strategies driven by common goals 
and objectives (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013). These goals are supported through use of advanced 
SCM practices such as CPFR, administered by multi-firm teams who enjoy broad authority to 
make investments and share rewards across the value chain (Lockamy and McCormack, 2004). 
The supply chain is able to effectively respond to short term customer demands and can be 
segmented to meet those demands through active monitoring of demand signals, leading to 
increased levels of trust and mutual dependency across the extended supply chain to include 
suppliers having access to company inventory and production planning information (Oliveira et 
al., 2011; Lockamy and McCormack, 2004). Proactive risk management activities include real-
time monitoring, analytics and reporting, but with flexibility to respond to environmental 
changes and adapt responses to gain competitive advantage (Hillson, 1997; IACCM, 2003; 
Simchi-Levi et al., 2013).  Risk governance is formalized and strategies are developed based on 
supplier profiles and market-product considerations (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013) and is supported 
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by a culture of risk awareness that seeks opportunities from managed risk and actively moving 
risk away from weaker partners (Hillson, 1997).  
 While not all firms achieve the same level of maturity in their operations, the current 
maturity possessed by a firm and opportunities to change maturity levels may have profound and 
important impact on both current and future competitiveness and operations.
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Table 3: Comparative supply chain risk management frameworks 
Maturity Models 
 Simchi-Levi et al., (2013) IACCM (2003) Hillson (1997) Lockamy and McCormack 
(2004) 
De Oliveira et al., (2011) 
Maturity 
Level 
SC RM RM RM SC SC 
I • Limited co-
ordination 
between 
internal 
functions 
• Resources are 
locally owned 
and managed 
• Performance is 
measured 
separately 
based on  
• functional Key 
Performance 
Indicators 
(KPIs) 
• Absence of 
integrated plan 
• Ad-hoc risk 
management 
processes 
• No visibility 
into changes 
outside the 
• functional 
domain 
• No planning of 
redundancy 
buffers towards  
• potential 
disruptions 
• Can only absorb 
limited volatility 
around  
• standard 
functional input 
parameters 
LEVEL: NOVICE 
• Risk averse 
• Lacking 
awareness/ 
understanding 
• Lacking strategy 
• Lacking 
commitment 
• Processes are 
inefficient, 
informal or ad-
hoc 
LEVEL: NAÏVE 
• Unaware of need 
for RM 
• No structured 
approach 
• Repetitive and 
reactive 
management 
processes 
• No attempt to 
learn from the 
past 
• No attempt to 
prepare for 
future threats or 
uncertainties 
LEVEL: AD-HOC 
• Unstructured, ill-
defined processes 
• Process measures are 
missing 
• Jobs and organization 
not based on 
horizontal SC 
processes 
• Performance is 
unpredictable 
• Targets are often 
missed 
• SCM costs are high 
• Customer satisfaction 
is low 
• Functional 
cooperation is low 
 
LEVEL: FOUNDATION 
• Processes changes are hard to 
implement 
• Customers dissatisfied with 
delivery time performance 
• No visibility or control on 
undelivered orders 
• No special treatment of orders is 
possible 
• Processes are inflexible 
• Inadequate demand forecasts and 
internal processes lead to 
production shortfalls and 
overpromised orders 
• IS do not fully support SCM 
processes 
• Strategic suppliers are unidentified 
• Service levels are not agreed, 
understood or documented 
 Maturity Models      
 Simchi-Levi et al., (2013) IACCM (2003) Hillson (1997) Lockamy and McCormack 
(2004) 
De Oliveira et al., (2011) 
Maturity 
Level 
SC RM RM RM SC SC 
II • Information 
sharing and 
common 
planning  
activities 
• Positioning of 
redundancy 
buffers based on 
a common, 
cross-functional 
LEVEL: 
COMPETENT 
• Patchy, 
inconsistent 
• Some 
LEVEL: NOVICE 
• Experimenting 
with RM 
• Few individuals 
involved 
LEVEL: DEFINED 
• Basic SCM processes 
are defined and 
documented 
• Jobs and organization 
LEVEL: STRUCTURE 
• Investments made to document 
planning and scheduling flows 
• Metrics developed for planning and 
production 
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between 
internal 
functions 
• Key resources 
and 
performance 
objectives are  
jointly 
managed 
plan 
• Basic risk 
governance 
processes 
• No visibility 
into emerging 
changes and 
patterns outside 
the company 
domain 
understanding/ 
awareness 
• Cautious 
approach/ 
reactive 
• Inconsistent 
• No learning from 
experience 
• Standard 
approach/ generic 
• No generic 
structured 
processes in 
place 
• Aware of 
benefits but fails 
to implement 
and gain benefits 
 
remain traditional 
• Process performance 
is more predictable 
• Targets defined but 
missed more than not 
• Functional silos hard 
to overcome due to 
boundary concerns 
and competing goals 
• SCM costs remain 
high 
• Customer satisfaction 
has improved, but 
remains low 
• Detailed plans developed for each 
item or service  offered 
• Production plans begin integration 
along firm divisions 
• Applied methodologies consider 
capacity constraints 
• IS support operations and begin 
integration with organizational 
processes 
• Demand analysis and forecasting 
implemented and formalized 
• Statistical methods used to baseline 
planning and forecasting 
• Process changes evaluated before 
implementation 
 Simchi-Levi et al., (2013) IACCM (2003) Hillson (1997) Lockamy and McCormack 
(2004) 
De Oliveira et al., (2011) 
Maturity 
Level 
SC RM RM RM SC SC 
III • Visibility, 
information 
sharing and 
integration of  
key activities 
between supply 
chain partners 
• Incorporation 
of external 
input into 
internal  
• planning 
activities 
• Supply chain 
rationalisation 
• Use of sensors 
and predictors to 
proactively  
position 
response 
mechanisms 
• Business 
continuity plans 
• Partner 
resilience 
monitoring 
• Quantitative risk 
management 
LEVEL: 
PROFICIENT 
• Prepared to take 
appropriate risks 
• Good 
understanding of 
benefits across 
most of 
organization 
• Strategy mapped 
onto process 
implementation 
LEVEL: 
NORMALIZED 
• Management of 
risk built into 
routine business 
practices 
• RM 
implemented on 
most or all 
projects 
• Formalized 
generic risk 
processes 
• Benefits 
understood at all 
levels of the 
organization, but 
not consistently 
achieved 
LEVEL: LINKED 
• Breakthrough level 
• SCM employed with 
strategic intent and 
results 
• SCM measures and 
goals reach 
horizontally across 
the SC 
• Process performance 
goals often achieved 
• SCM costs begin 
decreasing 
• Feeling of esprit de 
corps replaces 
frustration 
• Customers included 
in process 
improvement 
• Customer satisfaction 
shows marked 
improvement 
 
LEVEL: VISION 
• Procurement team formally 
designated and meets periodically 
across functions 
• Order commitments are owned and 
monitored for fulfillment 
• Teams are designated to develop 
strategic plans 
• Strategic planning team meets 
regularly and uses adequate tools 
• Planning process of operational 
strategy is documented 
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 Simchi-Levi et al., (2013) IACCM (2003) Hillson (1997) Lockamy and McCormack 
(2004) 
De Oliveira et al., (2011) 
Maturity 
Level 
SC RM RM RM SC SC 
IV • Alignment on 
key customer 
value 
dimensions  
• across the 
extended 
enterprise 
• Supply chain 
segmentation 
to match 
multiple  
• customer value 
propositions 
• Identification 
of emerging 
value chain 
patterns in  
• complex 
dynamic 
environments 
• Ability to adapt 
the supply 
chain to 
frequent  
• changes in the 
value chain 
• Investment in 
flexibility 
(processes, 
products,  
• plants, capacity)  
• Management of 
pressure away 
from weak  
• partners in the 
value chain  
• Risk strategy 
segmentation 
LEVEL: EXPERT 
• Proactive 
• Intuitive 
understanding 
• Belief, full 
commitment to be 
the best 
• Adaptive 
• Proactively 
developed 
processes 
• Processes fit for 
purpose 
• Best of breed 
LEVEL: NATURAL 
• Risk aware 
culture with 
proactive 
approach to RM 
in all aspects of 
business 
• Active use of 
risk information 
to improve 
business 
processes and 
gain competitive 
advantage 
• Emphasis on 
opportunity 
management 
(“positive risk”) 
LEVEL: INTEGRATED 
• Company, vendors 
and customers 
cooperate at the 
process level 
• SCM measures and 
management systems 
are embedded in the 
organization 
• Advanced SCM 
practices, i.e. CPFR, 
take shape 
• Process performance 
becomes very 
predictable and 
targets are reliably 
achieved 
• SCM costs 
dramatically reduced 
• Customer satisfaction 
and esprit de corps 
become a competitive 
advantage 
LEVEL: INTEGRATION 
• Develops with partners capabilities 
to respond to demand pull signals 
• Sales, operations and distribution 
collaborate with production 
planning and scheduling 
• Forecasts are developed for each 
customer individually 
• Company aligns with supplier’s 
developing plans 
• Measure and controls monitor 
supplier performance 
• Suppliers have access to company 
inventory and production planning 
information 
• Critical suppliers are considered 
partners 
• Strategic planning team constantly 
assesses impact of its strategies 
 Lockamy and McCormack 
(2004) 
De Oliveira et al., (2011) 
SC SC 
LEVEL: EXTENDED 
• Competition based on 
multi-firm supply 
chains 
• Advanced SCM 
practices that allow 
transfer of 
responsibility without 
legal ownership are 
 LEVEL: DYNAMICS 
• Sales, marketing, distribution and 
planning collaborate between 
themselves 
• Order commitment process is 
integrated with other SC processes 
• Demand management and 
production planning are completely 
integrated 
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in place 
• Multi-firm SCM 
teams with common 
processes, goals and 
broad authority take 
shape. 
• Trust, mutual 
dependency and 
esprit de corps are 
the glue holding the 
extended supply 
chain together. 
Process performance 
and reliability of the 
extended system are 
measured and joint 
investments in 
improving the system 
are shared, as are the 
returns. 
• Companies are responsive and 
attentive to short term demands of 
customers 
• Supply times are continuously 
revised and updated 
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Importance to the firm 
 Disruption types affecting operations are as broad and varied as firms and industry 
sectors. The Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals (CSCMP) has recognized the 
importance of deliberate SCRM activities “to identify and, when possible, mitigate operating 
risks in a way that protects operating profits” with mitigation activities “based on a cross 
functional understanding of the defined risk and the potential financial consequences of the risk, 
if it should actually occur” (CSCMP, 2012, p. 1). Some examples of how this importance is 
reflected in firms include: 
One unidentified firm, using the metric of time to recover (TTR) as part of a formal and 
robust SCRM program, reported savings of millions through improved pre-disruption 
adjustments based on SCRM analysis (Supply Chain Risk Leadership Council, 2011). However, 
it was also noted that TTR measures may be strained if analysis and decision-making are 
overwhelmed by the disruption as exemplified by events surrounding a recent major East Coast 
storm. Superstorm Sandy overwhelmed storm surge estimates in lower Manhattan by up to three 
feet causing power loss for 350,000 more customers than anticipated and in the Rockaways area 
there was total power loss for an extended period. This event triggered large scale patient 
movement from affected healthcare facilities on short notice, straining the capacity to coordinate, 
move, and house them appropriately (Gibbs and Halloway, 2013). In this instance, the low-
probability event was unanticipated and any TTR estimates by the city or the Army Corps of 
Engineers (COE) became useless. Prior contingency planning by the Army COE was hampered 
by underestimation of damage and faulty or outdated power requirements for key buildings. 
However, the implementation of the contingency Coastal Storm Plan, first developed in 2000 and 
refined following activation in 2007 and 2011, is credited with preventing worse effects (Gibbs 
and Halloway, 2013).  
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As noted, risks must be balanced, as in the case of healthcare evacuations, where risk of 
additional injury and mortality from the move must be weighed against potential injury and 
mortality from remaining in place and cultural and operational fit and responsiveness should be 
determined as well. Sheffi (2005) notes two examples where, based upon the unresponsiveness 
and dismissiveness of suppliers following a west coast port shutdown, Dell and P&G fired 
suppliers who were deemed too reactive, unresponsive and culturally misaligned with their own 
sense of urgency. A second example is that of a faulty dialysis filter manufactured by Baxter. In 
2001, it was determined that the $15 dialysis filters experienced a faulty quality control process 
that left residue in the filter, causing air bubbles to form in some patients’ bloodstreams, which 
led to the patients’ deaths. Following more than fifty deaths, an investigation and cessation of 
filter production, the firm suffered a loss of over $189 million in damages and 360 workers in 
Sweden and Florida became unemployed. Although this seems an extremely bad outcome, 
scanning the environment and mandatory reporting of deaths to Baxter helped identify the event 
at the earliest possible time; understanding the causes and taking actions to mitigate the effects 
prevented worse outcomes (Sheffi, 2005). 
Other firms may face supply chain disruptions from fraud. A recent US Department of 
Justice investigation highlighted the case of one firm who sold $15.8 million dollars of 
counterfeit integrated circuits to several hundred companies. “Counterfeit integrated circuits can 
result in product or system failure or malfunction, and can lead to costly system repairs, property 
damage, and serious bodily injury, including death. They also raise national security concerns 
because their history is unknown, including who has handled them and what has been done to 
them” (Department of Justice, 2011). Although a financial penalty was imposed on the 
counterfeiter to help with the cost of brand infringement, firms had to address the issues of 
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potentially dangerous parts in their supply chain along with recalls and repairs. Worldwide illicit 
trade is estimated by the World Economic Forum to be in the $1.3 trillion range (Chacon et al., 
2012).  
Supply chain failure in terms of timeliness or cost was in the top three of Chief 
Procurement Officer (CPO) concerns in a recent UK survey. Here, a supply chain disruption was 
acknowledged to have a negative impact on brand, performance and reputation (Achilles, 2012). 
Lloyds (2013a) Risk Index report discusses the various risk exposures faced across the world. In 
seventeen high-growth economies there is a collective insurance exposure of $168 billion to the 
impact of natural catastrophes on firms. Insurance is a means to transfer or mitigate risk, but 
cannot account for lost trust, lost business and competitive disadvantages to operations.  In a 
separate report, Maynard et al., (2013) writing for Lloyd’s, detail the exposure the North 
American population faces from a solar disruption ‘Carrington-level’ event. These solar 
geomagnetic storms occur on average once every 150 years. The last occurred in 1859. The 
estimated impacts, given North America’s reliance on electrical power now versus during the 
previous event, include a power outage lasting from sixteen days to 1-2 years and affecting 20-40 
million US citizens, concentrated mostly on the East Coast due to population density. The 
estimated financial impact ranges from $0.6 - $2.6 trillion. The report does not include other 
effects such as social or healthcare related issues. Faced with impacts from internal functions, 
such as Baxter faced with the faulty filters, or from external events, such as a potential disruption 
from a solar flare or other natural act, supply chain decision makers approach the task of risk 
management and decisions that drive firm action. They must make the right decisions for their 
supply chains. 
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Making the right decisions 
The process of managing risk is one of many tasks an executive may face. The 
identification of a low-probability/high-impact risk as a threat additionally requires greater 
insight, resources and time than a disruption that occurs more frequently, and is therefore more 
identifiable, or a risk that creates less negative impact and may be ignored with reduced risk. So 
the question of why manage these risks becomes key. Recent research, in addition to recent high 
visibility, high-impact events, suggests that a firm with more mature SCRM capabilities is more 
resilient to disruptions (Hillson, 1997; IACCM, 2003; Lockamy and McCormack, 2004; Oliveira 
et al., 2011; Simchi-Levi et al., 2013). Key findings from the Simchi-Levi et al., (2013) study of 
209 global firms include more than sixty percent of the respondent firms indicating performance 
measure declines of three percent or more due to supply chain disruptions, considered significant 
by Simchi-Levi et al., (2013). Firms with more mature risk management capabilities (measured 
across seven enablers) were impacted to a lesser degree and recovered more quickly than those 
without. Firms that invested in flexibility across their supply chains were more resilient and 
those with “mature capabilities in supply chain and risk management do better along all surveyed 
dimensions of operational and financial performance than immature companies” (Simchi-Levi et 
al., 2013, p. 5). Only forty percent of surveyed firms were considered mature, however.  
Level I maturity is described as ad hoc processes without collaboration, standards or 
redundancy and that is liable to volatility. Level II maturity involves some buffer planning to 
include anticipating some risk and investment in inventory and basic governance mechanisms.  
Level III maturity consists of proactive steps including quantitative risk management, continuity 
planning to include partner capabilities and use of early warning indicators. Level IV maturity 
adds flexibility of processes, products, plant and capabilities, provides aid in moving risk away 
from weak suppliers and managing bottlenecks in the supply chain (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013). 
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Table 4 summarizes the distribution of respondents from the Simchi-Levi et al., (2013) study. 
Ultimately, the main goal is to minimize the impact of a risk to operations and continue with 
normal supply chain functions in support of the firm in a complex operating environment. 
Development of an understanding of what risk is, in the context of a firm, may help decision-
makers as they address uncertainties. 
Table 4: Supply chain risk management risk maturity (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013) 
Capability 
Maturities 
Percent of 
Respondents 
Supply Chain Risk Management 
Level I 17 Functional Supply 
Chain Management 
Ad-hoc Management of Risk 
Level II 42 Internal Supply 
Chain Integration  
Positioning of Planed Buffers 
to Absorb Disruptions 
Level III 32 External Supply 
Chain Collaboration 
Proactive Risk Response 
Level IV 9 Dynamic Supply 
Chain Adaptation 
Fully Flexible Response to 
Risk 
 
Risk 
A risk has been described as a “negative deviation from the expected value of a certain 
performance measure, resulting in negative consequence for the focal firm” (Wagner and Bode, 
2010, p. 274).  The presence of a hazard, whether actual or possible, may lead to a disruption as 
the hazard develops into a trigger. In turn, this trigger event may lead to unacceptable levels of 
negative impact/damage (Sheffi, 2005). This impact can take many forms depending on the 
circumstances and may be unpredictable in nature. This continuum of damage may range from 
manageable and within coping capabilities to unmanageable, even with the presence of 
exogenous coping capabilities.  
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Risk as a phenomenon is an aspect of most activities. In fields such as decision theory, 
March and Shapira (1987), drawing on the work of Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1965), discuss risk 
as “most commonly conceived as reflecting variation in the distribution of possible outcomes, 
their likelihoods, and their subjective values. Risk is measured either by nonlinearities in the 
revealed utility for money or by the variance of the probability distribution of possible gains and 
losses associated with a particular alternative” (p. 1405). There is often the chance that an 
adverse outcome may present itself during any of the instances that occur in a process. 
Uncertainty surrounding these chance events further complicates preparation and response 
decisions. Contemplation of risk and associated uncertainty has been ongoing for nearly one 
hundred years. 
Knight (1921) and Fayol (1916) are among the earliest to discuss the concept of risk in a 
firm. Knight (1921) separated the concepts of risk and uncertainty as occurrences that are either 
quantifiable, i.e. risks, or not quantifiable, i.e. uncertainties and this research adopts the same 
understanding of the quality of a risk. Knight (1921) further acknowledged the roles of 
psychology of conduct, judgment and estimation in managerial comprehension and decision-
making as related to risk and notes that it had been widely avoided as a topic of study. Under the 
title of Security Function, Fayol, in 1916 (Fayol trans. Gray, 1984) broadened previous views of 
security as dealing with physical assets and personnel protection to include protection from all 
forms of threat. This included the tasks of “exposure identification, risk evaluation, risk control 
(eliminating hazards, minimizing the effects of those that cannot be eliminated, warning against 
the remainder), and risk financing (such as absorbing losses, self-insuring, outside insuring, 
sinking funds and  transferring risk to a supplier or client through contracts)” (Fayol trans. Gray, 
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1984, p. 11). Following Fayol (trans. Gray, 1984) and Knight (1921), risk remained in the realm 
of finance and insurance as a topic area for the bulk of the 20th century until recently. 
Risk as a current active academic discipline is evident from the numerous journals 
devoted to the topic and sub-specialties. A sample of titles include Risk Analysis, The Journal of 
Risk, The Journal of Risk Research, Stochastic Environmental Research and Risk Assessment, 
Risk Management: An International Journal, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Climate Risk 
Management, Journal of Risk and Insurance and Journal of Therapeutics and Clinical Risk 
Management. The main focus of many of these journals is finance at the corporate or 
governmental level; however risk to firm operations and corporate behavior renders risk an 
appropriate and important topic for examination in the field of supply chain management as well 
given the existence of supply chains in most all business fields and the prevalence of risk across 
all business fields. 
 
The importance of managing risk  
The importance of action in the face of risk derives from the concept that negative risk 
impacts financial performance, which if severe enough, may lead to firm demise (Mathur and 
Kenyon, 1997) and should be addressed to ensure continuity of operations and achievement of 
firm goals. The story of risk management failure at Barings Bank is a cautionary example for 
multiple industries. A trader, Nick Leeson, conducted unauthorized trading of financial options in 
Singapore. These transactions and subsequent mounting losses were hidden in an error account. 
There was no audit in place to detect this activity and losses mounted. Reports were altered by 
Leeson, including falsification of performance measures, to hide this activity to maintain cash 
flow for authorized activities. Financial market responses to a 1995 earthquake increased the 
volatility of the Nikkei market, where the unauthorized trading occurred, and the volatility and 
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subsequent losses of the unauthorized trading. In an attempt to correct the losses, even greater 
bets were placed by Mr. Leeson that subsequently failed. Ultimately the 223 year old bank 
suffered losses of $1.4 billion, the institution was forced to insolvency and sold for a little more 
than $1 to ING Bank. (Goto, 2007; Sunstrom and Hollnagel, 2006). Goto (2007) identifies that 
key governance mechanisms were not in place or monitored to align the actions and decision-
making of one of its employees with the firm strategy. Independent oversight appears to have 
been missing and the ability of one individual to expose the firm to ever greater risk was 
unlimited. Some of these risks were caused by the firm itself through lack of early warning 
techniques built into a complex and dynamic system.  Use of a dynamic, feedforward tool allows 
a system, such as an early warning system, to receive constant information, which allows 
managerial reaction to current and likely events. Feedback allows for a reaction to events, often 
classified as negative, and may delay the ability or timeliness of an appropriate response thereby 
negatively affecting resilience (Sundstrom and Nagel, 2006) In the case of Barings, neither risk 
management system was in place as part of a more broad firm strategy. 
 
Risk and strategy development 
Risk, strategic decisions regarding hazards to a company, and industry characteristics are 
important considerations when developing strategy. Although there are admitted difficulties 
regarding prediction of risk and historical understanding of risk, risk remains linked to 
performance (Bettis, 1982; Hillson, 1997; Simchi-Levi et al., 2013) and requires careful 
consideration. Timeliness may be critical. Risk management as a function is usually developed 
and conducted ex-ante to a trigger event, however effectiveness is measured ex-post (Ritchie and 
Brindley, 2010). Risk management activities cannot wait for a disrupting trigger event, they must 
be in place prior to achieve the greatest benefit (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013). 
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The ability to understand risk as well as the scope and context of such threats are subject 
to the bounded rationality of the manager, as all organizational learning takes place within a 
member of the organization and this learning has to be transmitted among members to develop 
understanding (Simon, 1991). Not all parts of the organization know something, learn something 
or learn the same thing. Having knowledge where it is needed is therefore important for decision-
making. This understanding can also be incorporated from knowledge gained outside the 
organization through the acquisition of a new employee (Simon, 1991), but the employee’s 
decision-making will also be subject to their own bounded rationality. 
Management of anticipated risk phenomenon allows a firm the opportunity to avoid or 
mitigate the impacts of those risks. This negative risk may result in damage to a portion or all of 
a firm, up to dissolution of the firm in the most catastrophic circumstances. To address this, the 
concept of risk management and associated frameworks are relevant. Managers in alignment 
with firm strategy should desire to reduce the impact of variability that leads to damage or loss 
(March and Shapira, 1987).  
Risk management 
Recent discussions of risk that are relevant to the current research have examined 
managerial perceptions of risk (Slovic, 1987) and risk aversion (Dutton and Webster, 1988; 
Berdica, 2002; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). For instance, risk aversion has been observed to 
possess multiple dimensions, often varying among managers. When faced with risks, Berdica 
(2002) found managers may seek new solutions to mitigate risks or abandon the idea that 
triggered the risk. March and Shapira (1987) found some managers ignore low probability, high 
significance outcomes, while Dutton and Webster (1998) and Pillai and Min (2010) found that 
high uncertainty leads to underestimation of an issue or mis-calibration of a response. Moving in 
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the opposite direction of managerial response, several researchers (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979; Johnson et al., 1993; Lichtenstein et al., 1978; Viscusi et al., 1987) found managers assign 
too much weight to low-probability, high-impact event probabilities. 
When the research is combined it indicates development of a human based understanding 
of risk phenomenon, but one that is disjointed. This human based understanding is subject to 
multiple forces including bias (Goto, 2007) and use of heuristics (Siegrist and Sutterlin, 2014) 
when making risk determinations. However, the interdisciplinary nature of risk (Wilkins, 2001), 
risk perception in extreme events (Slovic and Weber, 2002) and risk in supply chains (Hauser, 
2003; Christopher and Peck, 2004; Trkman and McCormack, 2011; Tummala and Schoenherr, 
2011) requires a greater degree of systematic control to ensure alignment with firm strategy and 
avoid serious to catastrophic disruptions more than heuristics and bias provide. When the 
attributes of managers and forces such as mis-calibration of risks, heuristics and biases coalesce, 
they create a more uncertain and complex environment for a supply chain manager to navigate. 
This navigation may be accomplished through the process of risk management activities to the 
extent a manager engages in the process and uses the tools provided.  
 
The tool of risk management 
Risk management as a tool was used initially in the US to reduce insurance costs, but its 
use has been noted elsewhere as early as 1738 by Bernoulli (trans. Summers, 1954) as a tactic 
used by traders to understand the utility cost of a risk choice, expressed by Bernoulli as a gain or 
loss. Discussion of firm and business enterprise level risk management that encompassed 
identification, evaluation and reaction to risks began in the late 1950s and early 1960s (Mehr and 
Hedges, 1963). Per Verbano and Venturini, (2013) risk management as simply an insurance 
function remained the goal until the insurance market crisis of the 1980s, when insurance fell 
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from favor as the only means to hedge against risk. In the 1990s, optimizing firm performance to 
create value through a multi-disciplined and proactive approach to operations developed. 
Examples provided by Verbano and Venturini (2013) of specific disciplines that have branched 
from the core risk management concepts and developed unique perspectives include: 
 
“1. Strategic risk management - the implementation of an integrated and continuous process 
of identification and assessment of strategic risks that are considered to be obstacles to reaching 
the financial and operational goals of an organization (Chatterjee et al., 2003; Miller, 1992). 
2. Financial risk management - the practice of creating economic value in a firm by using 
financial techniques and methodologies to manage exposure to risk (Crockford, 1986). 
3. Enterprise risk management - a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, 
management and other personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed 
to identify potential events that may affect the entity, and manage risk to be within its risk 
appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of entity objectives. (COSO, 
2004). 
4. Insurance risk management - the process of management of pure risk (understood as a 
risk that can be insured) in a firm, based on the observation of damaging events that have already 
occurred, the application of a premium and the subjective assessment based on the experiences 
and competences of the assessor (Gahin, 1967). 
5. Project risk management - a formal, systematic process integrated into the life cycle of 
any project that involves defining objectives, identifying sources of uncertainty, analyzing these 
uncertainties and formulating managerial responses to them in order to develop an acceptable 
balance between risks and opportunities (Verbano and Venturini, 2011). 
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6. Engineering risk management - a complex and continuous process that involves 
managing the planning, design, operation and evolution of an engineering system in order to 
identify and choose appropriate responses to problems related to different risk factors through the 
adoption of a systemic and proactive approach (Patè-Cornell, 1990; Regan and Patè-Cornell, 
1997). 
7. Disaster risk management - a holistic and flexible approach and an integral part of the 
governing of any community, involving a series of actions (programs, projects and measures) 
and tools expressly aimed at reducing disaster risks in regions at risk and mitigating the spread of 
disasters, maintaining the processes, structures and rigor typical of RM (Garatwa and Bollin, 
2002). 
8. Clinical risk management - An approach to improving quality in healthcare which places 
special emphasis on identifying circumstances which put patients at risk of harm, and then acting 
to prevent or control those risks. The aim is to both improve safety and quality of care for 
patients and to reduce the costs of such risks for health care providers (Johnstone and Kanitsaki, 
2007). 
9. Supply chain risk management - collaboration with the partners in the entire supply chain 
with the aim of developing a shared RM process in order to deal with the risks and uncertainties 
resulting from logistic activities and resources (Norrman and Lindroth, 2002).” (Verbano and 
Venturini, 2013, pp 187-188) 
 
In addition to the field specific definitions above, the concept of risk management, as in 
other newer areas of research, has not settled on a comprehensive definition (see Table 5). To 
varying degrees, however, the definitions of risk management agree in that there is a need to 
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reduce, control or eliminate risks to benefit the firm. Waring and Glendon, (1998) provide one 
definition that seeks to comprehensively engage all risks, describing risk management as “a field 
of activity seeking to eliminate, reduce and generally control pure risks (such as from safety, fire, 
major hazards, security lapses, environmental hazards) and to enhance the benefits and avoid 
detriment from speculative risks (such as financial investment, marketing, human resources, IT 
strategy, commercial and business risks)” (p. 3).  More recently COSO (2004) offers “enterprise 
risk management is a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management and other 
personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed to identify potential 
events that may affect the entity, and manage risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide 
reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of entity objectives” (p. 2) as a potential 
definition.  
Table 5: Risk management definitions 
Source Risk Management 
Dickson (1989) The identification, analysis and control of those risks which can 
threaten the assets or earning capacity of an enterprise 
Waring and Glendon 
(1998) 
A field of activity seeking to eliminate, reduce and generally 
control pure risks (such as from safety, fire, major hazards, 
security lapses, environmental hazards) and to enhance the 
benefits and avoid detriment from speculative risks (such as 
financial investment, marketing, human resources, IT strategy, 
commercial and business risks). 
Sundes and 
Birnbaum (2003) 
Human actions that are directed towards modification of the 
probability that a hazard will be converted into an event and 
eventually into a disaster 
Norrman and 
Jansson (2004) 
The making of decisions regarding risks and their subsequent 
implementation, and flows from risk estimation and risk 
evaluation 
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Federal Aviation 
Administration 
(2006) 
An organized, systematic decision- support process that 
identifies risks, assesses or analyzes risks, and effectively 
mitigates or eliminates risks to achieve program or 
organizational objectives 
US Army (2006) The process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks 
arising from operational factors and making decisions that 
balance risk cost with mission benefits 
US Department of 
Defense (2006) 
An overarching process that encompasses identification, 
analysis, mitigation planning, mitigation plan implementation, 
and tracking of future root causes and their consequence 
Al Mannai (2008) The process of understanding risk and deciding upon and 
implementing action to achieve an acceptable level of risk at an 
acceptable cost 
Department of 
Homeland Security 
(2008) 
The process of identifying, controlling, and minimizing the 
impact of events whose consequences are or may be unknown, 
or events that are themselves fraught with uncertainty 
Supply Chain 
Council (2010) 
SCOR 10 -  Improving (mitigating) the risks of an undesired 
event taking place, limiting the impact of such an event and 
improving the ability to recover from the event 
van Mieghan (2010) The broad activity of planning and decisionmaking designed to 
deal with the occurrence of hazards or risks. 
Waters (2011) The process for systematically  identifying, analyzing and 
responding to risks throughout an organization 
British Standards 
Institution (2011) 
Coordinated activities to direct and control an organization with 
regard to risk 
 
 Even with a definition, risk management is a complex task that occurs in the context of a 
complex business environment. To aid in understanding a manager’s role in implementing risk 
management practices, broad frameworks have been developed which aid in understanding a 
firm’s level of implementation maturity.  
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Risk management frameworks 
Enterprise risk management frameworks provide a means for firms to exert a level of 
control over potential future activities and attempt to take actions to have those activities remain 
within an acceptable level of variation. More recently the field has grown in response to 
pressures felt from specific disciplines. Additional impetus to engage in broad risk management 
activities across US industries include the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and a 
requirement that firms trading on the New York Stock Exchange provide an audit of non-
financial risk (Beasley et al., 2005).  
Several frameworks exist which firms can use to address enterprise risk concerns. One 
example is ISO 31000:2009 - Risk Management Principles and Guidelines which states “the 
adoption of consistent processes within a comprehensive framework can help to ensure that risk 
is managed effectively, efficiently and coherently across an organization” (ISO, 2009). This 
approach to risk will also serve as an enabler to  
— increase the likelihood of achieving objectives; 
— encourage proactive management; 
— be aware of the need to identify and treat risk throughout the organization; 
— improve the identification of opportunities and threats; 
— comply with relevant legal and regulatory requirements and international norms; 
— improve mandatory and voluntary reporting; 
— improve governance; 
— improve stakeholder confidence and trust; 
— establish a reliable basis for decision making and planning; 
— improve controls; 
— effectively allocate and use resources for risk treatment; 
— improve operational effectiveness and efficiency; 
— enhance health and safety performance, as well as environmental protection; 
— improve loss prevention and incident management; 
— minimize losses; 
— improve organizational learning; and 
— improve organizational resilience. 
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Enterprise Risk Management tools such as the ISO 31000:2009 framework, provide a 
comprehensive means for firms to address variations that may require additional resources to 
bring those variances under control. However, usage of these tools has been less than universal.  
Recent longitudinal research regarding ISO 31000:2009 implementation conducted by Scannell 
et al., (2013) indicated that alignment between SCRM usage and ISO 31000 principles presented 
serious challenges. These included external knowledge acquisition and the internal ability to 
obtain necessary information, key for decision-making efforts; the ability to share information 
among partners and obtain information from the environment, key to ensuring the widest 
congruence between plans and executors; and lack of a proactive approach of most firms, with 
notable exceptions being those firms who communicated regularly regarding risk. Risks deemed 
serious to catastrophic yet outside of firm control were generally addressed through dual 
sourcing or buffer inventory strategies. Overall the authors found little integration of formal 
SCRM with formal enterprise wide risk management, with many firms opting instead for a 
decentralized sense of responsibility spread among employees.       
The existence of such extensive frameworks and their level of employment indicates 
several dynamics key to this research. The first is that risk management is important to firms and 
regulatory bodies. The second is that managers are heterogeneous in decision-making and output 
and a normative framework, customized to a firm, can correct the differences and better align 
managerial activities with firm strategy, if employed. These issues become important as 
identification of firm maturity within  risk management frameworks allows firms to consider the 
“potential impact of all types of risks on all processes, activities, stakeholders, products and 
services”, including the “upside of risk” (AIRMIC, 2010, p.2). Research in this area will 
contribute to the understanding of the intersection of managers and risk management, as “beyond 
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a few case studies published in academic journals . . . not much is known about best practices 
employed by managers” (Manuj, 2013, p. 81). While best practices may be scarce in academic 
literature, cautionary examples of failures have been documented.  
 
Examples of risk management failure 
The healthcare infrastructure of facilities in New Orleans, Louisiana impacted by 
Hurricane Katrina were unprepared, and had not considered the risk of a long-term interruption 
to services. When the impact of the storm’s disruption began to take full effect, fuel and medical 
supplies were undeliverable and electrical service failed. As a result, several deaths were 
attributed to inadequate risk and resilience preparation, response and coping (Franco et al., 
2006). Further, mistrust and blame regarding inadequate preparation and subsequent response 
were quickly placed at all levels of government (Boin et al., 2010). Lack of planning created 
conditions that were worse than if effective planning and coordination had been present 
(Thevenaz and Resodihardjo, 2010). However, several years later, with the benefit of lessons 
learned (Weick and Sutcliff, 2001) from Hurricane Katrina, a powerful storm approached the 
East coast of the United States. 
New York City hospitals that were in the projected path of Superstorm Sandy had state 
regulatory requirements for power, communication and services to continue uninterrupted for an 
extended shelter-in-place event, but were overcome by unanticipated high storm surges. These 
unmitigated failures, which inundated electrical systems, ultimately affected five hospitals, thirty 
residential facilities, all of which were situated near the vulnerable NYC waterfront, and 6,300 
patients were unable to shelter-in-place (Gibbs and Holloway, 2013). These facilities and city 
administrators had the benefit of lessons learned from prior storms (Weick and Sutcliff, 2001; 
Tierney et al., 2001), several days advance forecast of a predicted impact cone and subsequent 
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storm related effects as they conducted their decision-making processes. Certain decisions, made 
in light of previous knowledge of large storm impacts, were chosen as the correct decisions for 
the ‘firm’ of New York City, yet plans were inadequate to meet the storm. However, some prior 
planning had undoubtedly mitigated worse effects (Gibbs and Halloway, 2013) from a complex 
disruption. 
Healthcare supply chain risk management is a complex and potentially life and death 
field.  Where ‘firm’ strategy of New York City may have been expressed through documents and 
statements (Clarke, 1999) that implied readiness for ‘all-hazards’ that could be encountered, 
concrete activities that occurred to prepare for the actual risk were inadequate. The complexities 
and the consideration of known and unknown events (Knight, 1921) may require advanced 
planning and coordination, but must be balanced against competing needs to support overall 
strategy. In serious to catastrophic disruptions firms suffer losses, some to the point of 
dissolution as well as experiencing negative impacts to revenue and reputation, all at odds with 
firm continuity. Firm strategy development and execution is a key component for a firm to 
support goals, such as loss reduction, business continuity and competitive advantage. Therefore a 
discussion of firm strategy will provide context for risk management within a firm. 
Firm strategy 
Firm strategy defined 
Firm strategy serves a key purpose by providing guidance to align efforts across the firm 
to achieve a goal. Over time, this strategy may also provide vision and motivation as well 
(Eisenhardt, 1999). When viewed from outside or inside the firm, understanding firm strategy 
will also serve to explain changes in action as conditions change (MacCrimmon, 1993). Key 
aspects of a complete firm strategy, which is difficult to achieve perfectly, include: 
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1a. Strategy is a series of related actions involving resource deployments 
1b. Strategy is goal-directed with the goals serving to coordinate the actions 
2.  Strategy has a wide scope in space and time 
3a. Strategy is conditional upon environmental events including actions of other agents 
3b. Strategy takes account of the effect of one's actions on other units, the possible actions of 
other units, and the various interactions that arise (MacCrimmon, 1993). 
 
Strategy Frameworks 
Multiple frameworks to understand firm strategy have been developed and used in the 
context of understanding supply chain management’s role in firm strategy. Rumelt (1974, 1986) 
discussed the interaction of diversification strategy, corporate structure and performance, based 
on a combination of dominant related businesses or business lines. Miles et al., (1978) provide a 
theoretical framework "to analyze an organization as an integrated and dynamic whole - a model 
that takes into account the interrelationships among strategy, structure, and process" (p. 547). 
Miles et al., (1978) further present assumptions that managers may need to adapt their style to 
the style required by the firm strategy. Porter (1979, 1991) developed a theory of strategy that 
uses a dynamic system of determinants that are mutually tied together. Although firms desire 
stability, the environment is constantly shifting. When prompted by forces to change to maintain 
advantage, value and advantage must be developed with understanding of the other determinants. 
Analysis of these five forces can help guide strategy development and understand potential 
viability of the firm and whether offensive or defensive action would be appropriate (Porter 
1979, 1991). 
Wernerfelt (1984) and Barney (1991) developed a resource based view of the firm that 
found tangible and intangible assets, tied semi-permanently to a firm, provide sustained 
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competitive advantage if they are valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable and non-substitutable. 
While the ability of firms in the same industry to develop formal strategy is therefore imitable, 
the underlying informal strategy development and the strategy decision and implementation may 
be valuable and rare and hence contribute to a competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). Teece 
(1997) discussed that competitive advantage stems from firm internal high-performance routines 
that are then shaped by processes and positions. Soft assets such as values, culture and 
experience must be built. This dynamic capability approach both develops new capabilities and 
uses old capabilities as well (Teece, 1997). 
     The field of strategy research continues to grow. Desarbo et al., (2005) reexamined and 
extended the work of Miles et al., (1978) through a reconsideration of the factors that drive 
placement into the four distinct groups Miles previously identified. The Miles et al. (1978) 
groups of Defender, Analyzer, Prospector and Reactor (P-A-D-R) were expanded to include 
groupings of Prospector/Analyzer, Defender/Reactor, Analyzer/Prospector/Defender and 
Prospector/Analyzer. These second-order derivatives of the P-A-D-R groups emerged when 
strategic types, capabilities, environmental uncertainty and firm performance variables were 
added to Miles and Snow's classifications. Obviously, the field of firm strategy is complex, 
multifaceted and is subject to revision as frameworks are tested and variables are added and 
adjusted. Within the complexity of the role of the firm is the role of the supply chain. 
 
Importance of firm strategy in supply chain research 
Supply chain management (SCM) has been identified as a strategic level function of a 
firm (Mentzer, 2001; Stank et al., 2005) and as such adds value for a firm and stakeholders 
through integration across the supply chain (Lambert et al., 1998). SCM is influenced by firm 
strategy, therefore firm strategies and frameworks must be acknowledged and understood which 
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in turn aids SCM in developing supporting strategies and actions. MacCrimmon (1993) noted 
that firm strategy may be variable and change over time due to influences such as mergers and 
acquisitions, market forces and regulatory influences and that firm strategy is implemented and 
impacted by managers and the resources they bring to bear.  
 
Impact of individual managers on strategy implementation 
Research indicates that managerial style matters (Burton and Obel, 2004; Håkonsson et 
al., 2006, 2008, 2012). Early discussions urged firms to consider leadership styles as they filled 
their executive ranks with technically adept personnel (Fiedler, 1965). From the fit between 
leadership styles of those selected for an executive position, a firm could adjust a leader’s power 
and the subsequent power structure they operated within, change the task structure as a form of 
governance and alignment, or change the subordinate structure to provide complimentary styled 
employees (Fiedler, 1965) were all suggestions to improve firm performance. Shortly after, 
Woffard (1971) found congruence between the effectiveness of managers who possessed a 
security and maintenance focus operating in a large complex organization and between a 
manager focused on personal interaction working in a simpler and more centralized operation. 
Very different environments, yet each manager successfully performed their role to support the 
firm.  More recent research indicates some managerial traits are universally desirable in all 
circumstances, while some are contingent on the structure of the business unit where the 
manager operates (Slater, 1989). Some traits that were found to be significant in a recent study 
were firm tenure, congruence between entrepreneurial behavior and firm strategy, and a thinking 
mode of decision-making in ambiguous situations (Slater, 1989). Managerial style may also play 
a role in how blame is assigned when negative events occur. Boin et al., (2010) examined the 
leadership style of political leaders following Hurricane Katrina and noted that leadership during 
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crisis is a function of a leader’s need for control and the contextual sensitivity that is brought into 
play. In uncertain circumstances, leaders will behave differently due to inherent qualities they 
possess. When change is involved, Oreg and Berson (2011), in a study of school principals and 
employees, found the principal’s personal attributes and leadership style were able to explain 
resistance to change or acceptance to change in school teachers. Managers therefore have an 
impact on their immediate environment and their actions may span to dimensions beyond the 
firm as well in support of firm strategy. While managers are heterogeneous in style, less 
understood is how that style impacts firm strategy. 
 
Firm strategy at the managerial unit of analysis 
While firm strategy has received considerable attention in the literature (Rumelt, 1974; 
Hofer, 1975; Porer, 1979, 1981, 1996; Bettis, 1982; Eisenhardt, 1989; Williamson, 1999) and 
effects of managerial or Executive Style are beginning to be explored in the literature (Burton 
and Obel, 2004; Håkonsson et al., 2006, 2008, 2012), there has been scant research on the 
intersection of Executive Style and risk management, a key component of firm strategy (Bettis, 
1982; Baird and Thomas, 1985; Sitkin and Pablo, 1992). As a component of strategy, risk 
management plays a key role in maintaining the viability of a firm under serious to catastrophic 
disruption conditions, when a firm may experience the greatest loss, perhaps to dissolution. In a 
supply chain context, the impact of a supply chain manager’s Executive Style on their approach 
to supply chain risk management in preparation for such a disruption may be significant. A more 
thorough understanding of this relationship between risk management and Executive Style is a 
key goal of this research and to date there has been no literature identified that fills this gap. A 
first step is developing an understanding of managerial Executive Style. 
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Executive Style 
Henri Fayol, in 1916, was one of the earliest management writers to express that 
managerial qualities play an important role within a firm. This role requires different abilities 
harnessed in different proportions based upon the position/role of the manager within the firm, 
the task to be accomplished and the size of the firm (Fayol trans. Gray, 1984). The importance of 
placement of a manager within the firm, based upon his perceived style and abilities, Fayol 
believed, would allow a firm to increase its effectiveness when dealing with internal and external 
relationships. The understanding of style continues to evolve as researchers probe continued 
knowledge gaps and how to define the unique attributes of a manager. 
 
The uniqueness of managers 
Managers are not homogeneous and selfless as they conduct their jobs as part of a set of 
larger firm processes. Selflessness in this context indicates a managerial view that suppresses any 
personal desires or inclinations in favor of total stewardship of the firm (Bertrand and Schoar, 
2003). With this view, it would be easy for a firm to substitute one matching manager with 
another and achieve the same output. In essence, this would carry with it the understanding that 
managers as individuals do not matter. Firms in the same field with managers possessing certain 
quantifiable qualities would perform similarly, make similar strategic choices and execute the 
same level of risk-taking and risk-averse activities. However, multifaceted factors pertaining to 
individual managers are known to exist (Bolman and Deal, 1991; Gammelgard and Larson, 
2001; Burton and Obel, 2004; Ben-David and Ben-David, 2007, 2010; Håkonsson et al., 2012). 
For instance, it is understood that agency issues are present with managers (Zsidisin and Ellram, 
2003; Fayezi et al., 2012), malleability of style (Crowe et al., 1972) and gender differences 
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(Eagly and Johnson, 1990; Eagly and Johannesen-Schmidt, 2001) in relation to Executive Style 
also exist and Executive Style has been recently characterized as a two dimensional construct of 
risk avoidance and preference to delegate (Burton and Obel, 2004; Håkonsson et al., 2006, 2008, 
2012). That is, executives are heterogeneous, yet have traits that can be measured and separated 
to understand their approach to the task of management. There are multiple avenues to approach 
this examination and delineation of style. 
Previous discussions of Executive Style have examined whether a manager models the 
style of their boss in order to be perceived more favorably (Stimpson and Reuel, 1984), if a 
manager changes their behavior in order to produce an improved interpersonal fit with 
subordinates (Crowe et al., 1972), if leadership style plays a role in job satisfaction and 
organizational commitment (Lok and Crawford, 2004), and whether components of managerial 
style (personality traits, background characteristics and managerial behaviors) exert a strong 
influence on business unit performance (Slater, 1989). Executive style in the literature has been 
variously termed management style or leadership style, but there is general agreement that style 
makes a difference and matters to the firm.  
 
Why style matters 
Researchers have found that as a unit of analysis, managers have various attributes 
described as style, which yield varied decisions and outcomes. Attributes such as gender (Eagly 
and Johnson, 1990; Eagly and Johannesen-Schmidt, 2001), fatherhood (Dahl et al., 2012), age 
and educational attainment (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003), esteem accorded to them, charisma, 
ability to inspire (Bass and Yammarino, 1991) as well as risk acceptance and delegation 
preference (Håkonsson et al., 2008, 2012), overconfidence (Deaves et al., 2008) or degree of 
interpersonal accommodation (Crowe et al., 1972) have all been explored. Differences in 
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managerial traits may lead to differing outcomes under the same or similar circumstances, due to 
the heterogeneity of managers themselves and their traits. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) have 
found that manager fixed effects did impact firm performance. Firms understand this variance 
exists and to reduce variance from these effects, often firms will employ governance mechanisms 
(Williamson, 1979). This research focuses on the impact of Executive Style in the supply chain 
risk management context. 
 
Where to find Executive Style in research 
Executive Style has been discussed in a broad range of disciplines. The social science 
field is concerned with how a social group functions as well as interacts. There are several 
related disciplines which have developed from this. Crowe et al., (1972) examine the effects of 
subordinate behavior on managerial behavior; Eagly and Johnson (1990) and Eagly and 
Johannesen-Schmidt (2001) examine the effects of gender and managerial style. General 
management studies have examined how an organization’s structure affects entrepreneurial 
orientation of the manager and subsequent financial performance (Covin and Slevin, 1988), 
managerial personality, background and behaviors impact on performance (Slater, 1989), 
managerial vision and strategy, including the differing direction middle managers may take 
(Rotemberg and Saloner, 2000) and how national cultural differences and leadership style affect 
satisfaction and commitment (Lok and Crawford, 2004). An area that has been unaddressed is 
Executive Style and supply chain risk management maturity. 
The fields of economics and finance discuss how financial performance over time is 
significantly related to the fixed effects that managers have through their heterogeneity (Bertrand 
and Schoar, 2003) while Malmendier and Tate (2005) note that managerial overconfidence as a 
trait leads to miscalibrated investments and impacts the amount of personal funds placed at risk.  
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Kofodimos (1990) provides an example from applied behavioral science of an 
ethnographic approach to understanding an individual manager’s style and the impact of personal 
history in shaping style. Behavioral modeling, where a subordinate mimics the behavioral style 
of their manager was examined by Stimson and Rueul (1984) who found that “a democratic style 
was likely to be modeled and an authoritarian style resulted in counter-modeling” (p. 171). 
Gender differences were noted here as well with females displaying increased tendencies for 
modeling. Followers were influenced likewise by managerial style in an organizational change 
context studied by Oreg and Berson (2011), who verified the effect of complexity, such as 
individual follower differences, in the effectiveness of a transformational leader.   
Bolman and Deal (1991) present a four-frame model that uses four constructs to help a 
leader understand the appropriate approach to be successful based upon possible issues they 
encounter and actions that may be taken. Multiple frames may be used simultaneously. Ledlow 
and Coppola (2010), in discussing healthcare leaders, describe a dynamic culture leadership 
model that relates how diverse styles are present in individual managers and these styles can 
contribute to a balanced team, once they are discovered and understood. In the related realm of 
strategic planning, Håkonsson et al., (2012) tie together Executive Style and firm strategy 
implementation to better understand how matching style with strategy leads to increased 
profitability of the firm. Yet the effects in the supply chain management field have remained 
generally unexamined. 
 
Executive Style and supply chain management 
The field of supply chain management treats Executive Style cursorily. This in spite of 
the observation by van Hoek et al., (2002) that managers are “the critical dimension” (p. 119) 
and that textbook knowledge and application itself is inadequate to yield differentiated firm 
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performance. Meyers et al., (2004) examine supply chain management human capital as an asset 
to develop, i.e. build competencies in the form of education, work experience and specific skill 
sets to drive successful performance. Development of these are proposed to increase employee 
worth. Andre (1995) examined leadership styles of logistics managers to understand how 
diversity of work-teams leads to competitive advantage while Cooper et al., (2007) found that 
female logistic executives displayed a managerial style well suited to making decisions in the 
workplace. 
Managers are ultimately heterogeneous. Faced with homogeneity, managerial 
replacements could be accomplished with anyone, as the results would be equivalent. However, 
managers differ and their effects differ as well (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003). To this end, March 
and Shapira (1987) note that although managers “vary in their individual propensities to take 
risks, those variations are obscured by processes of selection that reduce the heterogeneity 
among managers and encourage them to believe in their ability to control the odds, by systems of 
organizational controls and incentives that dictate risk taking behavior in significant ways, and 
by variations in the demand for risk taking produced by the context within which choice takes 
place” (p. 1414).  Therefore understanding how managerial differences, expressed as Executive 
Style, interact with structures designed to manage risk is a key concern for firms as failure to 
manage risk can lead to severe costs (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013).  
 
Executive Style 
This research adopts the usage of the term Executive Style per Håkonsson et al., (2012) 
where Executive Style is a multidimensional construct based on a manager’s information 
processing.  Based on prior research conducted by Cyert and March (1963), Likert (1967) Yukl 
(1981), Miller et al., (1982) and Kotter (1988), Burton and Obel (2004) found that managers 
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process information and use their time in different ways. The first root characteristic of 
Executive Style identified by Burton and Obel (2004), information processing, was found to be 
congruent with Cyert and March’s (1963, p. 119) concept of uncertainty avoidance, and who 
describe uncertainty avoidance to include: 
• Avoid correctly anticipating events in the distant future by using short-run reaction 
to short-run feedback, i.e. solve pressing problems rather than develop long run 
strategies 
• Avoid anticipating the environment by negotiating with it 
 
Information processing is a key component of Executive Style as each manager handles 
information differently. Håkonsson et al., (2012) also discuss the importance of information 
processing to strategy when they note “a misalignment of Executive Style and strategy implies 
that the Executive Style will not support the implementation of a strategy” (p. 183). The authors 
further explain that, “the more uncertainty is embedded in the strategy, the more information 
processing support will be required by the executive” (Håkonsson et al., 2012, p. 183).  
Information processing can also be challenging due to the possible amount of data 
available for analysis and the constrained abilities of a manager to synthesize and act upon the 
information. Daft and Lengel (1984, 1986) discuss the role of information processing in a firm as 
a means to first reduce uncertainty and second to reduce equivocality, a term distinct from 
uncertainty in that equivocality presumes a “messy, unclear field” (p. 554) while uncertainty has 
been described as “an individual's perceived inability to predict something accurately” (Milliken, 
1987, p. 136) and has been typified as a topic requiring additional research between the 
uncertainty types of 1) perceived environmental uncertainty, 2) effect uncertainty and 3) response 
uncertainty (Milliken, 1987). 
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The second characteristic identified by Burton and Obel (2004), the use of time, correlates 
to preference to delegate. Burton and Obel (2004) note “a leader is likely to delegate when 
he/she finds it efficient in terms of his or her own time availability and further when he/she 
thinks the organization will make decisions congruent with his/her preferences and experience” 
(p. 104). These two dimensions led to the identification of four styles termed Manager, Maestro, 
Producer and Leader (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Executive Styles (Håkonsson et al., 2012) 
 
 
The four styles - Manager 
The first two styles to discuss are styles of managers who prefer less delegation and more 
personal involvement in decision-making. The Manager style is characterized by a low degree of 
delegation and a low degree of uncertainty avoidance. Characteristics identified by Burton and 
Obel (2004) and Håkonsson et al., (2012) include a leader who attends to detail, controls 
feedback and has a short-term, income now, focus rather than a long-term profits later focus. 
This type of leader may prefer to make line-by-line decisions (Miller and Toulouse, 1986a, 
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1986b) and collect his/her own information. Reacting to events as they occur, this manager may 
be faced with emerging crises which threaten to overwhelm their information processing 
capacity. This may present difficulties as organizations become more complex and information 
processing requirements increase, although some aid may be provided by information processing 
and decision support systems (Daft and Lengel, 1984; Robbins, 1990) but ultimately may 
challenge this leader’s wish for control. 
 
The four styles - Maestro 
Maestro style managers possess a more long term proactive view and are managers who 
prefer stability to variance. They tend to focus on the difficult and new and work to bring it under 
control, similar to an orchestral maestro, hence the name (Håkonsson et al., 2012). However, this 
focus may proves to be a bottleneck as they may prefer personal involvement with decision-
making and information requirements in uncertain situations may prove overwhelming 
(Håkonsson et al., 2012; Robbins, 1990). The proactive approach they bring, such as “creative 
thinking,[and] a vision for the future” (Burton and Obel, 2004, p. 116) also require a great deal of 
information processing, but does not restrain the manager from long-range, perhaps risky, 
planning while providing inspirational leadership to subordinates (Miller and Toulouse, 1986).  
 
The four styles – Producer 
The two styles that remain are characteristic of managers who prefer more delegation of 
tasks. The Producer tends to focus more on control and prefers a decentralized structure (Burton 
and Obel, 2004). While they support bottom-up innovation they prefer to let subordinates pursue 
ambiguous situations (Håkonsson et al., 2013). In contrast to the Manager style of leader, a 
Producer may want to understand the decisions being made, and doesn’t wish to make line-by-
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line decisions (Miller and Toulouse, 1986) but still may have to react to situations as they occur, 
due to the Producer’s short-term orientation. The Producer’s use of delegation may enable others 
to address ambiguity while they maintain overall focus and control, all while avoiding 
development of innovative ideas themselves. This behavior may be supported by their desire to 
avoid risks, which innovation may represent (Burton and Obel, 2004; Miller et al., 1982; Miller 
and Toulouse, 1986).    
 
The four styles - Leader 
The final style is the Leader style. This style of executive displays a more global focus on 
what is happening next and is less focused on the present in favor of the future. They may prefer 
to leave the near term decisions to subordinates as well as information processing tasks, allowing 
the Leader to work on long term strategic decisions (Håkonsson et al., 2012). As part of the 
delegation process the Leader will only provide general versus detailed guidance to subordinates 
and instead of exerting a great deal of control will provide a great deal of autonomy and 
independence (Zaleznik, 1977). However, the Leader benefits from this in their ability to 
envision long term solutions and opportunities, although greater risk may be involved, both 
positive or negative (Burton and Obel, 2004). Inspiration versus direct control of subordinates is 
the preferred motivation method (Toulouse and Miller, 1986) and may be seen as entrepreneurial 
to observers (Håkonsson et al., 2012).  
Each of these styles of leader must engage with risk management decisions that face their 
supply chain risk management postures. Based on their differing attributes, it may be anticipated 
that different managers may address supply chain risk management differently, leading to 
differing amounts of fit between certain Executive Styles and attainment of a particular supply 
chain risk management maturity level.  
97 
 
 
 
Executive Style and fit 
Håkonsson et al. (2012), in their examination of Danish enterprises, examined the concept 
of fit between firm strategy and Executive Style. The authors explored if a certain Executive 
Style is best aligned with a firm strategy, would firm performance realize a positive impact. The 
hypothesis was that alignment raised the possibility of superior performance based upon the 
alignment fit between strategy and style. The study examined decision-making and information-
processing styles to arrive at an understanding of Executive Style and found the attributes 
associated with information-processing, referred to as ‘uncertainty avoidance’, is “relevant for 
strategy implementation” (Håkonsson et al., 2012, p. 185), which, as was noted by Miller and 
Friesen (1983), is an aspect of the system needed to meet and overcome dynamic challenges. 
Overall, Håkonsson et al., (2012) found “alignment between Executive Style and strategy has 
positive performance implications” (p. 195).   
Understanding Executive Style and the inherent challenges managers face can help a firm 
understand if future strategic direction can be best fulfilled by the current manager in place, or if 
style adjustment may need to occur to best match strategy. The examination of Executive Style 
conducted by Håkonsson et al. (2012) provides an increased granularity of managerial definition 
that incorporates the interaction effects of the two concepts of uncertainty avoidance and degree 
of delegation. The proper fit between style and strategy is opined to reduce performance loss 
stemming from misalignment of these two fields when merged with firm strategy. Knowing the 
executive and their style therefore becomes an important part of firm knowledge. One area of 
research extension where this interaction may have critical impact is when deliberations and 
decisions surrounding supply chain risk occur, accompanied by risk management decisions.  
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Research Hypotheses 
        Firm strategy provides guidance to align efforts across the firm to achieve a goal. Over time, 
this strategy may also provide vision and motivation as well. An understanding of a firm’s 
strategy will aid in understanding changes that are made as the environment changes 
(MacCrimmon, 1993). To retain a competitive advantage, Porter (1980) has noted that firms 
must be able to adopt an offensive or defensive position against competitive forces. In the face of 
a serious to catastrophic disruption to operations, an effective risk management structure will 
allow for mitigated damage and a more resilient and timely recovery to pre-disruption operations 
(Sheffi, 2005; COSO, 2004). If a firm has the capability to manage disruption risk better than its 
competitor, it may gain a competitive advantage post-disruption (Sheffi, 2005; Simchi-Levi et 
al., 2013).  
     Implementation of a risk management plan and process requires a decision-maker who has 
been assigned the task. If a firm benefits from implementation of risk management processes and 
plans (Sheffi, 2005; Sheffi and Rice, 2005), the closer aligned Executive Style is to firm strategy 
the more congruence there will be between a manager’s decision to participate in the risk 
management process and a firm strategy that desires risk to be managed. The manager becomes 
key.  “The influence a leader exerts in altering moods, evoking images and expectations, and in 
establishing specific desires and objectives determines the direction a business takes. The net 
result of this influence changes the way people think about what is desirable, possible, and 
necessary” (Zelaznik, 1977, p. 76). Therefore, the manager tasked with risk management sets the 
tone and direction of risk management execution. When a manager of either the Maestro style or 
Leader style assumes this task, greater congruence with firm strategy would be expected due to 
the increased risk acceptance and long-range focus of both managers. Advanced states of supply 
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chain risk management maturity involve time, vision and resource commitment that may be more 
congruent with the Maestro, followed by the Leader.  
     When the executive prefers a short-term focus, similar to that of the Manager and Producer, 
less congruence with achieving greater stages of supply chain risk management maturity levels 
may be anticipated. These managers are known for a more short term focus and a reactionary 
approach to management. This approach may be less supportive of the requirements to achieve 
higher levels of maturity. As it relates to risk management support of overall strategy, when a 
leader delegates the risk management task to subordinates, similar to the middle manager of 
Balogun and Johnson (2004), there appears to be a further distance and disconnectedness from 
firm strategy, which may be seen in the Producer and their delegates. This may be due to the 
imperfect information received by the middle manager and may be corrected with explicit risk 
management instructions, but perfect transmission of information in a firm is problematic. This 
gives rise then to “the emergence of unintended consequences out of intended strategies as a 
result of a process of sensemaking by middle managers” (Balogun and Johnson, p. 295).  Middle 
managerial sensemaking processes of subordinates determine that strategic “plans are translated 
into action through the medium of these inter-recipient processes (everyday experiences of the 
actions and behaviours of others, and the stories, gossip, jokes, conversations and discussions 
they share with their peers about these experiences), turning top-down intended change into an 
emergent and unpredictable process” Balugun and Johnson (2005, p. 2). Therefore, the further 
removed from firm strategy through delegation, which also introduces another layer of activities, 
and strategy dilution through individual sensemaking, the less congruent with firm strategy the 
risk management process may be. When considering congruence with Level IV of the supply 
chain risk management maturity framework, the Leader style, therefore may experience less 
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congruence than the Maestro style leader, while it is anticipated that the Producer style manager 
would possess the least congruence with Level IV maturity, following the Manager style. How 
these managers approach the task of risk management either through the use of heuristics or a 
more formal adoption of risk management techniques, such as established frameworks and the 
overall maturity of their efforts may impact firm performance.  
        Supply chain risk management implementation is a marker to identify implementation of 
firm strategy in anticipation of a serious to catastrophic business impact (Simchi-Levi et al., 
2013). The supply chain manager’s approach to risk management maturity achievement and 
subsequent actual planning may be affected by their Executive Style. From this discussion the 
following hypotheses are proposed and illustrated in Figure 3. 
H1a: The Maestro style is negatively associated with Level I SCRM maturity 
H1b: The Maestro style is positively associated with Level II SCRM maturity  
H1c: The Maestro style is positively associated with Level III SCRM maturity  
H1d: The Maestro style is positively associated with Level IV SCRM maturity. 
 
H2a: The Leader style is negatively associated with Level I SCRM maturity. 
H2b: The Leader style is positively associated with Level II SCRM maturity.  
H2c: The Leader style is positively associated with Level III SCRM maturity.  
H2d: The Leader style is negatively associated with Level IV SCRM maturity.  
  
H3a: The Manager style is negatively associated with Level I SCRM maturity.  
H3b: The Manager style is positively associated with Level II SCRM maturity.  
H3c: The Manager style is negatively associated with Level III SCRM maturity.  
H3d: The Manager style is negatively associated with Level IV SCRM maturity.  
 
H4a: The Producer style is positively associated with Level I SCRM maturity.  
H4b: The Producer style is positively associated with Level II SCRM maturity.  
H4c: The Producer style is negatively associated with Level III SCRM maturity.  
H4d: The Producer style is negatively associated with Level IVSCRM maturity.  
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Figure 3: Executive Style congruence with supply chain risk management, adapted from 
Håkonsson et al., (2012) 
 
 
Supply chain risk management and Executive Style  
      As previously discussed, Supply Chain Risk Management is an interdependent topic that 
draws upon relationships between firm strategy, risk, risk management and the individual 
manager, as expressed through the construct of Executive Style. The complexities that develop 
from these relationships impact a firm’s ability to be resilient when faced with disruptions 
(Hillson, 1997; IACCM, 2003; Lockamy and McCormack, 2004; Oliveira et al., 2011; Simchi-
Levi et al., 2012). Understanding this interaction is made challenging by several factors 
including that the “critical dimension” (van Hoek et al., 2002, p. 119) of manager as a unit of 
analysis has been under-researched in supply chain literature. Although the heterogeneity of 
decision-makers has been recognized in the literature of other fields, notably finance and 
economics, it remains poorly understood in supply chain contexts and has only been researched 
fleetingly. 
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Figure 4: Scope of research (adapted from Håkonsson et al., 2012; Simchi-Levi et al., 2013) 
 
 
  Additionally, how the manager interacts with the task of risk management may be subject 
to situational and individual (perspective driven) influences, although within the context and 
influence of firm strategy. For instance a manager may be faced with a disruption possibility 
along a range of probabilities and impacts and the manager’s individual attributes, such as prior 
experience or aversion to risk, will guide their decision-making. The individual risk management 
approach of managers, linked to their Executive Styles, has not been previously considered and 
collectively, these risk management topics have not been appropriately studied in a supply chain 
context. Figure 4 illustrates the scope of the present research. 
 
     This chapter discussed key literature pertaining to risk management and Executive Style as 
well as supply chain risk management and risk. Chapter Three describes the methodology used 
for this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The complex interaction between Executive Style and a manager’s approach to risk 
management has not been adequately explored or understood and represents a gap in the 
literature. McGrath (1982) and Creswell (2003) note the importance of converging qualitative 
and quantitative research methods to gain greater understanding of a research problem. Chapter 3 
will provide the justification and description of the qualitative and quantitative methodologies. 
Multiple Method Research Overview 
The purpose of the multiple method approach in this research is to more completely 
understand the effect of Executive Style on supply chain risk management in a healthcare 
context. Data was collected concurrently using a survey and semi-structured interviews. The 
selected approach, one of several as shown in Figure 5, allowed for both a numeric 
understanding of the relationship through quantitative research as well as provided additional 
detail derived through qualitative research (Andrew and Halcomb, 2009; Davis et al., 2011).  
 
104 
 
 
Figure 5: Research purposes in multiple methods research designs (Davis et al., 2011) 
 
Multiple methodologies approaches 
There are multiple possible approaches when combining methodologies for a single study 
(Creswell, 2002; Andrew and Halcomb, 2009). This research employed a concurrent 
implementation sequence, where the qualitative and quantitative data collection was conducted 
simultaneously. The emphasis was split equally between the quantitative determination of the 
relationship between Executive Style and supply chain risk maturity, Study 1, and the qualitative 
study, exploring the complex influences faced by supply chain managers, Study 2. The 
qualitative study was designed to provide more in depth exploration with selected respondents to 
understand if there are other important factors influencing supply chain risk managers that may 
cause their choices and influence decisions that lead to the current risk maturity of their supply 
chain. Additionally, Study 2 sought to add depth and nuance to results generated in Study 1 
(McGrath, 1982). This approach is important as the concurrent examination of the supply chain 
management from a risk management and leadership perspective and a more complete 
understanding of the breadth of the topic, provided by the exploratory qualitative portion added 
nuance and depth to the groundwork quantitative portion which sought to understand current 
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conditions with healthcare supply chain managers. An overview of the process is provided in 
Figure 6.  
Figure 6: Methodological process 
 
   (Poole and Van de Ven, 2010; Glaser and Strauss, 1967; adapted from Rowland and Perry, 
2009) 
 
Study 1 - Quantitative Research Overview 
Several authors have noted that the influence of Executive Style in supply chain decision-
making has received limited attention and is underdeveloped (Gattorna, 1998; Trkman and 
McCormack, 2009; Godsell et al., 2010). Research in managerial decision making should include 
an estimation of fit between supply chain managers, to include how managers approach the risk 
of supply chain non-performance and the firm’s supply chain risk management maturity level. 
Gattorna (1998) notes the different impact of leadership styles on firm strategy and stresses the 
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ability to assess and understand a manager’s style as an aid to determine gaps in managerial 
capabilities. To better understand these potential gaps, a process focused on uncovering the co-
variation between Executive Style and SCRM maturity was proposed. 
 
Quantitative research and survey methodology 
Quantitative research methods, as deductive processes, use a variance approach to 
understand proposed hypotheses and serve to provide an outcome-driven (Aldrich, 2001) 
explanation for the variation of the output (Van de Ven, 2007). Surveys are one method that is 
widely accepted in SCM research (Braunscheidel and Suresh, 2009; Richey et al., 2010; Speier, 
2011). Use of an electronically administered survey was justified for several reasons. First, the 
data required to address the research questions was not readily available through secondary data 
or other quantitative methods (Dillman et al., 2009). Second, a survey methodology provided, 
from among a select sample frame, a statistically validated numeric description of a relationship 
from which interpretations and generalizations were formulated across the survey population 
(Jick, 1979; Dillman, 2000; Creswell, 2003; Dillman et al., 2009). The third is its accepted use in 
supply chain research (Chen and Paulraj, 2004; Mangan et al., 2004; Braunscheidel and Suresh, 
2009; Richey et al., 2010; Speier, 2011) to include exploratory studies (Juttner, 2005) supply 
chain personnel research (Keller and Ozment, 1999; Ellinger et al., 2002; Myers et al., 2011) and 
managerial research (Schriesheim et al., 1988; Slater, 1989).  Fourth, electronic surveys have 
been shown to possess advantages over paper based surveys in perceived urgency, receipt-to-
response time, data entry, delivery knowledge (mis-sent e-mails are promptly indicated to the 
sender as undeliverable) and speed of delivery (Griffis et al., 2003; Dillman et al., 2009). Fifth, 
surveys are appropriate when relationships are not readily observable and manager perceptions 
are required for the analysis (Schneider et al., 1996). Finally, as part of a multiple method 
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approach, “surveys became more meaningful when interpreted in light of critical qualitative 
information” (Jick, 1979, p. 606).  Jick (1979) further found concurrent use of surveys as one of 
“various techniques and instruments generated a rather rich and comprehensive picture” (p. 606).   
 
Survey instrument overview 
The survey instrument was adapted from Simchi-Levi et al., (2013) for the supply chain 
management and risk management items (Table 6) and Håkonsson et al., (2012) for the 
Executive Style items. The complete survey item list is found in Appendix A. Simchi-Levi et al., 
(2013) identified characteristics of both supply chain maturity and risk management maturity 
within a four level framework progressing from least capable at Level I to most capable at Level 
IV. The measured maturity level, as achieved by a firm through managerial decision-making and 
strategy choices, is indicative of a firm’s propensity to recover following a supply chain 
disruption. A manager’s particular style (Håkonsson, et al., 2012) may bear on their willingness 
to achieve and maintain a particular level of maturity. 
Table 6: Generalized Capability Maturity Classifications 
Capability Maturities Supply Chain Risk Management 
Level I Functional Supply Chain 
Management 
Ad-hoc Management of 
Risk 
Level II Internal Supply Chain 
Integration  
Positioning of Planed 
Buffers to Absorb 
Disruptions 
Level III External Supply Chain 
Collaboration 
Proactive Risk Response 
Level IV Dynamic Supply Chain 
Adaptation 
Fully Flexible Response to 
Risk 
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Håkonsson et al., (2012), building on prior Executive Style studies (Håkonsson, 2006, 
2008), identified four categories of managers based upon their styles as delineated by a 
combination of preference for delegation and their preference for uncertainty avoidance (Figure 
7).  
Figure 7: Executive Style Classification 
 High Uncertainty Avoidance  
Low Delegation 
Preference 
Manager Producer High Delegation 
Preference 
Maestro Executive 
 Low Uncertainty Avoidance  
 
Survey sample 
Participants were selected through probabilistic random sampling of both civilian and 
military hospital supply chain managers. This sample was justified as the research sought to 
understand the relationship between supply chain decision-makers and their approach to risk 
management. Random sample responses allow for adequate confidence that the general 
population is represented in the results (Singleton and Straits, 2004; Van de Ven, 2007). Kotzab 
(2005), in a review of supply chain management survey research, found a large number of 
researchers utilized non-probabilistic samples and noted the “disadvantage of such samples is 
that the findings from the collected data cannot be considered to be statistically representative for 
the total population” (p. 134). This research provides more generalizable results in the healthcare 
supply chain discipline than were available previously. The initial sample was generated from a 
membership list of a professional organization that specializes in healthcare supply chain 
management. Flynn et al., (1990) suggests limiting survey research “to a group which is 
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homogeneous with respect to at least one characteristic, such as industry” (p. 257).  As 
leadership, delegation and decision-making are considered important traits for respondents, a 
search of the organization’s membership list for those who were designated as Vice President, 
Director or Manager of supply chains was conducted. Additionally the survey was distributed to 
US military officers who were active in the medical logistics career field and had recent hospital 
supply chain experience, which was the closest US military equivalent to the civilian role. 
 
Error handling 
Coverage, sampling and nonresponse errors are aspects that must be addressed in survey 
research. “Coverage error occurs when not all members of the population have a known, nonzero 
chance of being included in the sample” (Dillman et al., 2009, p. 17). This is a recognized 
weakness, as not all US based healthcare supply chain managers in a leadership role are 
members of the professional association from which respondent names were selected. 
Identification of the appropriate contact at the over 5,700 registered US hospitals (AHA, 2014) 
was beyond the cost and time considerations available for this study and the membership role of 
the professional association was referenced due to the organization’s mission and vision.  
The association’s stated mission is “to advance healthcare through supply chain 
excellence by providing education, leadership, and advocacy to professionals in healthcare and 
related organizations that are accountable to the community and committed to health 
improvement” (AHRMM, 2014) and their vision statement is “Advancing healthcare through 
supply chain excellence” (AHRMM, 2014). As such, members in healthcare leadership positions 
were deemed adequate as a respondent pool.   
Sampling error occurs as a result of not every member in the population being sampled 
(Dillman et al., 2009) and is recognized as a part of all surveys. Increased completed samples 
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mitigates this effect and guidance provided by Dillman et al., (2009) to increase response rates 
was followed. 
Nonresponse error “results when people selected for a survey who do not respond are 
different in a way that is important to the study from those who did respond” (Dillman et al., 
2009, p. 19). This will be addressed through the use of carefully worded explanatory follow-up 
reminders as nonresponse is recognized as “far outweighing random sampling error in 
contributing to total survey error” (Assael and Keon, 1982, p. 121). 
 
Procedure 
The survey instrument was developed using the supply chain risk maturity framework 
items of Simchi-Levi et al., (2013) and the Executive Style framework of Håkonsson et al., 
(2012) and will generally follow the procedures outlined by Gligor and Holcomb (2012). A first 
draft of the questionnaire was reviewed by several academic experts in supply chain 
management and was pilot tested with practitioners in the healthcare supply chain management 
field. The unit of analysis and informant in this research was the individual manager. Because 
managers are key decision makers in the supply chain who have a responsibility to the firm to 
support firm strategy (March and Shapira, 1987) and have also been under-researched in the 
supply chain field (Christopher, 2012; Manuj, 2013) the key informants were managers in a 
supply chain role. The healthcare industry was selected to reduce cross-industry bias (Flynn et 
al., 1990). 
The respondents received an e-mail at the e-mail address provided as part of their 
membership information. The email contained a brief description of the study, a note that the 
lead researcher is also a member of the association and a request for assistance (Dillman et al., 
2009). A copy of the initial e-mail and second wave e-mail request can be found in Appendices B 
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and C. Instructions assured respondents that their responses will remain anonymous and an 
opportunity to receive a tabulated copy of the findings was offered in exchange for their e-mail 
address. No further incentives were offered (Dillman et al., 2009). 
 
Pretest 
The questionnaire was pretested for content, predictive, construct and face validity. 
Experienced supply chain managers and academic subject matter experts reviewed the 
questionnaire and recommended adjustments were evaluated and incorporated. 
 
 Instrument 
The questionnaire consisted of a brief introduction, directions and demographic data 
collection. The remainder of the questionnaire administered the scale items. Individual portions 
of the questionnaire are discussed below and the complete protocol will be found in Appendix A. 
The study was assigned research number H14139 by the Institutional Review Board.  
The overview portion introduced respondents to the general purpose and scope of the 
research. Respondents were reminded that participation is entirely voluntary, may be ended by 
the participant at any time without penalty and there was no compensation sought or offered for 
completion of the survey beyond summary results in exchange for an e-mail address. A total of 
twenty-one items were used to measure Executive Style and fourteen items were used to measure 
supply chain risk maturity.  A brief section of demographics was also included.  
Slight modifications to the items from Simchi-Levi et al., (2013) were made for 
readability and to maintain the original intent. Items from Håkonsson et al., (2012) were not 
modified. A five point Likert scale was used for the majority of questions, in keeping with the 
original form of the questionnaires. The scales were reexamined to ensure continued reliability. 
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The survey was delivered electronically through Qualtrics (Qualtrics, 2014), a web-based survey 
administration firm. 
 
Scale Purification 
Following the procedure for a survey scale purification of Mentzer et al., (1999), a 
random sample of responses were subject to Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) to determine 
continued inclusion and possible exclusion of scale items. The remaining items were then 
assessed for both validity and reliability. SPSS was used to perform the analysis and verify the 
scales. Basic descriptive statistics were analyzed for normality, skewness, kurtosis, means, 
standard deviations and outliers. Items identified as discrepancies were considered for removal 
and validity was established (Cresswell, 2007). Modification indices were not utilized to 
minimize the impact of removal of one item on the overall scales (Hair et al., 2010).  
 
Common method bias 
 Common method bias occurs when scores are either inflated or decreased due to factors 
involving the measurement method or use of the same respondent to reply to all questionnaire 
items (Conway and Lance, 2010). Podsakoff et al., (2003) provides a comprehensive review of 
the topic and methods to address potential common method bias issues as they are reported to be 
“one of the main sources of measurement error” (Podsakoff et al., 2003, p. 879). The goal is to 
minimize any effect that measurement of one construct of interest has upon another construct of 
interest.  
 Several steps were taken to address the possible effects of common method bias in this 
research following Dillman et al., (2009). To minimize the effect of respondents’ pre-judgment of 
a topic and what the researcher was ultimately addressing, i.e. an item priming effect, 
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introductory headings were minimized to the most basic of instructions. Item ambiguity, the 
situation where respondents respond to items using their own heuristic or entirely at random, was 
addressed by ensuring items are clearly worded and represented distinct, discrete concepts. 
Measurement context effects include those pertaining to time, location and medium. As the use 
of separate survey instruments may have led to reduced overall response rate as a factor of 
survey fatigue (Dillman et al., 2009), all constructs were included on the same instrument to be 
completed concurrently, however survey items were separated by appearing on differing pages of 
the survey instrument. Location refers to where the survey is administered and was beyond the 
scope of influence of the researcher as the survey could be taken online at any location.  
Online delivery of the survey instrument has been shown to decrease social desirability 
effects (Richman et al., 1999) and increases accuracy when compared with face-to-face interview 
data collection techniques. To avoid effects from context induced mood, the questions pertaining 
to supply chain risk management maturity level were randomized to avoid building from least 
mature to most mature (Podsakoff et al., 2003). These are summarized in Table 7. 
 
Table 7: Common method bias sources of control 
Method of Bias Control Technique 
Item priming effects 
Item ambiguity 
Measurement context effects 
Social desirability and accuracy 
Minimize explanatory headings of questions 
Review questionnaire wording to minimize 
inclusion of respondent’s own heuristic 
Spatial separation of questions within the 
survey to reduce cueing from retrieval effects 
Use of survey vs. face-to-face data collection 
Context induced mood Randomize questions of supply chain risk maturity level determination 
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Data analysis – cluster analysis 
 Cluster analysis was employed to group supply chain maturity levels. Classification of 
maturity levels was accomplished through generation of groups of respondents based upon 
survey responses. This technique recognizes that aspects of multiple maturity levels may be 
present in a firm, while placing a respondent within the most homogenous grouping when 
compared with other respondents (Aldendorfer and Blashfield, 1984, Hair et al., 2010). This 
technique groups responses based upon similarity and serves as a method to represent 
respondents in this study as Simchi-Levi, et al., (2013) put forth maturity levels in their study of 
supply chain risk management.  
 This research classified a maturity level as a measure of prevailing presence of activities 
within a level. Cluster Analysis has been used previously to classify supply chain relationships 
(Humphries et al., 2007), introduce a taxonomy of supply chain management practices (Paulraj et 
al., 2013), introduce maturity level classification for e-commerce applications (Senarathna et al., 
2013, Daniel et al., 2002) and for business process maturity (van Looy et al., 2013) and “places 
the most similar observations into groups” (Hair et al., 2020, p. 510).  Cluster analysis further 
seeks to maximize homogeneity within clusters and maximize heterogeneity between clusters 
while allowing for objects to appear in multiple groups. 
 This classification allowed identification of the structure of a maturity level based upon 
responses to survey questions which formed clusters that were further analyzed for dependence 
relationships. The resulting clusters were non-metric, ordinal measures of maturity levels based 
upon the observed structure within the groups using SPSS software results. 
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Field, (2009) and Mooi and Sarstedt, (2011) suggest multinomial logistic regression as an 
appropriate technique for examining the relationship between one or more non-metric dependent 
variables and two or more non-metric independent variables. 
 
Data analysis – multinomial logistic regression 
 One goal of this research is to understand the effect of Executive Style on Risk 
Management maturity levels. While the effect of a single variable may be examined through the 
exclusive use of cross-tabulation, any interaction effects from multiple independent variables 
would remain unknown. A common method used to explore similar relationships is multiple 
regression, however, the current model includes variables that are non-metric, may not be 
normally distributed and seeks to determine a relationship between a single dependent variable 
and multiple independent variables. Discriminant analysis was eliminated due to the need for the 
independent variables to be metric (Hair et al., 2010) 
 Multinomial logistic regression combines multiple regression and multiple discriminant 
analysis (Hair et al., 2010), when prediction of membership is desired with more than two 
categorical outcomes (Field, 2009), can accommodate single and multiple metric and non-metric 
independent variables and the dependent variables are non-metric. 
The objective was to use the Executive Style classification to predict group membership 
in a Maturity Level cluster. Literature support for grouping maturity levels of supply chain risk 
management maturity levels has been previously identified by Simchi-Levi, et al., (2013), 
IACCM, (2003),  Hillson, (1997), Lockamy and McCormack, (2004), and De Oliveira et al., 
(2011). These studies have classified maturity levels as occurring variously on four or five levels, 
yet all exhibit general descriptive agreement as to the capabilities present in a given maturity 
level. 
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The dependent variables were be the risk management maturity clusters. The independent 
variables were the four Executive Styles. Descriptive statistics were analyzed and are reported 
below.  
The process of data inspection began with a check for missing data and followed the 
guidelines of Hair et al., (2007) regarding the potential impact and application of any remedies.  
Means and standard deviations were examined, skewness, kurtosis, scatterplots and normal 
probability plots were also examined to determine normality of the data. Normal distribution of 
the variables used to form Executive Style construct is a key criteria for data to insure further 
statistical testing is valid (Hair et al., 2007). Corrective measures are possible and are discussed 
in Chapter 4, if applied.  Skewness is a measure of the balance of data distribution to the left or 
the right from being centered and having the same shape. Kurtosis is an indication of the amount 
of peak or flatness in the distribution. Normal distributions are indicated by a value of zero (Hair 
et al., 2007). 
Visual examination of large data sets is accomplished through graphical representation of 
the data. Common methods include generation and examination of a normal probability plot and 
scatterplot to assess any departure from normal distribution. The scatterplot examination yields 
insight into the homoschedasticity of the data. Homoschedastic data is preferable as dependent 
relationships should be explained across all of the predictor variables and according to Hair et 
al., (2007) these relationships are best examined through graphical means. The scatterplot 
examination also provides a check on the linearity of the data distribution. Presence of a non-
linear relationship may indicate weakened strength of the relationship.  
Once the data was been evaluated, multinomial logistic regression was conducted 
following Field, (2009) and Mooi and Sarstedt, (2011) suggestions. The model was assessed 
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using the log likelihood statistic which compares the predicted values of the outcome with the 
observed values of the outcome and “is analogous to the residual sum of squares in multiple 
regression in the sense that it is an indicator of how much unexplained information there is after 
the model has been fitted” (Field, 2009, p. 267). The log-likelihood is a measure of unexplained 
observations, therefore the larger the value, the less predictive value the model possesses. 
   
Study 2 - Qualitative Research Overview 
     Testing the dynamic human behavior driven relationship between Executive Style and risk 
management is an emergent research area, therefore a qualitative approach which uses semi-
structured interviews is appropriate (Gligor and Autry, 2012) to provide additional details that 
may fall outside the scope of a survey. With scant preexisting empirical research in the area of 
supply chain risk management (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013) this approach allows researchers to 
conduct studies “attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings 
people bring to them” (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011, p. 3). Trkman and McCormack (2009) suggest 
further qualitative study of both risk mitigation and risk impact in the developing but “currently 
disorganized” (Trkman and McCormack, 2009, p. 255) field of SCRM. Exercising this method 
as part of a larger multiple method approach provides an opportunity for converging data 
(Denzin, 1971; Jick, 1979; Bak, 2005) as a means of validation. This confirmation is key to 
expanding and validating knowledge, as use of multiple methods “enhances our belief that the 
results are valid and not a methodological artifact” (Bouchard, 1976, p. 268). This approach also 
serves to address Hunt’s (2010) reminder that when seeking to understand theory the process 
should do so “through a systematized structure capable of both explaining and predicting 
phenomena” (p. 194) as both induction and deduction are important aspects of empirical 
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confirmation (Hunt, 2010). However there has been a lack of mixed empirical confirmation in 
the SCM field.  
 
Qualitative research and interview methodology 
The supply chain management field has been dominated by deductive research (Ellram 
and Cooper, 2013) and as Creswell (2003) notes, research decisions should develop from the 
nature of the problem and fit appropriately. To provide greater validity to the quantitative results, 
and address some concerns of the three-horned dilemma (McGrath, 1982), an exploratory 
qualitative approach will be employed as part of this dissertation. The three horned dilemma 
addresses the challenge of research having the ‘horns’ of generalizability, precision and realism, 
yet methods which are strong in support of one ‘horn’ are weak in the support of the others. 
Multiple methods in a research project or stream address more than one horn. The interview 
process, as a qualitative approach, allows participants to provide historical information, personal 
responses and allows the researcher to tailor the questions to a specific scope of interest 
(Creswell, 2003) to explore nuances that quantitative methods cannot capture. The use of 
qualitative, grounded research can “bring to light deeper or different perspectives and behaviors 
of participants than those discovered previously” (Mello and Flint, 2009) and helps understand 
antecedents, processes and outcomes (Randall et al., 2010).  
A grounded approach, described as research “grounded in data from participants who 
have experienced the process” (Creswell, 2013, p. 83) and using qualitative analysis for 
“examining and interpreting data in order to elicit meaning, gain understanding, and develop 
empirical knowledge” (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, p.1), develops an explanation of an interaction 
or action as described by actual participants through “rich, full, earthy” data (Miles, 1979). 
Further it provides “a basis for corroboration and greater explanatory power” (Ritchie and 
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Brindley, 2007, p. 1406) and allows for the continued conceptualization/definition of integrated 
approaches in research (Tashakkori and Creswell, 2008). 
 Qualitative interview methodology was determined to be an appropriate approach to the 
research questions as no research has been identified that explores the complexity underlying 
Executive Style and supply chain risk management maturity.   Although scales exist for 
measurement of these two concepts separately, other influences may have an effect and may 
emerge through the interview process. Incorporating a systematic interview and analysis process, 
grounded in the actual experiences of practitioners, was designed to obtain insights that may not 
be currently known (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). In this manner, the current research sought to 
combine methods to provide intellectual vitality (Golicic and Davis, 2011) and generate multiple 
perspectives of the topic. Combinations of qualitative and quantitative research are rare in supply 
chain management (Golicic and Davis, 2011) and the presence of both in a research stream may 
support more full understanding of supply chain complexities and contingencies that occur 
between cases in different firms. 
 Although Contingency Theory will be the formal theoretical lens to understand the 
relationship between Executive Style and risk management in the quantitative portion of this 
research, a qualitative research approach was selected within grounded theory guidelines and 
utilized a substantive understanding of literature (Flint et al, 2005).  A substantive understanding 
of literature acknowledges that although researchers enter any endeavor with preconceptions 
based on prior research and knowledge, this research is conducted with an awareness and a 
sensitivity to reduce researcher preconceptions and bias based upon prior theoretical exposure. 
The goal is to allow the voice of the respondent to emerge (Creswell, 2007; Mello, 2006). Use of 
a pre-developed interview protocol, for instance, allows the researcher to focus on discovery 
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leading to verification of a phenomena (Randall and Mello, 2011) as topics to be addressed are 
delimited, yet provide flexibility for exploration. To address some of these concerns, three 
specific steps were used to support theoretical sensitivity, ensure rigor and control bias (Flint, 
1998; Mello, 2006). 
 The first step was to reflect on the larger scope of inquiry. Using self-reflective questions 
such as “What is really going on here?” and “Does my interpretation fit the reality of the 
phenomenon as indicated by the data?” (Mello, 2006) allowed the researcher to remain focused 
on the data and avoid returning to biases that may have derived from a focus on preexisting 
theory. The next step was to ensure a strong skepticism to any explanations that seem to support 
a theoretical perspective, to include creation of categories during analysis or adjusting questions, 
until a thorough verification, grounded in the data, was conducted (Mello, 2006). The final step 
was to ensure adherence to grounded methodology techniques that support rigor and theoretical 
sensitivity (Mello, 2006). 
 
Interview protocol overview 
 Interviews are considered a valuable tool to collect information from research subjects 
(Kvale, 1996; Witzel, 2000; Creswell, 2013) as they allow the researcher to collect rich, nuanced 
data unavailable through other techniques. They also allow the researcher to branch into relevant 
topics as they emerge and follow-up new topics of interest. Following a literature review, 
questions were developed that supported exploration of key topics also under consideration in 
the quantitative portion of the research, such as supply chain risk management maturity (Simchi-
Levi et al., 2013) and Executive Style (Håkonsson et al., 2012). The interview protocol was 
reviewed by academic experts in the field of supply chain management and a pre-test was 
conducted with several practitioners to refine the questions. As with the quantitative portion of 
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the study, respondents were be geographically dispersed. Interviews with the sample respondents 
near the researcher were conducted in person while those at a distance were interviewed via 
telephone, following prior coordination (Creswell, 2013). A copy of the final protocol can be 
found in Appendix A. 
 
Sampling 
     The participants chosen were supply chain managers in a US based healthcare supply chain 
with multiple suppliers. These healthcare supply chains are either civilian or Department of 
Defense entities. Initial contacts were generated from a convenience sample of the author as well 
as contacts provided by those with knowledge of the healthcare industry, with additional 
informants selected based on purposive sampling (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Purposive sampling builds upon conceptual relationships formed during initial interviews which 
allows the researcher to identify new respondents to understand conceptual gaps that have been 
identified (Charmaz, 2000; Macdonald and Corsi, 2013) and are not available from former 
respondents.  
     Sampling continued until saturation was been achieved, which is a point described as “when 
no new categories or relevant themes are emerging” (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, p.148). 
Ultimately, a greater understanding of the relationship between executives and supply chain risk 
management maturity is the goal underlying data collection and analysis. 
 
Data Collection Procedures 
 Mello and Flint (2009) encourage the expanded use of the interview as part of a 
qualitative approach and echo McCracken (1988) who encouraged depth interviews to prompt a 
deeper understanding of the phenomenon under investigation. The semi-structured style of 
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interview is designed to understand a process that presents a problem for those involved 
(Creswell, 2013) and utilizes an instrument that is fluid and refined during the data collection 
process based upon ongoing input and analysis (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011). 
Key to development of this understanding of interview usage is use of the researcher as a 
key instrument in the data collection process (Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2004; Creswell, 2013) in 
contrast with a survey instrument or experiment. To best prepare for the collection of data and 
ensure methodological rigor, a systematic process was followed. As previously discussed, a 
literature review was conducted of the relevant key topics under examination and a gap was 
identified (Suddaby, 2006) in understanding the impact of Executive Style on supply chain risk 
management maturity. From this groundwork, a semi-structured interview protocol was 
developed to guide both the researcher and subject regarding the scope of the questions and to 
remain focused on the core issues (Creswell, 2007). This step is important as it avoided an 
unstructured approach to the material and allowed easier cross case analysis across similar topics 
of interest. After receiving consent from the subject, interviews were audio recorded and then 
transcribed by the researcher. 
Prior to the interview, the subject was asked to complete a supply chain risk map 
indicating their top four to six supply chain disruption risks. Discussions framed by the 
interviewer began with questioning about risks identified in the lower right quadrant of the map, 
which encompasses risks that occur with medium to very-low probability and have an impact 
characterized as medium to catastrophic (see Figure 8). These were followed by discussions of 
risk that indicated in the upper left quadrant of the map to provide contrast. This technique was 
utilized to allow the specific item of concern to the particular supply chain to emerge from within 
the quadrant. Forcing a particular event for discussion, such as a hurricane, may have led to 
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discussions where subjects placed the risk in another quadrant, if those risks were judged 
differently at that facility. Placing the discussion in a certain quadrant aids in quadrant cross case 
comparison of underlying attributes when the specific concerns differ. However, the particular 
event is of less concern than how each facility addressed a similarly scoped concern, and it is 
acknowledged that these events may be unique between facilities and contingent on unique firm 
strategies and attributes. However, development of similar and contrasting themes and categories 
through analysis were believed to lend insight into similarities and differences between managers 
and firms. 
 
Figure 8: Sample completed supply chain risk map 
 
Coding and memoing 
 The use of codes allows the researcher the opportunity to group emergent data based on 
categorical and thematic concepts as the data reveals them and rejects use of pre-determined or 
theoretically derived concepts, categories or themes (Mello, 2006). Key functions of grounded 
theory are addressed by coding, as outlined by Strauss (1978, pp. 55-56) who states coding: 
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1) Both follows upon and leads to generative questions; 
2) Fractures [breaks into distinct meaning units] the data, thus freeing the researcher from 
description and forcing interpretation to higher levels of abstraction; 
3) Is the pivotal operation for moving toward the discovery of a core category or categories; 
and so 
4) Moves toward ultimate integration of the analysis; as well as 
5) Yields the desired conceptual density (i.e., relationships among the codes and the 
development of each). 
 
The researcher began by transcribing the interview and conducted a line-by-line analysis, 
noting initial similarities and differences and developing initial groupings of words, phrases, 
thoughts, sentences and paragraphs (Glaser, 2001). As transcription review continued, the 
researcher added to extant categories and added new categories as necessary, regardless of any 
preconceptions based on a priori knowledge (Charmaz, 1998).  
As categories emerge from codes, they should be reflective of boundaries between concepts 
as well as identifying an integrated set of concepts (Glaser, 1978). The following criteria should 
be present to elevate a category to the level of a core category, one that becomes a guide for 
directing future data collection efforts include (Goulding, 2002, p. 89): 
1) It must be central and account for a large portion of behavior. 
2) It must be based on reoccurrence in the data. 
3) A core category takes longer to saturate than other categories/concepts. 
4) It must relate meaningfully to other categories. 
5) It should have clear implications for the development of formal theory. 
6) The theoretical analysis should be based on the core category. 
7) It should be highly variable and modifiable.  
 
The use of memoing allows researchers the opportunity to organize their thoughts regarding 
ongoing analysis (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Memos reflect and explicate the researchers 
thought process regarding coding, categorization and linkages between them in order to maintain 
an accounting of how ideas change over time as well as allowing for informal reflection on idea 
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development (Glaser, 1978). To allow for efficient and effective use of memos Glaser (1978) 
recommends: 
1) Memos should have a title related to the category or property to which it is initially 
related, 
2) Any other category or property mentioned in the memo is to be highlighted, 
3) If two categories or their properties are identified in the memo, their relationship should 
be discussed or highlighted, 
4) Memos should be kept separate from data (e.g., not written in the margins of field notes), 
and  
5) The analyst should be prepared to sort memos however the theory emerges, and not on a 
predetermined set of ideas. (in Mello, 2006). 
 
These guidelines were employed by the researcher and served as a groundwork for the next 
higher order of grouping and analysis as themes developed across and within cases. 
 
Theoretical sorting 
 Once coding has sufficiently developed, theoretical sorting begins to organize the data 
into a coherent framework as a preparatory phase to writing (Glaser, 1992). Sorting allows for 
further refinement of connections between categories and data properties and allows researchers 
to conceptualize more broadly. This conceptualization may aid in theory development as 
concepts and themes build in complexity and depth (Glaser, 1978). Building on Glaser (1978) 
and following the example of Mello (2006) the subsequent sorting and writing rules that were 
observed include: 
1) Starting to sort: The analyst can start sorting anywhere in the memo bank. 
2) Core variable: Begin sorting all other categories and their properties only as they relate to 
the core category. This rule forces focus, selectivity, and delimiting of the analysis. 
3) Promotion-demotion of core variables: When the analyst is faced with two equally 
qualified variables, one must promote one variable to the core, and demote all other 
variables.  Only those properties of the demoted variable that relate to the core variable 
are used in the analysis. 
4) Memoing: Once sorting on the core variable begins, new ideas are likely to be generated, 
especially on theoretical codes for integrating the theory.  It is necessary to stop sorting at 
these points and write memos. 
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5) Integrative fit: All ideas must fit somewhere in the outline, or the integration must be 
changed or modified. The basic rule is unwavering. 
6) Sorting levels: The analyst first sorts for chapters, then sections of each chapter, and then 
within sections. 
7) Cutting off rules: The firm rule to follow is only to stop when theoretical completeness is 
achieved.  This means that the theory explains variation of behavior in the phenomenon 
with the fewest possible concepts, and with the greatest possible scope. 
 
This technique was designed to provide a parsimonious theoretical development that captured as 
much of the relevant behavior as possible. Of note is Glaser’s (1978) observation that additional 
rules may be developed as necessary, based on requirements of a specific research topic and with 
the goal of ensuring the trustworthiness of the results is solid. 
 
Trustworthiness 
  A broad criticism noted by Glaser and Strauss (1967) is that early qualitative research 
lacked credibility, which then led to their seminal work on grounded theory guidelines. These 
guidelines addressed this credibility criticism through establishment of criteria that address their 
multiple concerns. As grounded theory has matured, other guidelines have been developed as 
part of a rigorous assessment of qualitative research. Flint et al., (2002), drawing on the work of 
Hirschman (1986) and Wallendorf and Belk (1989), note that several critical criteria must be 
addressed during data interpretation (see Table 8). 
Table 8: Trustworthiness considerations in grounded theory (Flint et al., 2002, p. 106) 
Credibility The extent to which the results appear to be acceptable representations of the 
data. 
Transferability The extent to which findings from one study in one context will apply to 
other contexts. 
Dependability The extent to which the findings are unique to time and place; the stability or 
consistency of explanations. 
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Confirmability The extent to which interpretations are the result of the participants and the 
phenomenon as opposed to researcher biases. 
Integrity The extent to which interpretations are influenced by misinformation or 
evasions of participants. 
 
  
     This research addressed these areas through multiple means. Credibility is addressed by 
providing complete information about the respondents and having multiple academic experts 
review the analysis results. Also, respondents were provided initial results and feedback was 
requested to confirm findings are in line with their views (Flint and Mentzer, 2000; Flint et al., 
2002). Transferability was addressed through the use of purposive sampling and periodic checks 
with practitioners as to the possibility that ongoing results and conclusions from other 
respondents were reasonable (Flint and Mentzer, 2000; Flint et al., 2002). Dependability was 
determined as specific events were discussed and compared with the responses from other 
respondents (Flint and Mentzer, 2000; Flint et al., 2002). Confirmability was addressed through 
maintenance of documents and availability of interpretative notes and discussions. Integrity was 
addressed through conducting a professional interview that was consistent with the protocol, 
assuring interviewee anonymity to encourage truthful and non-evasive answers and providing a 
non-threatening or intimidating atmosphere (Flint and Mentzer, 2000; Flint et al., 2002). Once 
the assurances outlined above were met that the data meets the trustworthiness goal, assessment 
of the data began. 
 
Assessment 
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 Early qualitative research was subject to much criticism as being unstructured and 
therefore lacking validity. Glaser and Strauss (1967) developed a systematic process to analyze 
qualitative data that was designed to answer these criticisms. Further, Glaser (1992) specified 
that the criteria of fit, relevance, work, ease of modification as well as parsimony and scope of 
explanatory power were valid criteria for evaluating grounded theory.  
 Fit “refers to the relationship of the core category to the salient social problem and its 
ability to account for most of the variation in behavior used to address the problem” (Hall and 
Callery, 2001, p. 259) as well as the “extent to which findings fit the substantive area under 
investigation” (Flint et al., 2002, p. 106). If the categories develop from the data they should 
easily fit empirical situations and be considered appropriate. This concept was assessed through 
provision of data summaries to respondents and assessment of their comments related to 
accuracy as it relates to their experiences. This step allowed for further refinement of data 
interpretation and improved accuracy. 
 Relevance is achieved when practitioners feel conclusions are focused on core issues they 
face in their work environment. Again, respondents were provided a summary of research 
findings from the initial draft and their input was used to assess the relevance from a practitioner 
point of view. As theory develops from findings it should remain focused on the core issues that 
emerge from the data (Hall and Callery, 2001). Academic experts were asked to provide their 
input regarding relevance of the initial results to the academic supply chain field (Mello, 2006). 
 Work implies that developing theories should effectively “provide predictions, 
explanations and interpretations of what was going on in the area under study” (Hall and Calery, 
2001, p. 191). This implies that the researcher should carefully and accurately record facts. Once 
again, respondents reviewed summaries of the findings and were asked if they recognized the 
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activities, strategies and processes of others in the industry (Glaser, 1978). While not explicitly 
describing the theory, this step allows the researcher to ensure facts are faithfully reported.  
 Modification addresses the adjustment to findings as they are constantly compared with 
new data (Glaser, 2002) in the substantive area of study. To provide clear explanation of 
modifications, an audit of modifications was established to clearly show how and why changes 
were made. (Mello, 2006). 
 Parsimony and scope are considered “two major requirements of theory” (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967, pp. 110-111). Parsimony addresses the requirement that as few salient categories 
as possible are retained to explain relationships and findings. Scope strives to have any emerging 
concepts and findings be as widely applicable as possible to “discover multiple aspects of the 
phenomenon” (Flint et al., 2002, p. 106). A concept with a broad enough scope will allow for 
change and variation while continuing to remain relevant and practical. Extended, semi-
structured interviews were used to discover facets and nuances that were present yet previously 
unknown (Flint et al., 2002). This lead to examination of both the quantitative and qualitative 
results simultaneously to understand the supportive and integrative nature of findings from each 
study. 
Multiple method integration 
 The complementarity design of concurrent research addresses differing aspects of the 
same phenomenon related to the research question (Golicic and Davis, 2012). The concurrent 
data collection and analysis precludes one study informing another study, i.e. quantitative data 
results influencing formation of the subsequent qualitative portion (e.g. Pagel and Krause, 1999). 
Data are then analyzed, interpreted and reported as a single report. The benefit of this approach 
was noted by Fawcett and Magnan, (2002) who found that “the insight gained by combining the 
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surveys with the interviews yielded a rich and robust view of modern supply chain” (Fawcett and 
Magnan, 2002, p. 343) practice. Integrated results, including comparisons, contrasted findings, 
findings which build upon another or are embedded will be discussed as appropriate (Creswell 
and Tashakkori, 2007), following the guidance of Caracelli and Greene (1993). The use of data 
transformation will be used for integrated analysis. Data transformation involves the 
transformation of quantitative data “into narrative and [is] included with qualitative data in 
thematic or pattern analysis” (Caracelli and Greene, 1993, p. 197). Barriers to multiple method 
integration are presented in Table 9 with proposed mitigation techniques. 
Table 9: Barriers to integration of quantitative and qualitative findings (adapted from 
Bryman, 2007) 
Barrier Mitigation Technique 
Different audiences Ensure balanced analysis and write up of findings do not 
emphasize one technique over another 
Methodological 
preferences 
Ensure each technique receives equal focus; obtain additional 
training in new techniques 
Structure of the research 
project 
Develop the methods concurrently to ensure a mutual supporting 
role of methods and interlinking of findings is supported 
Skill specialisms Obtain additional training in techniques as required; future work 
may integrate a team with varying strengths 
Nature of the data Avoid focusing on ‘more interesting’ results from the data at the 
expense of the entire integrated findings 
Publication issues Avoid emphasis on reaching certain conclusions or focusing on a 
certain method based on ‘publishability’ in a certain journal based 
on perceived journal bias 
  
 The first potential barrier is to conduct research and develop findings based upon possible 
readership that has a preference and bias for a particular methodology (Bryman, 2007). The 
researcher addressed this concern by ensuring careful weighting was provided for each method 
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and associated findings. Methodological preferences as a barrier may occur when a researcher 
places more faith in one type of method than others and experiences difficulties in finding 
meaningful combinations (Bryman, 2007). This was addressed through research design as each 
protocol was designed to be mutually supportive and provide greater rigor to the findings 
through triangulation. Structure of the project (Bryman, 2007) was addressed through careful and 
thoughtful consideration of how each method was individually appropriate to the research 
question as well as adjusting the particular methods to support both verification through the 
quantitative study and emergence of new concepts through the second study.  
 The concept of skill specialisms addresses the particular strengths and weaknesses that 
particular researchers bring to a project (Bryman, 2007). The lead researcher has developed 
rigorous techniques for each method through solid basing in literature and relevant texts that 
allow the full capabilities of each method to strengthen the overall interlinked research approach. 
A danger lies in one method producing results that are of greater interest to a researcher 
(Bryman, 2007). The research must be careful to not pursue a particularly appealing finding at 
the detriment of other findings. This may also lead to missed interactions and thoughtful 
reflection of more nuanced and relevant findings (Glaser, 1978). Finally publication issues is 
concerned with the research taking on aspects that favor publication in a journal of interest 
(Bryman, 2007) rather than allowing the finding to lead to their natural conclusions. Researchers 
can address this through a varied team or through feedback from a committee which is the 
approach this research will pursue.  
 
Summary 
 This chapter discussed the methodological choices for this research and provided 
explanation for their appropriateness to address the research question. Further the chapter 
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highlighted strengths of survey and interview based research, combined in a single research 
project. Understanding the strengths and barriers and means to address methodological gaps may 
spur further multiple method studies in supply chain management. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
 
 This chapter will discuss the results and findings from both the quantitative and 
qualitative portions of the research. They will be discussed separately for clarity. Study 1, the 
quantitative portion, will be discussed in terms of sample rationale, sample size, data purification 
and data analysis and summary of findings. Study 2, the qualitative portion, will be discussed in 
terms of sample rationale, data collection and interview processes, trustworthiness, data analysis 
and assessment of results.  
Study 1 Quantitative Research Findings 
Sample 
 Participants were healthcare supply chain managers in the United States who were drawn 
from two groups. They were members of the Association of Healthcare Resource and Material 
Managers (AHRMM) and members of the US military who served in hospital supply chain 
positions. The AHRMM members were selected from the AHRMM membership list and were 
screened for two qualities. The first is that they were employed by a hospital, versus members 
who were employed by a healthcare material supplier or distributor. The next is that they held 
senior leadership positions as determined by their title. The membership description screening 
terms were ‘senior,’ ‘vice president,’ and ‘manager’.  777 e-mails were sent to civilian 
respondents. 50 e-mails were returned as undeliverable. 224 respondents attempted (began) the 
survey. 371 e-mails were sent to military respondents in the US Army and US Navy. The US Air 
Force declined to participate. Seven were returned as undeliverable. 57 automated responses 
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indicated the respondent had left their position or were out of the office.  109 respondents 
attempted (began) the survey.  
 
Data Cleaning and Transforming 
Data cleansing consisted of several steps. The first was an examination of missing data. 
As missing data values can affect the calculation of multiple types of statistical analysis, steps 
were taken to reduce this impact while retaining an adequate sample size for analysis. One 
variable “preference for minimizing business risk” was standardized from a three-point to a five-
point Likert score to match all other survey items following Hakonsson et al., (2012).  
A visual inspection of the data identified several respondents with multiple non-response 
fields. These were deemed too numerous to retain and these respondents were deleted. This 
resulted in retention of 187 responses with a limited number of missing data values which 
produced an overall response rate of 18.8%. Missing data was analyzed using the SPSS (2014) 
missing values function to discern any patterns of missing data. Minimum missing percentage for 
analysis was set to 0.01% to ensure all variables were examined for missing patterns. 30 different 
variables were included in the analysis. Seven variables contained complete sets of responses. 
Overall, of the 5,850 individual responses, 71 responses were missing, less than 1.2% and is 
acceptable for imputation (Figure 9) (Hair et al., 2010).  
Variables that are missing must be examined for a pattern that may impact the selection 
of a remedy (Hair et al., 2010). A visual inspection of missing value patterns indicated 
monotonicity of the data was not present, data was not missing at random and bias from a series 
of non-responses was not present (Figure 10). As there were no islands of non-missing data in 
the lower right portion of the grid and no islands of non-missing data in the upper left portion of 
the grid the data was assessed to be non-monotone (SPSS, 2014). Non-monotonic patterns 
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indicate that once a variable is missing, it will reappear in a subsequent measure and the 
underlying reason for the absence may be considered random. This condition limits the 
imputation choices available for remedy (Hair et al., 2010).  
Figure 9: Summary of Missing Data Values for Retained Responses 
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Figure 10: Missing Value Patterns 
 
 
Univariate descriptive statistics were examined to understand at the variable level the 
non-missing values (Table 10). No key survey variable had missing values > 5.3% indicating 
there was no serious issues with missing values (Mooi and Sarstedt, 2011). Examination of 
cross-tabulations of demographics indicated no issues pertaining to membership in a particular 
demographic group having a substantial pattern of missing data with the exception of the 
question regarding disruption experience which had only a 65.2% response rate (Appendix H). 
Demographic questions pertaining to Years of Supply Chain Experience, Years of Healthcare 
Supply Chain Experience and Facility Bed Size all registered a 94.7% response rate. 
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Table 10: Missing Value Univariate Statistics 
Univariate Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation 
Missing No. of Extremesa,b 
Count Percent Low High 
DelegUncert 177 2.21 .811 10 5.3 . . 
SolHumanProb 187 4.32 .706 0 .0 1 0 
StimulCoopDivisions 187 4.33 .644 0 .0 0 0 
FormIdeasVisions 185 4.32 .670 2 1.1 1 0 
Daytodayguidance 187 3.18 .871 0 .0 0 0 
DevNewRoutMethods 186 3.82 .732 1 .5 0 0 
GovEconDecisions 186 4.17 .827 1 .5 9 0 
CertaintRulesFollowed 187 3.91 .785 0 .0 0 0 
DecisionBasedDetailInfo 187 4.08 .604 0 .0 . . 
WaitSeebeforeaction 187 3.03 .643 0 .0 . . 
MinimizeBizRiskStandardised 187 3.58 .977 0 .0 0 0 
MgmntControlsLeadEmpFolRules 184 3.87 .966 3 1.6 0 0 
MgmntControlsNonLeadEmpFolRules 186 3.87 .944 1 .5 0 0 
MgmntControlsLeadEmpRchExpect 183 3.98 .994 4 2.1 0 0 
MgmntControlsNonLeadEmpRchExpect 184 3.88 .956 3 1.6 0 0 
MgmntUsesRsltBasedMotivationLeadEmp 186 4.11 .812 1 .5 10 0 
MgmntUsesRsltBasedMotivationNonLeadEmp 185 3.89 .917 2 1.1 . . 
UseAdHomRMProcess 183 3.14 .890 4 2.1 7 0 
NoVisOutsideOurDomain 185 2.77 .968 2 1.1 0 0 
NoPlannedRedundforDisrupt 186 2.56 .881 1 .5 0 3 
OnlyAbsorbLimitVolatility 184 3.28 .858 3 1.6 3 0 
RedundBasedXfuncCommonPlan 185 3.17 .908 2 1.1 8 0 
BasicRskGovisUsed 186 3.46 .806 1 .5 5 0 
NoVistoOutsideChangesandPatterns 183 2.60 .938 4 2.1 0 3 
UseSensorsandPredictorstoPositResp 185 3.03 .932 2 1.1 0 0 
HaveBCPlans 183 3.80 .822 4 2.1 . . 
MonitorPartnersSCResilience 185 3.14 1.001 2 1.1 0 0 
EmployQuantRM 185 3.21 .887 2 1.1 6 0 
InvestinFlexibility 184 3.30 .949 3 1.6 6 0 
MovePresfromWeakPartners 183 3.26 .817 4 2.1 4 0 
RiskStrategyisSegmented 185 3.25 .816 2 1.1 8 0 
YrsSCExp 177   10 5.3   
YrsHCSCExp 177   10 5.3   
CurrentPosition 177   10 5.3   
DisruptionExperience 122   65 34.8   
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FacilityBedSize 177   10 5.3   
BranchofService 58   129 69.0   
a. Number of cases outside the range (Q1 - 1.5*IQR, Q3 + 1.5*IQR). 
b. . indicates that the inter-quartile range (IQR) is zero. 
 
Multiple Imputation of Missing Values 
Imputation of data is a remedy that uses inputs derived from surrounding variables within 
similar cases. A tradeoff occurs when imputed data is derived from similar cases, as qualities of 
the case may be reinforced with the addition of a derived variable. However, this technique also 
prevents possible listwise deletion of cases in subsequent analyses which may reduce the sample 
size below acceptable levels (Hair et al., 2010). Maintenance of an adequate sample size was 
determined to be of greater importance for this research. The SPSS module for Automatic 
Imputation of Missing Values was utilized for the imputation. This procedure required a 
selection of a random number generation method,  which was set to Mersenne Twist method and 
a random number seed start point was set at the SPSS default of 2,000,000 (SPSS, 2014). The 
SPSS Automatic Imputation function scanned the data and selected the appropriate imputation 
method based on the pattern of missing data (SPSS, 2014). Constraints were set to ensure each 
variable being imputed and was subsequently used as a predictor. An Imputation Model, 
Descriptive Statistics and Iteration History were generated. A new dataset was created following 
10 imputations and the tenth data set became the data set used for subsequent analysis. 
  Multiple imputation is a process that examines patterns in the available data and 
determines an estimate of what the missing value may be and produces a recommended 
replacement. Whether or not to include missing data is examined in two manners. The first is to 
determine the impact of the exclusion of the complete responses and the corollary, to understand 
the impact of the use of imputed data to the overall analytical results. A criticism is that use of 
imputed data tends to reinforce and increase the effect of cases already present in the data (Hair 
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et al., 2010). Researchers must weigh this criticism against the possibility of discarding the entire 
case and therefore construct survey instruments and procedures in a way that enough complete 
responses are valid for analysis. As less than two per cent of values were missing, those values 
were missing at random, were not tied to a particular demographic group and were not 
monotonic, this was not considered a large concern in this study (McKnight et al., 2007).   
Multiple imputation was conducted using SPSS with ten iterations. The tenth iteration 
was used for further analysis. Delegation preference and uncertainty avoidance were calculated 
following Burton et al., (2002). The variables were next tested for normality, as most statistical 
methods assume a normal distribution homoscedasticity, which “ensures that the variance used 
in explanation and predictions is distributed across the range of variables, thus allowing for a 
“fair test” of the relationships across all values” (Hair et al., 2010, p. 74). 
Variables were assessed for normality using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk 
normality tests (Mooi and Sarstedt, 2011). Normality plots for all variables are in Appendix D. 
For all variables, the scores were significant (<.05), indicating an absence of normality in 
distribution (Hair et al., 2010). Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests begin with the null 
hypothesis that the distribution is normal. Therefore, if the significance value is below 0.05 the 
null hypothesis is rejected and non-normality is present indicating a remedy is required. The 
sample size falls within the thresholds of between 30 and 1,000 suggested by Hair et al., (2010), 
which indicates the usefulness of the tests  Next, skewness z-test scores were examined to 
determine if, at the 0.05 level of error, any values exceeded either 1.96 or -1.96 (Hair et al., 
2010). Values exceeding these thresholds indicate non-normal distribution for the characteristic 
of skewness. Probability plots were examined as a verification of the normality tests and all 
indicated varying degrees of non-normality. Based upon the non-normal distributions, skewness 
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transformations were applied as recommended by Moutinho and Hutcheson (2011). All 
transformed variables indicated improved z scores as a result of the transformation. The 
transformed variables were used in subsequent analysis. Distribution characteristics, tests of 
normality and remedies are shown in Table 11. Descriptive statistics for all survey variables are 
in Appendix E and tests for normality of all variables are in Appendix F. 
26 of 30 variables required a transformation remedy as they fell outside the critical z 
score of ± 1.96, indicating a lack of normal distribution. The pre- and post-remedy information is 
provided in Table 11. All remedies improved skewness and 15 of the variables moved within the 
critical z value of ± 1.96 for normal distribution (Tabachnik and Fidell, 2006). Although the 
remaining variables exceeded the ±1.96 threshold they were kept in the analysis based on their 
presence in previous research. 
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Table 11: Tests of Normality, Distribution Characteristics and Remedies 
   Shape Descriptors Normality Tests 
  
  
  Skewness Kurtosis Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
 
Applicable Remedies 
Variable Statistic 
z 
value Statistic 
z 
value Statistic Sig. Statistic Sig 
Distribution 
Description Transformation 
Sig. After 
Remedy 
SolHumanProb -0.640 -3.600 -0.415 -1.175 0.286 0.000 0.779 0.000 Slight negative skew, positive kurtosis 
Reflect and 
square root 2.075 
StimulCoopDivisions -0.434 -2.440 -0.708 -2.001 0.274 0.000 0.768 0.000 Slight negative skew Reflect and square root 1.038 
FormIdeasVisions -0.589 -3.313 -0.200 -0.566 0.275 0.000 0.782 0.000 Slight negative skew and negative kurtosis 
Reflect and 
square root 1.557 
Daytodayguidance 0.306 1.719 -0.599 -1.693 0.241 0.000 0.865 0.000 Normal Distribution     
DevNewRoutMethods -0.286 -1.607 -0.054 -0.153 0.297 0.000 0.838 0.000 Negative kurtosis     
GovEconDecisions -0.844 -4.750 0.291 0.823 0.249 0.000 0.806 0.000 Slight negative skew and negative kurtosis 
Reflect and 
square root 2.446 
CertaintRulesFollowed -0.357 -2.007 -0.328 -0.928 0.265 0.000 0.849 0.000 Slight negative skew and positive kurtosis 
Reflect and 
square root -0.290 
DecisionBasedDetailInfo -0.042 -0.237 -0.293 -0.830 0.326 0.000 0.768 0.000 Normal Distribution     
WaitSeebeforeaction 0.213 1.197 0.174 0.492 0.320 0.000 0.792 0.000 Positive kurtosis     
MinimizeBizRiskStandar
dised 0.491 2.764 -0.778 -2.199 0.415 0.000 0.645 0.000 Slight positive skew Square root 0.516 
MgmntControlsLeadEmp
FolRules -0.765 -4.304 0.353 0.999 0.254 0.000 0.862 0.000 
Slight negative skew 
and negative kurtosis 
Reflect and 
square root 1.536 
MgmntControlsNonLead
EmpFolRules -0.690 -3.883 0.218 0.616 0.255 0.000 0.863 0.000 
Slight negative skew 
and negative kurtosis 
Reflect and 
square root 1.200 
MgmntControlsLeadEmp
RchExpect -0.838 -4.716 0.152 0.428 0.239 0.000 0.844 0.000 
Slight negative skew 
and negative kurtosis 
Reflect and 
square root 2.366 
MgmntControlsNonLead
EmpRchExpect -0.690 -3.883 -0.010 -0.027 0.265 0.000 0.859 0.000 
Slight negative skew 
and negative kurtosis 
Reflect and 
square root 1.409 
MgmntUsesRsltBasedM
otivationLeadEmp -1.178 -6.628 2.179 6.161 0.304 0.000 0.779 0.000 
Slight negative skew 
and negative kurtosis 
Reflect and 
square root 2.925 
MgmntUsesRsltBasedM
otivationNonLeadEmp -0.935 -5.259 0.820 2.320 0.308 0.000 0.828 0.000 
Slight negative skew 
and negative kurtosis 
Reflect and 
square root 2.177 
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UseAdHocRMProcess -0.485 -2.729 -0.460 -1.301 0.240 0.000 0.863 0.000 Slight negative skew and negative kurtosis 
Reflect and 
square root 0.913 
NoVisOutsideOurDomai
n 0.350 1.968 -0.687 -1.943 0.254 0.000 0.877 0.000 
Slight positive skew 
and negative kurtosis Square root -0.061 
NoPlannedRedundforDis
rupt 0.616 3.464 -0.233 -0.660 0.309 0.000 0.837 0.000 
Slight positive skew 
and negative kurtosis Square root 1.233 
OnlyAbsorbLimitVolatili
ty -0.388 -2.184 -0.538 -1.522 0.254 0.000 0.861 0.000 
Slight negative skew 
and negative kurtosis 
Reflect and 
square root 0.215 
RedundBasedXfuncCom
monPlan -0.698 -3.927 -0.133 -0.376 0.258 0.000 0.843 0.000 Slight negative skew 
Reflect and 
square root 2.238 
BasicRskGovisUsed -1.119 -6.296 0.950 2.686 0.344 0.000 0.768 0.000 Slight negative skew and negative kurtosis 
Reflect and 
square root 4.151 
NoVistoOutsideChanges
andPatterns 0.466 2.621 -0.604 -1.708 0.296 0.000 0.857 0.000 
Slight positive skew 
and negative kurtosis Square root 0.509 
UseSensorsandPredictors
toPositResp -0.392 -2.205 -0.712 -2.012 0.216 0.000 0.866 0.000 
Slight negative skew 
and negative kurtosis 
Reflect and 
square root 0.681 
HaveBCPlans -1.076 -6.056 1.632 4.615 0.356 0.000 0.789 0.000 Slight negative skew and negative kurtosis 
Reflect and 
square root 2.403 
MonitorPartnersSCResili
ence -0.300 -1.690 -0.909 -2.570 0.256 0.000 0.868 0.000 Negative kurtosis     
EmployQuantRM -0.633 -3.563 -0.529 -1.495 0.277 0.000 0.827 0.000 Slight negative skew and negative kurtosis 
Reflect and 
square root 2.171 
InvestinFlexibility -0.628 -3.532 -0.496 -1.402 0.307 0.000 0.831 0.000 Slight negative skew and negative kurtosis 
Reflect and 
square root 1.717 
MovePresfromWeakPart
ners -0.507 -2.855 -0.134 -0.379 0.245 0.000 0.857 0.000 Slight negative skew 
Reflect and 
square root 0.716 
RiskStrategyisSegmented -0.802 -4.512 0.498 1.409 0.244 0.000 0.828 0.000 Slight negative skew Reflect and square root 2.312 
a. Lilliefors Significance 
Correction 
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Reliability- Executive Style 
Reliability of the internal consistency between multiple variables to measure the same 
construct is obtained through the examination of Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 1951) which 
examines the entire scale (Hair et al., 2010). Scale items for Executive Style were examined for 
their alpha score and compared with the Cronbach alpha scores obtained by Burton et al., (2002) 
and are reported in Table 12. Executive Style is a summated score of Preference for Delegation 
and Uncertainty Avoidance (Hakonsson et al., 2012, 2002). Preference for Delegation is a single 
item construct and therefore alpha was not obtained. The two remaining multi-variable 
constructs of Uncertainty Avoidance and Motivation through Control scored .622 and .711. 
While .70 is often considered the acceptable lower limit threshold, some researchers have 
suggested .60 may be acceptable for exploratory social science studies (Robinson et al, 1991) 
such as this examination of the ES construct within the Healthcare industry. 
Reliability was further examined to determine if elimination of any variable improved 
score performance. The overall ES alpha improved with the deletion of the Results-based 
Salaries for Non-leading Employees variable, changing from .680 to .685. Likewise, the score 
for Motivation through Control sub-measure improved from .711 to .738 with the removal of the 
same variable. However the increases were slight and the variable was retained. The Motivation 
through Control sub-measure (f) reached an acceptable level both with and absent the variable. 
To ensure the continued correspondence with Burton et al., (2002) measurements, the variable 
was retained in future analyses.   
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Table 11: Cronbach's alpha - Executive Style 
 Executive Style (ES) Healthcare SC 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
Burton et al. 
Cronbach’s alpha 
 (ES) Complete .680a .690 
 (ES) Pref for deleg   
 (ES)  Uncert Avoid .622 .820 
1 
Solution of Human Problems   
2 
Stimulate Cooperation   
3 
Formulate Ideas and vision   
4 
Guide Employees   
5 
Implement new Routines and Methods   
6 
Control Accounts and Budgets   
7 
Rules and Procedures Followed   
 Detailed Information   
 Wait and See Before Action   
 Preference for Minimizing Risk   
 Motivation through control .711b .730 
1 
Leading Employees Follow Rules   
2 
Non-leading Employees Follow Rules   
3 
Controls that Leading Employees Reach Expected 
Results 
  
4 
Controls that Non-Leading Employees Reach 
Expected Results 
  
5 
Results-based Salaries for Leading Employees   
6 
Results-based Salaries for Non-leading Employees   
a .685 when Results-based Salaries for Non-leading Employees is removed 
b .738 when Results-based Salaries for Non-leading Employees is removed 
 
Reliability- RM Maturity 
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The next area of reliability examined was the grouping of variables of RM Maturity level 
measurement and Cluster formation. A first step examined how each measure correlated to the 
summed score of the entire construct. Robinson et al., (1991) note that item-to-total correlations 
should exceed .5 when examining each variable to the summated score. These results are found 
in Appendix I. Most variables did not achieve this level of correlation, indicating that different 
concepts were being measured by the separate variables when compared to the total of the 
remaining variables.  
Overall reliability of variables by Maturity Level and Cluster membership were examined 
using Cronbach’s alpha (Table 13). Responses were examined across three sets of variables and 
groupings. The first was the grouping of all respondents by RM Maturity level specified by 
Simchi-Levi et al., (2013). Only Level III responses displayed an acceptable level of internal 
consistency (.717). Next, Cluster level groupings of variables across all respondents were 
examined. Both Clusters 3 and 4 displayed internal consistencies considered acceptable or 
marginally acceptable (.701 and .618). The final examination was of the Cluster level groupings 
of the respondents that loaded on those clusters. Levels 2 and 3 displayed marginal scores of .610 
and .664 respectively. Cluster 4 size was too small for the analysis to be conducted (n = 5).  
However, it is important to note that the items and item groupings are identified as RM 
Maturity groupings and RM clusters that, by their group and cluster construct, consist of 
variables that may indeed measure divergent concepts, yet are related when examined through 
response distance measures in the cluster analysis process. Therefore, while their relatedness to 
measure a single construct’s internal consistency is poor with the possible exception of Level III/ 
Cluster 3, the function of those variables by group and cluster may not extend to requiring robust 
scores in this measure. Cluster stability as examined by k-means clustering following 
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hierarchical clustering addresses this concern (Hair et al., 2010, Aldenderfer and Blashfield, 
1984) and is discussed in the cluster analysis section. The combination of both cluster stability 
and Cronbach’s alpha may require future examination to determine overall importance. 
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Table 13: Cronbach's alpha - RM Level and Cluster members 
 
Variables 
Simchi-Levi 
et al Variables 
Healthcare SC 
(All 
Respondents) 
Healthcare SC 
(Cluster 
Respondents) 
Level I/ 
Cluster 1 
Ad-hoc risk management processes 
No visibility into changes outside the functional 
domain 
No planning of redundancy buffers towards potential 
disruptions 
Can only absorb limited volatility around standard 
functional input parameters 
.392a 
Ad-hoc risk management processes 
Can only absorb limited volatility around standard 
functional input parameters 
.260 .293 
Level II/ 
Cluster 2 
Positioning of redundancy buffers based on a common, 
cross-functional plan 
Basic risk governance processes 
No visibility into emerging changes and patterns 
outside the company domain 
.562 
No visibility into changes outside the functional 
domain 
No planning of redundancy buffers towards 
potential disruptions 
.543 .610 
Level III/ 
Cluster 3 
Use of sensors and predictors to proactively position 
response mechanisms 
Business continuity plans 
Partner resilience monitoring 
Quantitative risk management 
.717 
Positioning of redundancy buffers based on a 
common, cross-functional plan 
Basic risk governance processes 
No visibility into emerging changes and patterns 
outside the company domain 
Business continuity plans 
Quantitative risk management 
Investment in flexibility (processes, products, 
plants, capacity) 
Risk strategy segmentation 
.701 .664c 
Level IV/ 
Cluster 4 
Investment in flexibility (processes, products, plants, 
capacity) 
Management of pressure away from weak partners in 
the value chain 
Risk strategy segmentation 
.223b 
Use of sensors and predictors to proactively 
position response mechanisms 
Partner resilience monitoring 
Management of pressure away from weak partners 
in the value chain 
.618 d 
a.398 with removal of UseAdHomRMProcess 
b.449 with removal of RiskStrategyisSegmented 
c.676 with removal of HaveBCPlans 
d sample too small to obtain usable result 
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A Principal Component Factor Analysis was conducted to determine positive and 
negative loadings of the supply chain risk management maturity response items as part of data 
preparation. All variables were part of the analysis and varimax rotation was applied. The sample 
size was adequate when compared to the rule of thumb for number of variables as advocated by 
Mooi and Sartstedt (2011) as sample n ≥ 10* number of variables. Fourteen variables were 
analyzed. Items were examined for high correlation values (Table 14). Highly correlated items, 
those with a loading ≥ 0.90, when used in cluster analysis, may overweight the concept 
represented by the variable in question (Mooi and Sarstedt, 2011). No values exceeded .600, 
which was the correlation between the variables NoVistoOutsideChangesandPatterns and 
NoVisOutsideOurDomain, indicating the variable are sufficiently different from each other. 
However the correlation was not deemed strong enough to cut a variable. 
Next, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Measure of Sampling Adequacy and Bartlett’s 
tests were examined for the risk management maturity variables (Table 15). KMO is a measure 
that indicates the presence of enough variables to sufficiently form a factor and the value should 
exceed 0.70 (Kaiser, 1974). Kaiser’s ranges are described colorfully in Table 16. Bartlett’s test 
was significant at the .001 level of sensitivity and measures the “overall significance of all 
variables within a correlation matrix” (Hair et al., 2010, p. 92), indicating “significant 
correlations among at least some of the variables” (Hair et al., 2010, p. 104).
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Table 12: Risk Management Variables Correlation Matrix 
Correlation Matrixa 
  
UseA
dHoc
RMPr
ocess 
NoVis
Outsid
eOurD
omain 
NoPlan
nedRed
undforD
isrupt 
OnlyA
bsorbL
imitVol
atility 
RedundB
asedXfun
cCommo
nPlan 
Basic
Risk
Govis
Used 
NoVisto
Outside
Change
sandPatt
erns 
UseSe
nsorsa
ndPredi
ctorsto
PositRe
sp 
Have
BCPl
ans 
Empl
oyQu
antR
M 
Invest
inFlex
ibility 
MovePr
esfrom
WeakP
artners 
RiskStr
ategyis
Segme
nted 
Monitor
Partner
sSCRes
ilience 
Co
rre
lati
on 
UseAdHoc
RMProces
s 1.000 -.104 -.209 .152 -.190 -.035 -.169 -.062 -.253 -.026 -.076 .044 .126 .105 
NoVisOuts
ideOurDo
mnai  1.000 .274 -.274 .236 .156 .600 .354 .272 .276 .270 .198 -.061 -.293 
NoPlanne
dRedundfo
rDisrupt   1.000 -.290 .403 .149 .396 .281 .342 .221 .271 .137 -.071 -.172 
OnlyAbsor
bLimitVola
tility    1.000 -.207 -.201 -.317 -.343 -.222 -.226 -.355 -.126 .048 .273 
RedundBa
sedXfuncC
ommonPla
n 
    1.000 .365 .284 .457 .445 .463 .399 .245 .109 -.505 
BasicRisk
GovisUsed 
     1.000 .253 .374 .285 .404 .295 .296 .096 -.284 
NoVistoOu
tsideChan
gesandPat
terns 
      1.000 .299 .353 .289 .437 .292 -.096 -.398 
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UseSenso
rsandPredi
ctorstoPos
itResp 
       1.000 .284 .419 .439 .253 .023 -.404 
HaveBCPl
ans 
        1.000 .311 .351 .252 .002 -.454 
EmployQu
antRM 
         1.000 .369 .091 -.049 -.386 
InvestinFle
xibility 
          1.000 .267 -.008 -.475 
MovePresf
romWeak
Partners            1.000 -.057 -.353 
RiskStrate
gyisSegm
ented             1.000 -.022 
MonitorPar
tnersSCRe
silience              1.000 
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Table 13: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy and Bartlett’s Test 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .828 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 690.374 
df 91 
Sig. .000 
 
Table 14: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Adequacy Standard 
KMO/MSA value  Adequacy of the correlations 
Below 0.50 Unacceptable 
0.50-0.59 Miserable 
0.60-0.69 Mediocre 
0.70-0.79 Middling 
0.80-0.89 Meritorious 
0.90 and higher Marvelous 
 
The Executive Style Construct and Classification 
 Determination of a respondent’s Executive Style classification was conducted following 
Burton et al., (2002) and Hakonsson et al., (2006, 2012). The technique used weighted summated 
scores of the Executive Style variables to determine a score for both ‘Preference for Delegation’ 
and ‘Uncertainty Avoidance’ between 1 and 5. Based on their scores, respondents were placed 
within the quadrants of the Executive Style chart to greater or lesser degrees, depending on their 
score, yet still possessing the traits of that style (Table 17).  A summary of the Executive Style 
distribution for this sample is in Table 18. Respondents classified as a member of the Manager 
group 57.8 percent of the time and as Maestro 27.8 percent of the time for a cumulative 85.6 
percent of respondents who are low on preference for delegation and prefer to maintain close 
control. Identifications by Hakonsson et al., (2012, p. 183) noted that a Manager “prefers to deal 
with matters in a disciplined way, focusing on the short term with an internal focus, a fine level of 
detail, and high control of employee behavior” (Hakonsson et al., 2012, p. 188) and Maestros “are 
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executives that prefer to be personally involved in decision making; they embrace uncertainty and 
prefer long-term, proactive decision making” (Hakonsson et al., 2012, p. 187).  Hakonsson et al 
(2012) notes importantly that in times of uncertainty the Maestro may become a bottleneck during 
decision-making.  
Producer style was indicated in 7.5 percent of respondents. While not comfortable with 
risk laden options, the Producer “is likely to enable other people to deal with ambiguous 
information and take risky action while he himself maintains overall focus and control of the 
situation” (Hakonsson et al., (2012, p. 188). The Producer focuses on short term and immediate 
results, while utilizing subordinates and in-place systems to navigate dynamic, long-term 
situations. Leader style membership was identified 7.0 percent of the time. Hakonsson et al., 
(2012) notes “a Leader will focus more globally on what might happen next, with less attention to 
the details of the here and now” and notes that as in previous research by Zaleznik (1977) “they 
focus on the future and are willing to delegate, but they are unlikely to emphasize a great deal of 
detail and control” (Hakonsson et al., 2012, p. 188). Hakonsson et al., (2012, p. 188) compares 
them to an entrepreneur and further notes “Leaders are not necessarily successful; their success is 
contingent upon the strategy to be implemented”.   
Table 15: Executive Style Classification Statistics 
Executive Style Classification 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Leader 13 7.0 7.0 7.0 
Maestro 52 27.8 27.8 34.8 
Manager 108 57.8 57.8 92.5 
Producer 14 7.5 7.5 100.0 
Total 187 100.0 100.0  
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Table 16: Executive Style Distribution 
U
nc
er
ta
in
ty
 
A
vo
id
an
ce
 
High Less acceptance of risk  
Manager makes 
decisions alone 
Manager 
n =108  
(57.8%) 
Producer 
n =14  
(7.5%) 
Manager 
includes 
others in 
decision 
making 
Maestro 
n =52 
(27.8%) 
Leader 
n =13 
(7.0%) 
Low Greater acceptance of risks High 
 Delegation 
 
Cluster Analysis for Risk Management Maturity 
 A multi-step cluster analysis process was used to identify the risk management maturity 
categories. Use of a multi-step process is appropriate as determination of an appropriate number 
of clusters is unavailable through other statistical procedures and is a method recommended to 
provide increased levels of internal cluster homogeneity and between-cluster heterogeneity (Hair 
et al., 2010). Hierarchical partitioning identified an initial set of clusters as a possible solution. 
Following this, a non-hierarchical analysis was conducted to fine tune a final cluster solution.  
Prior research in the area of supply chain and risk management maturity levels has 
suggested four groupings (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013; Hillson, 1997, IACCM, 2003), based on 
identified attributes, are appropriate and will be used as a suggested starting point for determining 
clusters (Table 19). 
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Table 17: Risk Management Maturity Models 
Risk Management Maturity Models 
Maturity 
Level 
Simchi-Levi et al., (2013) IACCM (2003) Hillson (1997) 
I • Ad-hoc risk management 
processes 
• No visibility into changes outside 
the functional domain 
• No planning of redundancy buffers 
towards potential disruptions 
• Can only absorb limited volatility 
around standard functional input 
parameters 
LEVEL: NOVICE 
• Risk averse 
• Lacking awareness/ 
understanding 
• Lacking strategy 
• Lacking commitment 
• Processes are inefficient, 
informal or ad-hoc 
LEVEL: NAÏVE 
• Unaware of need for RM 
• No structured approach 
• Repetitive and reactive 
management processes 
• No attempt to learn from the 
past 
• No attempt to prepare for 
future threats or 
uncertainties 
II • Positioning of redundancy buffers 
based on a common, cross-
functional plan 
• Basic risk governance processes 
• No visibility into emerging 
changes and patterns outside the 
company domain  
LEVEL: COMPETENT 
• Patchy, inconsistent 
• Some understanding/ awareness 
• Cautious approach/ reactive 
• Inconsistent 
• No learning from experience 
• Standard approach/ generic  
LEVEL: NOVICE 
• Experimenting with RM 
• Few individuals involved 
• No generic structured 
processes in place 
• Aware of benefits but fails to 
implement and gain benefits 
III • Use of sensors and predictors to 
proactively position response 
mechanisms 
• Business continuity plans 
• Partner resilience monitoring 
• Quantitative risk management  
LEVEL: PROFICIENT 
• Prepared to take appropriate 
risks 
• Good understanding of benefits 
across most of organization 
• Strategy mapped onto process 
implementation  
LEVEL: NORMALIZED 
• Management of risk built into 
routine business practices 
• RM implemented on most or 
all projects 
• Formalized generic risk 
processes 
• Benefits understood at all 
levels of the organization, 
but not consistently achieved 
IV • Investment in flexibility 
(processes, products, plants, 
capacity)  
• Management of pressure away 
from weak partners in the value 
chain  
• Risk strategy segmentation 
LEVEL: EXPERT 
• Proactive 
• Intuitive understanding 
• Belief, full commitment to be the 
best 
• Adaptive 
• Proactively developed processes 
• Processes fit for purpose 
• Best of breed 
LEVEL: NATURAL 
• Risk aware culture with 
proactive approach to RM in 
all aspects of business 
• Active use of risk information 
to improve business 
processes and gain 
competitive advantage 
• Emphasis on opportunity 
management (“positive risk”) 
 
Hierarchical Cluster Analysis for Risk Management Maturity 
 Following data cleansing and transformation, hierarchical cluster analysis was conducted 
as the first of two cluster analyses to determine the clustering of risk management maturity 
respondents.  The cluster analysis was executed using the single linkage method and the Euclidian 
distance as a between variable measure. This methodology is appropriate as sizes of clusters may 
not be uniform, based on previous research findings. Specifically, respondents in the highest and 
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lowest maturity levels have been significantly fewer than in more central maturity measures (Hair 
et al., 2010). The data was first examined for collinearity between variables which may produce 
unwanted weighting. No issues (Pearson scores >.90) were found (Table 20). Three, four, and five 
cluster solutions were requested from the SPSS statistical package. The choice to explore three to 
five clusters is a heuristic based on moving one cluster size smaller and larger than previous 
maturity models which suggested four levels of maturity (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013; Hillson, 1997, 
IACCM, 2003). Greater than five clusters risked having too few variables to distinguish between 
cluster characteristics.  Each cluster solution was saved as a new case. 
 
Ensure Hierarchical Cluster Requirements are Met 
 Mooi and Sartstdt, (2011, p. 243) caution that a sufficient sample size must be available 
for the cluster analysis and notes that “Formann (1984) recommends a sample size of at least 2m, 
where m equals the number of clustering variables” and that there is low multicollinearity 
between variables. Fourteen clustering variables are present and the sample size >28, exceeding 
the suggested levels. Risk Management variables were next checked for collinearity. Correlates 
may be candidates for deletion if the correlation coefficients >.90. No variables exceeded this 
threshold and all remained in the analysis. 
 
Cluster Specification 
 Hierarchical clustering is an agglomerative technique which identifies two of the closest 
variables, based on their similarity measure, which in this research was determined through the 
use of Euclidean distance between centroids. Hierarchical agglomerative clustering begins with 
each response in a unique cluster. Thus, for this research, 187 clusters were formed at the 
beginning of the process. The first variable was then compared to other variables until the closest 
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match was found and a new cluster was formed as well as a new centroid being computed. This 
process continued until one final cluster was formed. A noted weakness of the process is that a 
cluster member cannot move from one cluster to another, even if a better fit would be available 
with a subsequently derived centroid (Andendorfer and Blashfield, 1984). Hair et al., (2010) notes 
that “no standard objective selection procedure exists” (p. 536) to determine the number of 
clusters that best represent the underlying data. 
 Four clusters, identified in previous literature as Maturity Levels, have been identified 
and were used as a base taxonomy. However, it was unknown if healthcare supply chain risk 
management maturity levels in the United States follow the same taxonomical clustering among 
healthcare supply chain practitioners as the previous constructs which surveyed managers in 
multiple global industries (Simchi Levi et al., 2013, IACCM, 2003, Hillson, 1997). Cluster 
analysis was chosen for the main investigative tool as this method returns multiple cluster 
solutions which can be further analyzed for membership and comparison with the base 
taxonomy. Based on this, cluster solutions that contained three to five solutions were examined 
closely using the initial hierarchical clustering method.
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Table 18: Risk Management Variables Correlations 
Correlations 
 
UseAdH
ocRMPr
ocess 
NoVisO
utsideO
urDomai
n 
NoPlann
edRedun
dforDisru
pt 
OnlyAbs
orbLimitV
olatility 
RedundBas
edXfuncCo
mmonPlan 
BasicRi
skGovis
Used 
NoVistoOut
sideChange
sandPattern
s 
UseSensor
sandPredi
ctorstoPosi
tResp 
HaveB
CPlans 
Emplo
yQuan
tRM 
Investi
nFlexi
bility 
MovePresf
romWeak
Partners 
RiskStrat
egyisSeg
mented 
Monitor
Partner
sSCRes
ilience 
UseAdHocRMPro
cess 
Pearson Correlation 1 -.104 -.209** .152* -.190** -.035 -.169* -.062 -.253** -.026 -.076 .044 .126 .105 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .158 .004 .037 .009 .634 .021 .400 .000 .719 .304 .549 .085 .153 
N 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 
NoVisOutsideOur
Domain 
Pearson Correlation -.104 1 .274** -.274** .236** .156* .600** .354** .272** .276** .270** .198** -.061 -.293** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .158  .000 .000 .001 .033 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .007 .408 .000 
N 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 
NoPlannedRedun
dforDisrupt 
Pearson Correlation -.209** .274** 1 -.290** .403** .149* .396** .281** .342** .221** .271** .137 -.071 -.172* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .004 .000  .000 .000 .042 .000 .000 .000 .002 .000 .062 .337 .018 
N 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 
OnlyAbsorbLimitV
olatility 
Pearson Correlation .152* -.274** -.290** 1 -.207** -.201** -.317** -.343** -.222** -.226** -.355** -.126 .048 .273** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .037 .000 .000  .005 .006 .000 .000 .002 .002 .000 .086 .517 .000 
N 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 
RedundBasedXfu
ncCommonPlan 
Pearson Correlation -.190** .236** .403** -.207** 1 .365** .284** .457** .445** .463** .399** .245** .109 -.505** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .009 .001 .000 .005  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .136 .000 
N 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 
BasicRiskGovisU
sed 
Pearson Correlation -.035 .156* .149* -.201** .365** 1 .253** .374** .285** .404** .295** .296** .096 -.284** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .634 .033 .042 .006 .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .192 .000 
N 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 
NoVistoOutsideC
hangesandPatter
Pearson Correlation -.169* .600** .396** -.317** .284** .253** 1 .299** .353** .289** .437** .292** -.096 -.398** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .021 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .190 .000 
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ns N 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 
UseSensorsandPr
edictorstoPositRe
sp 
Pearson Correlation -.062 .354** .281** -.343** .457** .374** .299** 1 .284** .419** .439** .253** .023 -.404** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .400 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 .751 .000 
N 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 
HaveBCPlans Pearson Correlation -.253** .272** .342** -.222** .445** .285** .353** .284** 1 .311** .351** .252** .002 -.454** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .002 .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 .000 .001 .978 .000 
N 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 
EmployQuantRM Pearson Correlation -.026 .276** .221** -.226** .463** .404** .289** .419** .311** 1 .369** .091 -.049 -.386** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .719 .000 .002 .002 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 .216 .510 .000 
N 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 
InvestinFlexibility Pearson Correlation -.076 .270** .271** -.355** .399** .295** .437** .439** .351** .369** 1 .267** -.008 -.475** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .304 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 .909 .000 
N 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 
MovePresfromWe
akPartners 
Pearson Correlation .044 .198** .137 -.126 .245** .296** .292** .253** .252** .091 .267** 1 -.057 -.353** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .549 .007 .062 .086 .001 .000 .000 .000 .001 .216 .000  .440 .000 
N 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 
RiskStrategyisSe
gmented 
Pearson Correlation .126 -.061 -.071 .048 .109 .096 -.096 .023 .002 -.049 -.008 -.057 1 -.022 
Sig. (2-tailed) .085 .408 .337 .517 .136 .192 .190 .751 .978 .510 .909 .440  .769 
N 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 
MonitorPartnersS
CResilience 
Pearson Correlation .105 -.293** -.172* .273** -.505** -.284** -.398** -.404** -.454** -.386** -.475** -.353** -.022 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .153 .000 .018 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .769  
N 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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 The single linkage method (nearest neighbor) method was utilized using SPSS, and 
Euclidean (straight line) distances were analyzed. Data did not require standardization as all 
responses but one were on a 5-point Likert scale. The one variable on a 3-point Likert scale was 
transformed prior to analysis. Weighting was not applied. An examination of scree plots, as 
suggested by Burns and Burns (2008) failed to provide appropriate identification of a clear 
demarcation between cluster solutions (Figure 11). This demarcation would have appeared as a 
sharp elbow-like change in direction.  Following the suggestion of Hair et al., (2010), previous 
conceptions of aspects of the clusters indicated by prior research may be used as a start point. 
Additional analysis was required to determine the appropriate number of clusters. 
Figure 11: Hierarchical Cluster Agglomeration Scree Plot 
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The hierarchical cluster analysis process generated an agglomeration schedule which 
included information regarding the distances between cases and the order in which they entered 
the cluster solution. This schedule included all clusters generated from 186 to 1 cluster. Clusters 
were generated using two different methods. The agglomeration outcomes between clusters 7 
and 1 were analyzed using two different methods to determine between-cluster changes in 
heterogeneity and facilitate identification of the optimal stopping rule (Table 21 and Table 22) as 
suggested by Hair et al., (2010). The centroid agglomeration method used squared Euclidean 
distances and calculated the similarities between centroids of clusters under consideration for 
joining.  Ward’s method used Euclidean distances to identify clusters for joining which have a 
minimum variance between cluster centroids (Aldenderfer and Blashfield, 1984). 
Figures 12 and 13 provide a graphic representation of the stopping rune changes in 
heterogeneity and should be examined in addition to the agglomeration chart to increase 
understanding of the stopping rule attributes. Examination of changes in heterogeneity can 
provide insight into the stopping rule, however, the choice of stopping point has no firm criteria 
and is ultimately left to the discretion of the researcher, while considering the literature, specifics 
of the data and managerial impact (Hair et al., 2010, Mooi and Sarstadt, 2011). The presence of 
similar agglomerative traits when multiple methods are examined lends weight to a decision and 
indicates stability of the cluster solution. 
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Table 19: Hierarchical Clustering Agglomeration and Stopping Rule Ward’s Method 
Euclidean Distance 
Agglomeration Schedule Nearest Neighbor Euclidean Distance 
Stage 
Cluster Combined 
Coefficients 
Number of 
Clusters 
After 
Combining 
Differences 
Proportionate 
Increase in 
Heterogeneity to 
Next Stage 
Stopping Rule Cluster 
1 
Cluster 
2 
180 1 63 1.244 7 0.040 3.250% 
Increase is very small and 
favors combination to six 
clusters 
181 1 9 1.285 6 0.102 7.935% 
Increase is relatively large, 
favoring combination to five 
clusters 
182 155 171 1.387 5 0.018 1.313% 
Increase is very small and 
suggests a combination of 
four clusters over five 
clusters is appropriate 
183 1 163 1.405 4 0.029 2.072% 
Increase is relatively small 
and may suggest a 
stopping point favoring four 
over three clusters 
184 1 155 1.434 3 0.220 15.335% 
Increase is large and favors 
a three cluster solution over 
a two cluster solution 
185 1 152 1.654 2 0.063 3.815% Large increase from two to one is normal 
186 1 16 1.717 1   0 One-cluster solution is not meaningful 
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Figure 12: Proportional Change in Cluster Heterogeneity Ward’s Method Euclidean 
Distance 
 
 
Table 20: Hierarchical Clustering Agglomeration and Stopping Rule Centroid Method 
Squared Euclidean Distance 
Agglomeration Schedule Centroid Squared Euclidean 
Stage 
Cluster 
Combined 
Coefficients 
Number of 
Clusters 
After 
Combining 
Differences 
Proportionate 
Increase in 
Heterogeneity to 
Next Stage 
Stopping Rule Cluster 
1 
Cluster 
2 
180 152 155 2.255 7 0.122 5.406% 
Increase is very small 
and favors 
combination to six 
clusters 
181 2 3 2.377 6 0.098 4.106% 
Increase is relatively 
large, favoring 
combination to five 
clusters 
182 2 24 2.475 5 0.128 5.191% 
Increase is relatively 
small and suggests a 
combination of four 
clusters over five 
clusters is appropriate 
183 1 39 2.603 4 0.107 4.113% 
Increase is relatively 
small and may 
suggest a stopping 
point favoring four 
over three clusters 
0.000%
10.000%
20.000%
30.000%
40.000%
50.000%
60.000%
70.000%
80.000%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Proportionate Increase in Heterogeneity to Next Stage (Ward's Method 
Euclidean) 
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184 16 152 2.710 3 0.393 14.481% 
Increase is large and 
favors a three cluster 
solution over a two 
cluster solution 
185 1 2 3.103 2 4.785 154.204% Large increase from two to one is normal 
186 1 16 7.888 1     One-cluster solution is not meaningful 
 
 
Figure 13: Proportional Change in Cluster Heterogeneity Centroid Method Squared 
Euclidean Distance 
 
 
This initial examination of agglomerations and development of likely stopping rules 
provided a base reference number of clusters and formed the foundation for further 
nonhierarchical analysis of a four cluster solution through k-means cluster analysis. Initial 
agglomeration analysis of the current data indicates either three or four clusters would be the best 
candidate for nonhierarchical analysis. The determination of the number of clusters may not be 
able to be established through statistical analysis and is left to the researcher to determine, with 
support from literature and analysis of cluster membership (Hair et al., 2010, Mooi and Sarstedt, 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
140%
160%
180%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Proportionate Increase in Heterogeneity to Next Stage (Centroid Method 
Squared Euclidean) 
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2011) as clusters will always form using clustering techniques. Four clusters was determined the 
preferred solution to proceed to the non-hierarchical clustering process based upon both visual 
observation of the proportionate increases in heterogeneity, development of appropriate stopping 
rules based on the heterogeneity change and previous literature which had identified four clusters 
for risk management maturity. Additionally, the presence of too few or too many clusters may 
aggregate or dilute cluster solutions that are less managerially relevant or lack sufficient inter-
cluster distinction to be useful or well supported by the variables (Hair et al., 2010, Mooi and 
Sarstedt, 2011). 
 
Non-hierarchical k-means clustering 
 The next step consisted of nonhierarchical k-means analysis, which allowed the 
researcher “to adjust, or “fine-tune”, the results from the hierarchical procedures” (Hair et al., 
2010, p. 554). A key component of this step is to identify cluster membership for each variable 
and is often conducted following initial hierarchical clustering. However, once a variable is 
placed within a cluster using hierarchical clustering it cannot be reassigned to another cluster 
even if the fit is improved, which is a limitation that nonhierarchical clustering seeks to address 
(Hair et al,., 2010, Mooi and Sarstedt, 2011). Unlike hierarchical clustering which begins by 
assuming each variable is a cluster by itself, k-means begins with random assignment of 
variables to the four clusters indicated in hierarchical clustering or from the literature. Unlike 
hierarchical clustering, in k-means clustering a variable may be reassigned to a different cluster 
as within-cluster variation is calculated and minimized (Mooi and Sarstedt, 2011) with the goal 
of achieving improved placement of variates within a prescribed number of clusters.  
The initial seed point for the k-means technique is the centroid of each variate within 
each cluster. Following Mooi and Sarstedt (2011), data was aggregated to determine cluster 
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centroids which were then used as seed points to begin the k-means process. This approach is 
considered a superior method to the use of random seed points generated within statistical 
software (Hair et al., 2010, Mooi and Satstadt, 2011). The four cluster derivation using Ward’s 
method was used.  (Table 23). 
Table 21: Initial k-means Cluster Centroids 
Initial Cluster Centers 
 
Cluster 
1 2 3 4 
UseAdHocRMProcess 1.685 1.639 1.669 1.413 
NoVisOutsideOurDomain 1.571 1.708 1.619 2.177 
NoPlannedRedundforDisrupt 1.519 1.610 1.645 1.722 
OnlyAbsorbLimitVolatility 1.677 1.585 1.661 1.104 
RedundBasedXfuncCommonPlan 1.499 1.784 1.790 2.177 
BasicRiskGovisUsed 1.489 1.641 1.619 1.825 
NoVistoOutsideChangesandPatterns 1.474 1.666 1.629 2.177 
UseSensorsandPredictorstoPositResp 1.589 1.792 1.757 2.236 
HaveBCPlans 1.343 1.557 1.492 2.177 
EmployQuantRM 1.549 1.750 1.672 2.051 
InvestinFlexibility 1.483 1.733 1.663 2.177 
MovePresfromWeakPartners 1.544 1.690 1.678 2.236 
RiskStrategyisSegmented 1.622 1.615 1.694 1.722 
MonitorPartnersSCResilience 4.091 1.926 3.023 1.000 
 
 
 Following the application of the k-means technique a final cluster center solution was 
provided. When compared with the initial cluster center points it provided an indication of the 
stability of both the initial dual hierarchical clustering as well as the subsequent nonhierarchical 
clustering. Table 24 describes the change in cluster centroids from those initially defined through 
hierarchical analysis and indicates the desired strong stability of the hierarchical centroid 
solution when compared to the k-means centroid solution. 
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Table 22: Change in Cluster Centers from Hierarchical Solution 
Iteration Historya 
Iteration 
Change in Cluster Centers 
1 2 3 4 
1 .000 .025 .000 .265 
2 .000 .000 .000 .000 
a. Convergence achieved due to no or small change in 
cluster centers. The maximum absolute coordinate change 
for any center is .000. The current iteration is 2. The 
minimum distance between initial centers is 1.116. 
 
 
Evaluation of final k-means cluster centroids (Table 25) indicated that minor changes 
were applied to most of the fifty-six centroids and none exceeded a .2 change in coordinate, 
indicating that moving objects between clusters did not significantly reduce variation within 
clusters.  
 
Table 23: Final k-means Cluster Centroids 
Final Cluster Centers 
 
Cluster 
1 2 3 4 
UseAdHocRMProcess 1.685 1.638 1.669 1.476 
NoVisOutsideOurDomain 1.571 1.702 1.619 2.142 
NoPlannedRedundforDisrupt 1.519 1.608 1.645 1.724 
OnlyAbsorbLimitVolatility 1.677 1.588 1.661 1.166 
RedundBasedXfuncCommonPlan 1.499 1.791 1.790 2.024 
BasicRiskGovisUsed 1.489 1.640 1.619 1.807 
NoVistoOutsideChangesandPatterns 1.474 1.660 1.629 2.142 
UseSensorsandPredictorstoPositResp 1.589 1.784 1.757 2.236 
HaveBCPlans 1.343 1.559 1.492 2.024 
EmployQuantRM 1.549 1.741 1.672 2.088 
InvestinFlexibility 1.483 1.728 1.663 2.142 
MovePresfromWeakPartners 1.544 1.690 1.678 2.135 
RiskStrategyisSegmented 1.622 1.612 1.694 1.724 
MonitorPartnersSCResilience 4.091 1.943 3.023 1.000 
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 Evaluation of the ANOVA Table indicated that all but two variables differed significantly 
across at least three cluster solutions (Table 26) rejecting the null hypothesis (Sig. ≤ .05). 
 
Table 24: k-means ANOVA Table 
ANOVA 
 
Cluster Error 
F Sig. 
Mean 
Square df 
Mean 
Square df 
UseAdHocRMProcess .083 3 .070 183 1.180 .319 
NoVisOutsideOurDomain .627 3 .078 183 8.037 .000 
NoPlannedRedundforDisrupt .216 3 .071 183 3.042 .030 
OnlyAbsorbLimitVolatility .465 3 .062 183 7.510 .000 
RedundBasedXfuncCommonPlan 1.495 3 .050 183 30.043 .000 
BasicRiskGovisUsed .395 3 .053 183 7.486 .000 
NoVistoOutsideChangesandPatterns .988 3 .072 183 13.769 .000 
UseSensorsandPredictorstoPositResp .993 3 .057 183 17.429 .000 
HaveBCPlans 1.100 3 .056 183 19.805 .000 
EmployQuantRM .756 3 .056 183 13.397 .000 
InvestinFlexibility 1.210 3 .061 183 19.729 .000 
MovePresfromWeakPartners .726 3 .052 183 14.035 .000 
RiskStrategyisSegmented .079 3 .059 183 1.324 .268 
MonitorPartnersSCResilience 58.157 3 .057 183 1020.785 .000 
 
 
The final grouping solution indicated the following number of cases present in each 
cluster (Table 27). Descriptive Statistics are found in Appendix G. 
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Table 25: Final Number of Cases by Cluster 
Number of Cases in each 
Cluster 
Cluster 1 83 
2 53 
3 46 
4 5 
Valid 187 
Missing 0 
 
   
Table 28 summarizes the final cluster variate members as compared to the reference 
model for this research (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013). Bold values indicate actual cluster 
membership when compared to cluster taxonomy from the reference model. This differs from the 
clustering of risk management maturity levels, as based on previous literature (Simchi-Levi et al, 
2013, IACCM, 2003, Hillson, 1997) (Table 28). This unanticipated clustering was used as the 
dependent variable for subsequent Multinomial Linear Regression to determine if the research 
hypotheses were supported, although the underlying structure of the maturity level constructs as 
they pertain to healthcare supply chain managers differs significantly from those of previous 
multi-industry studies. Final results in Table 29 indicate overall maturity levels to be very low.  
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Table 26: Cluster Membership Comparison 
 
Variable Simchi-Levi et al., 2013 
Four Cluster 
Healthcare  
 Ad-hoc risk management 
processes 1 1 
A
d 
H
oc
 No visibility into changes outside 
the functional domain 1 2 
No planning of redundancy buffers 
towards potential disruptions 1 2 
 
Can only absorb limited volatility 
around standard functional input 
parameters 
1 1 
B
uf
fe
r P
la
nn
in
g 
Positioning of redundancy buffers 
based on a common, cross-
functional plan 
2 3 
Basic risk governance processes 2 3 
No visibility into emerging changes 
and patterns outside the company 
domain 
2 3 
Pr
oa
ct
iv
e 
Use of sensors and predictors to 
proactively position response 
mechanisms 
3 4 
Business continuity plans 3 3 
Partner resilience monitoring 3 4 
Quantitative risk management 3 3 
Fl
ex
ib
le
 
Investment in flexibility 
(processes, products, plants, 
capacity) 
4 3 
Management of pressure away 
from weak partners in the value 
chain 
4 4 
Risk strategy segmentation 4 3 
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Table 27: Healthcare Supply Chain Risk Management Cluster Membership 
Variable Four Cluster Healthcare  n % 
Ad-hoc risk management 
processes 1 
83 44.3 
Can only absorb limited volatility 
around standard functional input 
parameters 
1 
No visibility into changes outside 
the functional domain 2 
53 28.3 
No planning of redundancy buffers 
towards potential disruptions 2 
Positioning of redundancy buffers 
based on a common, cross-
functional plan 
3 
46 24.6 
Basic risk governance processes 3 
No visibility into emerging changes 
and patterns outside the company 
domain 
3 
Business continuity plans 3 
Quantitative risk management 3 
Investment in flexibility 
(processes, products, plants, 
capacity) 
3 
Risk strategy segmentation 3 
Use of sensors and predictors to 
proactively position response 
mechanisms 
4 
5 2.7 
Partner resilience monitoring 4 
Management of pressure away 
from weak partners in the value 
chain 
4 
 
RM Maturity Level and Cluster Differences 
 Canonical correlation analysis (CCA) was used to determine if there is a significant 
difference between the RM Maturity levels as provided by Simchi-Levi et al., (2012) and those 
developed through the cluster analysis in this research. Canonical correlation analysis is a 
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technique that determines interrelations between groups of variables and has been used to assess 
both statistical as well as practical significance (Hair et al., 2010). Although the sets of variables 
are commonly referred to as independent and dependent variables, no causal relationship is 
implied (Hair et al., 2010, Thompson, 1984). The Independent Variables consisted of the 
groupings formed by the RM Maturity Levels described by Simchi-Levi et al., (2013) and the 
Dependent Variables consisted of Healthcare SC RM Clusters developed in this study. Each set 
of variables forms a canonical variate composed of the variables within the respective set. This 
analysis examined the variate pairs of RM Maturity Level I variate and the corresponding Cluster 
1 variate, and the process was repeated for the remaining three variate pairings of levels and 
clusters. The procedures discussed by Nimon et al., (2010) and Tabachnick and Fidell (2006) 
were followed.  
Tabachnick and Fidell (2006) further note a function of canonical correlation as a 
descriptive or screening procedure to determine the strength of any correlation between the 
variate pairs, which is the purpose it serves in this research, Analysis was conducted with SPSS 
22 (SPSS, 2014). 
The key statistics for examination in CCA include the squared canonical correlation (R2c) 
and the standardized canonical coefficients or equations.  R2c “represents the amount of shared 
variance between the two sets of canonical variate scores produced from a canonical function” 
(Nimon et al., 2010, p. 709). Canonical correlation produces functions that are equal to the 
number of variables in the smallest set to be examined. Each variate represents the redistributed 
variance of the variables.   
The first function incorporates values of the full model (all functions) while subsequent 
functions represent the functions by themselves, with the previous functions removed. A 
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summary of the findings is found in Table 28. The R2  value for each function captures the effect 
size of the relationship between the variates and Function 1 represents the “linear combinations 
of the study’s variables that yield the largest squared correlation R2c possible” (Nimon et al., 
2010, p. 705). Canonical functions for Levels I, III and IV  R2c were all very large (.994, .994 and 
.997) and statistically significant at the .01 level in each of the Function 1 scores. Additionally, 
the models indicated that 100% of the shared variance explained in each of the three 
comparisons is present in the full Function 1 model.  In contrast, Level II R2c  was .472, 
significant at the .01 level and indicated that Function 1 explained 50.1% of the shared variances 
between the two variates. Due to the unusually large indications of shared variance in the Level 
I, III and IV scores, additional examination of the data was conducted. 
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Table 28: Full Canonical Model, Correlations and Cumulative Effects 
RM Maturity Level I/ HC 
Cluster 1 
RM Maturity Level II/ HC 
Cluster 2 
RM Maturity Level III/ HC Cluster 3 RM Maturity Level IV/ HC Cluster 4 
Wilks's λ Wilks's λ Wilks's λ Wilks's λ 
Function 1 Function 2 Function 1 Function 2 Function 1 Function 2 Function 3 Function 4 Function 1 Function 2 Function 3 
0.000 0.011 0.499 0.944 0.000 0.014 0.711 0.982 0.007 0.756 1.000 
χ2 χ2 χ2 χ2 
Function 1 Function 2 Function 1 Function 2 Function 1 Function 2 Function 3 Function 4 Function 1 Function 2 Function 3 
1753.135 815.852 126.57 10.487 1682.515 765.13 61.289 3.266 902.395 51.145 0.013 
df df df df 
Function 1 Function 2 Function 1 Function 2 Function 1 Function 2 Function 3 Function 4 Function 1 Function 2 Function 3 
8.000 3.000 6.000 2.000 28.000 18.000 10.000 4.000 9.000 4.000 1.000 
Rc Rc Rc Rc 
Function 1 Function 2 Function 1 Function 2 Function 1 Function 2 Function 3 Function 4 Function 1 Function 2 Function 3 
0.997 0.994 0.687 0.237 0.997 0.99 0.525 0.134 0.687 0.237 0.687 
R2c R2c R2c R2c 
Function 1 Function 2 Function 1 Function 2 Function 1 Function 2 Function 3 Function 4 Function 1 Function 2 Function 3 
0.994 0.988 0.472 0.056 0.994 0.98 0.276 0.018 0.997 0.99 0.525 
Var. explained Var. explained Var. explained Var. explained 
100% 98.90% 50.1% 5.6% 100.0% 98.6% 28.9% 1.8% 100.0% 98.6% 28.9% 
p<.001 p<.001 p<.001 p<.005 p<.001 p<.001 p<.001 p>.05 p<.001 p<.001 p<.001 
174 
 
 
Redundancy scores were analyzed to determine across the variates the amount of 
variance explained by the opposite variate within Function 1 (Table 29). The low to moderate 
levels of redundancy indicate a moderate degree of shared variance across the variates. Similar in 
function to R2, the redundancy value indicates predictive capability from one variate to another 
(Hair et al., 2010).  
Table 29: Redundancy of Dependent and Independent Variates 
Proportion of Var. Explained by Opposite Variate (Redundancy) 
 IV DV 
Level I Function 1 0.222 0.434 
Level II Function 1 0.208 0.290 
Level III Function 1 0.381 0.261 
Level IV Function 1 0.359 0.397 
 
Nimon et al., (2010) suggests that CCA interpretation begins with understanding both 
practical and statistical significance of the model. Hair et al., (2010) recommends first examining 
canonical weights and loadings as part of interpretation. Canonical weights are of most use when 
collinearity between variables is minimal. Due to the presence of the same variable in both the 
dependent and independent variates for Levels I, III and IV, interpretation may be biased due to 
unstable weightings and is not recommended (Hair et al., 2010). Canonical weights for Levels I, 
III and IV were next examined to understand the extent of intercorrelation. Level 1 IV and DV 
included the shared variables ARHMP, AOLV and AHRMP2, AOLV2. The squared cross-
loadings “indicate the percentage of the variance for each of the variables explained by Function 
1” (Hair et al., 2010, p. 257). For instance, 55.2% of AHRP is explained by the DV of Function 1 
and 53.6% of AHRP2 is explained by the IV of Function 1.      
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Table 30: Canonical Weights, Loadings and Cross-Loadings for the Canonical Function 
Level I - Cluster 1 
    
Level II - Cluster 2 
    
  
Canonical 
Weights 
Canonical 
Loadings 
Canonical 
Cross-
Loadings 
Cross-
Loading 
sq. 
  
Canonical 
Weights 
Canonical 
Loadings 
Canonical 
Cross-
Loadings 
Cross-
Loading 
sq. 
Independent Variables 
   
Independent Variables 
   AHRMP   -0.824 -0.754 -0.743 0.552 RDXCP 
 
-0.315 -0.553 -0.38 0.144 
NVD 
 
0.007 -0.086 -0.086 0.007 BRGU 
 
0.035 -0.32 -0.22 0.048 
NPRD 
 
0.002 -0.03 -0.03 0.001 NVCP 
 
-0.874 -0.955 -0.565 0.319 
AOLV 
 
0.674 0.574 0.572 0.327 
      Dependent Variables 
   
Dependent Variables 
     AHRMP2 
 
0.822 0.734 0.732 0.536 NVD2 
 
-0.782 -0.897 -0.616 0.379 
AOLV2 
 
-0.685 -0.579 -0.578 0.334 NPRD2 
 
-0.457 -0.654 -0.449 0.202 
            Level III - Cluster 3 
    
Level IV-Cluster 4 
    
  
Canonical 
Weights 
Canonical 
Loadings 
Canonical 
Cross-
Loadings 
Cross-
Loading 
sq. 
  
Canonical 
Weights 
Canonical 
Loadings 
Canonical 
Cross-
Loadings 
Cross-
Loading 
sq. 
Independent Variables 
   
Independent Variables 
   USPPR 
 
0.003 0.440 0.438 0.192 Iflex 
 
0.003 -0.289 -0.288 0.083 
HBCP 
 
0.092 0.410 0.409 0.167 MPWP  
 
-1.001 -1.000 -0.995 0.990 
MPSCRes 0.002 0.422 0.421 0.177 RSSeg  
 
0.005 0.051 0.05 0.003 
EQRM 
 
0.964 0.996 0.993 0.986 
      Dependent Variables 
     
Dependent Variables 
     RDXCP2 
 
-0.005 -0.494 -0.493 0.243 USPPR2 
 
0.015 0.268 0.267 0.071 
BRGU2 
 
0.001 -0.419 -0.418 0.175 MPSCRes2 -0.005 -0.362 -0.36 0.130 
NVCP2 
 
0.012 0.329 0.329 0.108 MPWP2 
 
0.994 1.000 0.995 0.990 
HBCP2 
 
-0.088 -0.395 -0.394 0.155 
      EQRM2  
 
-0.961 -0.996 -0.993 0.986 
      IFlex2 
 
-0.005 -0.397 -0.396 0.157 
      RSSeg2 
 
-0.002 0.045 0.045 0.002 
       
 The cross-loadings in both Levels III and IV display unusually strong influence from 
their cross-loaded variate (Table 30). These influences are found in the shared variables of 
EQRM and EQRM2 in Level III and MPWP and MPWP2 in Level IV. Over 98.5% of each of 
these variable’s variance is explained by the cross loaded Function 1. Given the caution by Hair 
et al., (2010) regarding the bias that may be present with multicollinearity between variates the 
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results of Levels III and IV may be viewed with extreme caution, especially given the 
overwhelming weight of individual variables that is present. Level I displays similar weightings 
across common variables, however the effect appears to be reduced as two variables are shared 
in that case. Only Level II does not share any variables across the variates.  
 Overall, the statistical significance of the relationship between the RM Maturity levels of 
Simchi-Levi et al (2012) and the Clusters developed in this research should be used with caution 
due to several factors. The first is the relatively moderate redundancy index and the 
understanding that the collinearity of several variables account for most of the cross-loading 
weight (see Table 30). The second is the very small Wilks’s Lambda (Table 28) which is a 
measure of variance not accounted for by the model. Given the heuristic understanding of the 
variables and the presence of differing variables in variates of Levels I-IV it would be 
impractical to conclude understand that the model captured all of the variance. Again, the weight 
of similar variables in each variate of Levels I, III and IV must be considered. The practical 
significance “(i.e., variance shared between canonical variates” (Nimon et al., 2010, p. 706) is 
likewise low, as expressed by the redundancy values in Table 29. A reasonable, yet cautious, 
conclusion is that there is limited practical relationship between RM Maturity groupings of 
Simchi-Levi et al., (2012) and the healthcare RM Maturity clusters developed through this 
research and they measure different levels of maturity.  
Multinomial Logistic Regression 
 Multinomial logistic regression was used as the means to ascertain if traits present in the 
construct of Executive Style could predict a corresponding risk management maturity cluster 
membership as derived in the k-means clustering. The independent variables (IVs) were 
Uncertainty and Delegation Preference, the two constructs that form Executive Style (Hakonsson 
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et al., 2006, 2012), and the dependent variable (DV) was the four cluster risk management 
maturity cluster classification. They were checked for normality and the Shapiro-Wilk test 
indicated both variables were non-normally distributed (Table 31). Remedies were applied as 
suggested by Moutinho and Hutcheson (2011) but failed to improve skew significance (Table 
32). 
Table 31: Independent Variables Normality Test 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Uncertainty Avoidence .419 187 .000 .602 187 .000 
Delegation Preference .515 187 .000 .418 187 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
Table 32: Independent Variables Descriptives 
  Shape Descriptors Normality Tests 
  
  
  Skewness Kurtosis 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov Shapiro-Wilk 
 
Applicable Remedies 
Variable Statistic z value Statistic z value Statistic Sig. Statistic Sig 
Distribution 
Description 
Transform
ation 
Sig. After 
Remedy 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance -0.645 -3.631 -1.601 -4.257 0419 0.000 0.602 0.000 
Slight 
negative 
skew 
Reflect and 
square root -3.631 
Delegation 
Preference 0.515 11.429 2.185 6.178 0.515 0.000 0.418 0.000 
Positive 
skew Square root 11.429 
 
 
 Multicollinearity of the predictor variables of Uncertainty and Delegation Preference 
were checked and the correlation analysis indicated that the variables independently measured 
different constructs and are not related conceptually (Table 33). Table 34 provides an overview 
of beginning observed cases and their quantity for both predictor variables of Delegation 
Preference and Uncertainty Preference and the Dependent Variable of risk management maturity 
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classifications. One concern noted was the n for High Delegation Preference below the suggested 
sample size of 50 cases that may affect the results of chi-square analysis (Hair et al., 2010). 
Results were tested twice using both Executive Style as a single variable IV as well as bivariate 
measures for Uncertainty Preference and Uncertainty Avoidance. 
Table 33: Dependent Variable Correlations 
Correlations 
 Delegation UncertaintyAvoid 
Delegation Pearson Correlation 1 -.137 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .061 
N 187 187 
UncertaintyAvoid Pearson Correlation -.137 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .061  
N 187 187 
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Table 34: Multinomial Logistic Regression Case Processing Summary 
Case Processing Summary 
 N 
Marginal 
Percentage 
RM Cluster 1 83 44.4% 
2 54 28.9% 
3 46 24.6% 
4 4 2.1% 
Executive Style Manager 108 57.8% 
Maestro 52 27.8% 
Producer 14 7.5% 
Leader 13 7.0% 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
Low 65 34.8% 
 High 122 65.2% 
Delegation 
Preference Low 160 85.6% 
 High 27 14.4% 
Valid 187 100.0% 
Missing 0  
Total 187  
Subpopulation 4  
 
 
Tests of Fit 
 The model failed to meet the criteria for model fitting (Table 35). The -2 Log Likelihood 
decreased from the intercept or null value of 47.016 to the model value of 34.068, a small portion 
of the initial variability (Field, 2009). Importantly, the results failed to reach a Significance level 
of <.05. That is, the independent variables are not “significant in improving model estimation fit” 
(Hair et al., 2010, p. 420). Goodness of fit measures were examined next. Both Pearson and 
deviance measures were unavailable for Executive Style and failed the null hypothesis (Table 
36) for Delegation/ Uncertainty, indicating the data fits that model well and the predicted values 
“are not significantly different from the observed values” (Field, 2009, p. 308). 
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Table 35: Model Fitting Information 
Model Fitting Information 
Model 
Model Fitting Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
AIC BIC 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept Only 53.016 62.709 47.016    
Final (ExStyle) 58.068 96.841 34.068 12.948 9 .165 
Final (Del/ 
Uncert) 
56.921 85.371 39.291 8.725 6 .190 
 
 
Table 36: Goodness-of-Fit Measures 
Goodness-of-Fit Executive Style 
 Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson .000 0 . 
Deviance .000 0 . 
 
Goodness-of-Fit (Del/ Uncert) 
 Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 4.032 3 .258 
Deviance 4.224 3 .238 
 
 
 
The effect size is indicated by the Pseudo R-Square values (Table 37). Pseudo R-Square 
is similar to the coefficient of determination (R2) in regression analysis with both values ranging 
from 0.0, indicating poor fit, to 1.0, indicating a perfect fit (Hair et al., 2010). Reported Pseudo 
R-Square values for both models indicate a poor fit (Table 37). Likelihood Ratio Tests (Table 
38) were examined and determined to have failed tests of significance. Likelihood Ratio Tests 
are designed to identify the predictor variables that significantly determine the outcome variable 
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(Field, 2009). These ratios provide a summary of all of the predictor variables whereas individual 
parameter estimates provide details of each component of a variable.   
Table 37: Pseudo R-Square Values 
Pseudo R-Square 
(Executive Style) 
Cox and Snell .067 
Nagelkerke .074 
McFadden .030 
 
Pseudo R-Square (Del/ 
Uncert) 
Cox and Snell .046 
Nagelkerke .051 
McFadden .020 
 
Table 38: Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Likelihood Ratio Tests (Executive Style) 
Effect 
Model Fitting Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
AIC of Reduced 
Model 
BIC of Reduced 
Model 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced Model Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 58.068 96.841 34.068a .000 0 . 
ExStyle 53.016 62.709 47.016 12.948 9 .165 
Intercept 56.291 85.371 38.291 a .000 0 . 
Unert 
Avoid 
54.320 73.707 42.320 4.029 3 .258 
Del Pref 55.295 74.681 43.285 5.003 3 .172 
 
The chi-square statistic is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods between the final model and a reduced model. 
The reduced model is formed by omitting an effect from the final model. The null hypothesis is that all 
parameters of that effect are 0. 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the effect does not increase the 
degrees of freedom. 
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Individual parameter estimates (Table 39) were examined to determine if any 
components of the variables were significant in determining the outcome variables. Examination 
of all of the significance levels for each cluster indicates that no component was able to 
significantly predict membership in one of the four target clusters.  
 
Table 39: Individual Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Estimates (Executive Style) 
RM Clustera B 
Std. 
Error Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Exp(B) 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
1 Intercept 4.043 1.433 7.965 1 .005    
[UncertAvoid_H_L=3] -1.938 1.188 2.660 1 .103 .144 .014 1.479 
[UncertAvoid_H_L=4] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[DelPref_H_L=3] .020 1.211 .000 1 .987 1.020 .095 10.946 
[DelPref_H_L=4] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
2 Intercept 3.043 1.460 4.344 1 .037    
[UncertAvoid_H_L=3] -1.573 1.197 1.725 1 .189 .207 .020 2.169 
[UncertAvoid_H_L=4] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[DelPref_H_L=3] .554 1.241 .199 1 .655 1.740 .153 19.792 
[DelPref_H_L=4] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
3 Intercept 2.171 1.524 2.030 1 .154    
[UncertAvoid_H_L=3] -1.527 1.204 1.609 1 .205 .217 .021 2.299 
[UncertAvoid_H_L=4] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[DelPref_H_L=3] 1.320 1.315 1.008 1 .315 3.744 .284 49.275 
[DelPref_H_L=4] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
a. The reference category is: 4. 
b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. 
 
 Actual and predicted classification are described in Table 40. These tables indicate that 
the model using only Executive Style as a predictor correctly identifies 44.4% of the overall 
classifications of the variables. This model fails to accurately predict placement into clusters 2-4, 
183 
 
 
which is a serious weakness. The model that uses Uncertainty Avoidance and Delegation 
Preference provides a marginally improved overall percentage correct, however, the absence of 
predicted membership in clusters three and four continues to be a weakness. Interest in the 
classification ability of the model includes the ability to identify the managerial attributes of 
executives who manage more risk mature supply chains as this greater level of maturity has 
indicated improved financial performance of firms (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013). Observed 
frequencies are listed in Table 41. 
Table 40: Classifications 
Classification (Executive Style) 
Observed 
Predicted 
1 2 3 4 Percent Correct 
1 83 0 0 0 100.0% 
2 54 0 0 0 0.0% 
3 46 0 0 0 0.0% 
4 4 0 0 0 0.0% 
Overall Percentage 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 44.4% 
 
 
Classification (Del/ Uncert) 
Observed 
Predicted 
1 2 3 4 Percent Correct 
1 67 16 0 0 80.7% 
2 36 18 0 0 33.3% 
3 30 16 0 0 0.0% 
4 2 2 0 0 0.0% 
Overall Percentage 72.2% 27.8% 0.0% 0.0% 45.5% 
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Table 41: Observed Executive Style Frequencies by Cluster 
Observed Frequencies 
Delegation Preference Uncertainty Avoidance Executive Style RM Cluster 
Frequency Percentage 
Observed Observed 
Low Delegation Preference Low Uncert Avoid Maestro 1 16 30.8% 
2 18 34.6% 
3 16 30.8% 
4 2 3.8% 
High Uncert Avoid Manager 1 51 47.2% 
2 29 26.9% 
3 27 25.0% 
4 1 0.9% 
High Delegation Preference Low Uncert Avoid Leader 1 9 69.2% 
2 2 15.4% 
3 1 7.7% 
4 1 7.7% 
High Uncert Avoid Producer 1 7 50.0% 
2 5 35.7% 
3 2 14.3% 
4 0 0.0% 
The percentages are based on total observed frequencies in each subpopulation. 
 
 Based on the findings, the multinomial logistic regression model is not valid to support 
initial hypotheses or predictions of cluster membership (Table 42) and additional research may 
be required to understand the relationship between managers, risk management maturity levels 
and the appropriate managerial attributes that may impact the relationship that is statistically 
significant.   
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Table 42: Hypothesis Findings 
Hypothesis Prediction Finding 
   
H1  Maestro style is   
 a) negatively associated with Level I RM maturity Not supported 
 b) positively associated with Level II RM maturity Not supported 
 c) positively associated with Level III RM maturity Not supported 
 d) positively associated with Level IV RM maturity Not supported 
   
H2  Leader style is   
 a) negatively associated with Level I RM maturity Not supported 
 b) positively associated with Level II RM maturity Not supported 
 c) positively associated with Level III RM maturity Not supported 
 d) negatively associated with Level IV RM maturity Not supported 
   
H3  Manager style is   
 a) negatively associated with Level I RM maturity Not supported 
 b) positively associated with Level II RM maturity Not supported 
 c) negatively associated with Level III RM maturity Not supported 
 d) negatively associated with Level IV RM maturity Not supported 
   
H4  Producer style is   
 a) positively associated with Level I RM maturity Not supported 
 b) positively associated with Level II RM maturity Not supported 
 c) negatively associated with Level III RM maturity Not supported 
 d) negatively associated with Level IV RM maturity Not supported 
 
 The second questioned examined by the quantitative study concerned the Executive Style 
attributes of healthcare supply chain managers. Several self-reported attributes were examined 
using SPSS Crosstabs as related to the study respondents. Table 43 summarizes the response 
values by case for each area examined. Of note, not all respondents indicated whether or not they 
had experienced a disruption to their supply chain. Further, only military respondents were 
queried regarding their Branch of Service, resulting in lower total cases for both variables. 
Additional Crosstab results are located in Appendix H. 
 
 
 
 
186 
 
 
 
Table 43: Case Processing Summary 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Executive Style * YrsSCExp 177 94.7% 10 5.3% 187 100.0% 
Executive Style * 
YrsHCSCExp 
177 94.7% 10 5.3% 187 100.0% 
Executive Style * 
CurrentPosition 
177 94.7% 10 5.3% 187 100.0% 
Executive Style * 
DisruptionExperience 
120 64.2% 67 35.8% 187 100.0% 
Executive Style * 
FacilityBedSize 
177 94.7% 10 5.3% 187 100.0% 
Executive Style * 
BranchofService 
57 30.5% 130 69.5% 187 100.0% 
Executive Style * RM 
Cluster 
187 100.0% 0 0.0% 187 100.0% 
 
 
 When examining the respondents Executive Style compared to their years of healthcare 
supply chain experience the Manager style was most represented with 58.2% of respondents. 
Over 50% of Manager identified respondents indicated over 17 years of Healthcare supply chain 
experience. These managers have been characterized as having a short term focus, a preference 
for executing tasks themselves and avoiding uncertainty (Table 44). To ensure the proper level of 
supply chain responsibility and potential influence was present in the respondent pool, the survey 
requested the current position held (Table 45). Only 2.3% identified as a front line supervisor or 
manager, indicating the respondents carried a large share of responsibility for supply chain 
operations in their facility. 
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Table 44: Executive Style and Years of Healthcare Supply Chain Experience Comparison 
Crosstab 
 
YrsHCSCExp 
Total <1 2-4 5-8 9-12 13-16 17-20 >20 
Executive 
Style 
Manager Count 1 6 18 12 13 11 42 103 
Expected Count .6 6.4 18.0 16.3 13.4 10.5 37.8 103.0 
% within 
Executive Style 
1.0% 5.8% 17.5% 11.7% 12.6% 10.7% 40.8% 100.0% 
% within 
YrsHCSCExp 
100.0% 54.5% 58.1% 42.9% 56.5% 61.1% 64.6% 58.2% 
% of Total 0.6% 3.4% 10.2% 6.8% 7.3% 6.2% 23.7% 58.2% 
Maestro Count 0 2 10 9 7 6 14 48 
Expected Count .3 3.0 8.4 7.6 6.2 4.9 17.6 48.0 
% within 
Executive Style 
0.0% 4.2% 20.8% 18.8% 14.6% 12.5% 29.2% 100.0% 
% within 
YrsHCSCExp 
0.0% 18.2% 32.3% 32.1% 30.4% 33.3% 21.5% 27.1% 
% of Total 0.0% 1.1% 5.6% 5.1% 4.0% 3.4% 7.9% 27.1% 
Producer Count 0 2 2 3 2 0 4 13 
Expected Count .1 .8 2.3 2.1 1.7 1.3 4.8 13.0 
% within 
Executive Style 
0.0% 15.4% 15.4% 23.1% 15.4% 0.0% 30.8% 100.0% 
% within 
YrsHCSCExp 
0.0% 18.2% 6.5% 10.7% 8.7% 0.0% 6.2% 7.3% 
% of Total 0.0% 1.1% 1.1% 1.7% 1.1% 0.0% 2.3% 7.3% 
Leader Count 0 1 1 4 1 1 5 13 
Expected Count .1 .8 2.3 2.1 1.7 1.3 4.8 13.0 
% within 
Executive Style 
0.0% 7.7% 7.7% 30.8% 7.7% 7.7% 38.5% 100.0% 
% within 
YrsHCSCExp 
0.0% 9.1% 3.2% 14.3% 4.3% 5.6% 7.7% 7.3% 
% of Total 0.0% 0.6% 0.6% 2.3% 0.6% 0.6% 2.8% 7.3% 
Total Count 1 11 31 28 23 18 65 177 
Expected Count 1.0 11.0 31.0 28.0 23.0 18.0 65.0 177.0 
% within 
Executive Style 
0.6% 6.2% 17.5% 15.8% 13.0% 10.2% 36.7% 100.0% 
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% within 
YrsHCSCExp 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 0.6% 6.2% 17.5% 15.8% 13.0% 10.2% 36.7% 100.0% 
 
Table 45: Executive Style and Current Position Comparison 
Crosstab 
 
CurrentPosition 
Total 
Front Line 
Mgr/ 
Supervisor 
Mid-Lvl Mgr/ 
Dept Mgr 
Senior Mgr/ C-
level 
Executive Style Manager Count 3 58 42 103 
Expected Count 2.3 57.6 43.1 103.0 
% within Executive Style 2.9% 56.3% 40.8% 100.0% 
% within CurrentPosition 75.0% 58.6% 56.8% 58.2% 
% of Total 1.7% 32.8% 23.7% 58.2% 
Maestro Count 0 24 24 48 
Expected Count 1.1 26.8 20.1 48.0 
% within Executive Style 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within CurrentPosition 0.0% 24.2% 32.4% 27.1% 
% of Total 0.0% 13.6% 13.6% 27.1% 
Producer Count 0 8 5 13 
Expected Count .3 7.3 5.4 13.0 
% within Executive Style 0.0% 61.5% 38.5% 100.0% 
% within CurrentPosition 0.0% 8.1% 6.8% 7.3% 
% of Total 0.0% 4.5% 2.8% 7.3% 
Leader Count 1 9 3 13 
Expected Count .3 7.3 5.4 13.0 
% within Executive Style 7.7% 69.2% 23.1% 100.0% 
% within CurrentPosition 25.0% 9.1% 4.1% 7.3% 
% of Total 0.6% 5.1% 1.7% 7.3% 
Total Count 4 99 74 177 
Expected Count 4.0 99.0 74.0 177.0 
% within Executive Style 2.3% 55.9% 41.8% 100.0% 
% within CurrentPosition 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 2.3% 55.9% 41.8% 100.0% 
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      Further delineation of the scope of responsibility was examined by comparing Executive 
Style classifications against the size of facility they were responsible to furnish with supplies. 
The categorizations are a standard taxonomy utilized by the American Hospital Association 
(Table 46). Managers, Maestros and Leaders were most prevalent in hospitals or hospital 
systems in excess of 500 beds, representing in all cases over 26% of the respondents in that 
Executive Style. 
Overall, Managers tend to be the most numerous style of respondents and those with over 
13 years of healthcare supply chain experience represent over 35% of total respondents. 
Managers with greater tenure and serving in larger facilities may exert a great deal of influence 
on operational choices. 
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Table 46: Executive Style and Facility Size Comparison 
Crosstab 
 
FacilityBedSize 
Total 6-24 25-49 50-99 
100-
199 
200-
299 
300-
399 
400-
499 >500 n/a 
Executive 
Style 
Manager Count 2 7 10 18 9 11 5 27 14 103 
Expected 
Count 
3.5 8.7 9.3 13.4 9.9 8.7 5.2 27.9 16.3 103.0 
% within 
Executive Style 
1.9% 6.8% 9.7% 17.5% 8.7% 10.7% 4.9% 26.2% 13.6% 100.0% 
% within 
FacilityBedSize 
33.3% 46.7% 62.5% 78.3% 52.9% 73.3% 55.6% 56.3% 50.0% 58.2% 
% of Total 1.1% 4.0% 5.6% 10.2% 5.1% 6.2% 2.8% 15.3% 7.9% 58.2% 
Maestro Count 2 8 3 4 5 3 3 14 6 48 
Expected 
Count 
1.6 4.1 4.3 6.2 4.6 4.1 2.4 13.0 7.6 48.0 
% within 
Executive Style 
4.2% 16.7% 6.3% 8.3% 10.4% 6.3% 6.3% 29.2% 12.5% 100.0% 
% within 
FacilityBedSize 
33.3% 53.3% 18.8% 17.4% 29.4% 20.0% 33.3% 29.2% 21.4% 27.1% 
% of Total 1.1% 4.5% 1.7% 2.3% 2.8% 1.7% 1.7% 7.9% 3.4% 27.1% 
Producer Count 1 0 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 13 
Expected 
Count 
.4 1.1 1.2 1.7 1.2 1.1 .7 3.5 2.1 13.0 
% within 
Executive Style 
7.7% 0.0% 23.1% 7.7% 15.4% 7.7% 7.7% 15.4% 15.4% 100.0% 
% within 
FacilityBedSize 
16.7% 0.0% 18.8% 4.3% 11.8% 6.7% 11.1% 4.2% 7.1% 7.3% 
% of Total 0.6% 0.0% 1.7% 0.6% 1.1% 0.6% 0.6% 1.1% 1.1% 7.3% 
Leader Count 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 6 13 
Expected 
Count 
.4 1.1 1.2 1.7 1.2 1.1 .7 3.5 2.1 13.0 
% within 
Executive Style 
7.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 7.7% 0.0% 0.0% 38.5% 46.2% 100.0% 
% within 
FacilityBedSize 
16.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.9% 0.0% 0.0% 10.4% 21.4% 7.3% 
% of Total 0.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 0.0% 0.0% 2.8% 3.4% 7.3% 
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Total Count 6 15 16 23 17 15 9 48 28 177 
Expected 
Count 
6.0 15.0 16.0 23.0 17.0 15.0 9.0 48.0 28.0 177.0 
% within 
Executive Style 
3.4% 8.5% 9.0% 13.0% 9.6% 8.5% 5.1% 27.1% 15.8% 100.0% 
% within 
FacilityBedSize 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 3.4% 8.5% 9.0% 13.0% 9.6% 8.5% 5.1% 27.1% 15.8% 100.0% 
 
 
Discussion of Quantitative Study One Results 
 Quantitative Study One was designed to explore two questions. The preliminary question 
concerned the impact that a healthcare supply chain manager’s Executive Style has on risk 
management maturity as examined through the lens of Contingency Theory. The second question 
was designed to gain understanding as to whether healthcare supply chain managers possess 
similar styles. Contingency Theory suggests that within specific industries and contexts certain 
characteristics of managers, in this research defined as Executive Style, may be best overall to 
address certain contingencies, described here as supply chain risk management maturities 
(Fiedler, 1965, Singhal and Singhal, 2012). Contrary to expectations, a healthcare supply chain 
manager’s classification within Executive Style taxonomy failed to predict a firm’s supply chain 
risk management maturity level when risk management levels were clustered.   
Hypothesis 1 suggested that a manager’s preference for executing activities themselves, 
characterized by low preference for delegation and the acceptance of greater uncertainty, often 
needed when developing the long term relationships required for stronger relationships 
(Ganesan, 1994) and classified in this research as Maestro style, would be more likely to predict 
membership in the highest level of risk management maturity. Interestingly, there were far 
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greater members of the Maestro classification (52) than Cluster 4 members (4). However some 
researchers (Ganesan, 1994) have found that some types of uncertainty have opposite effects on 
relationships. Others have noted that increased periods of transactional relations increase trust 
and reduce risk (Ring and van de Ven, 1992). This interactional data and longitudinal 
information was not obtained in this study and could not be tested. This pattern was found to 
repeat across the remaining hypotheses, H2-H4. 
   H2 tested the relationship between Leader style and a higher level of risk management 
maturity. Leaders are characterized also by their willingness to accept uncertainty but prefer to 
delegate. This was the smallest group with a total of 13 respondents. As with H1 no relationship 
to higher levels of risk management maturity could be established.  
H3 suggested the Manager style would be closely related to lower maturity levels. While 
overall lower maturity levels were indicated by the research, Managers represented the largest 
group of respondents (n=108) and no statistically significant relation was indicated. Maestro and 
Producer styles populated Cluster 2 with higher percentages of respondents. 
H4 examined the Producer style and as with previous hypotheses no significant 
relationship was indicated. Interestingly, both Producer and Leader styles were represented with 
approximately 85 percent of respondents in this maturity level and all styles reported at least 65 
percent of respondents clustered into the two lowest levels of maturity. 
 
 These results suggest an important implication noted by Hakonsson et al., (2012) in the 
discovery that misalignment between Executive Styles and firm strategy resulted in opportunity 
losses and poor financial performance. While this study was not longitudinal and did not explore 
the financial impact on operation costs from supply chain management activities, it was noted 
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that the majority, seventy three percent, of respondents classified in the lowest two clusters, 
indicating immaturity in their operations, characterized by qualities previous researches have 
classified as ‘ad-hoc’ (Simchi-Levi et al., 2012), ‘novice’ (IACCM, 2003) or ‘naive’ (Hillson, 
1997).  This may be characteristic of the failure to align found by Hakonsson et al., (2012). 
However in that longitudinal research, more broad dependent variables of strategy and firm 
performance were examined. Additionally, there may be influences beyond the ability of the 
supply chain manager to impact due to their power in the organizational structure. Some of these 
issues are explored in the Study two results discussion. 
Of particular interest is the difference discovered between the more broad based risk 
management maturity levels defined by multiple researchers (Simchi-Levi et al, 2013, IACCM, 
2003, Hillson, 1997) which are used to classify firms and provide benchmarks and the self-
reported supply chain risk management maturity clusters described by hospital supply chain 
managers.  
  Previous research (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013) indicated risk management maturity levels 
that numbered fewer members at the highest and lowest levels and near equal membership in the 
second and third levels. However, Executive Style was still unable to predict membership. Study 
Two explored simultaneously the complex influences that impact risk management choices in the 
healthcare supply chain and the impact on supply chain manager choices. 
 
 
Study 2 Qualitative Research Findings 
Sample 
 Respondents were drawn from the current roster of US Military medical logistics 
specialists in the Army and membership rolls of AHRMM. The respondents were selected to 
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ensure representation across most all sizes of hospitals, as defined by the American Hospital 
Association taxonomy (AHA, 2014). The Names provided are pseudonyms, although the gender 
matches the gender of the respondent. The Facility label indicates if the facility serves mainly a 
civilian or military population. The Manager label indicates if the manager is in the US 
uniformed services or a civilian. The indication of Rural or Urban focus is a self-identified 
attribute for each respective facility. The Bed Range indicates the size of each facility according 
to the AHA standard classification. A range of bed sizes is used to protect the anonymity of 
respondent facilities who provided a specific bed size to the interviewer and which was validated 
through public records (Table 47). Interviews were conducted during a ten month period and 
were conducted both telephonically and in person where geographically feasible. 
Table 47: Interview Participant Demographics 
“Name” Facility (Military/Civilian) 
Manager 
Military/Civilian 
Rural/ 
Urban 
Bed Size 
AHA Range 
US 
Hospitals 
% by size 
% of 
Respondents 
Linda Civilian Civilian Rural  
25-49 
 
22 20 Ken Military Military Rural 
Ron Military Military Rural 
Pamela Military Military Rural  
50-99 
 
21 20 Laurie Civilian Civilian Rural 
Stan Civilian Civilian Rural 
Brenda Military Military Rural 100-199 21 7 
Donald Civilian Civilian (Former 
Military) 
Rural 200-299 11 7 
Norman Civilian Civilian Rural 
300-399 6 13 Nancy Civilian Civilian Urban/ 
Regional 
Patricia Military Civilian Urban 400-499 3 7 
Evan Civilian Civilian (Former 
Military) 
Rural 
500+ 5 27 
Tony Civilian Civilian (Former 
Military) 
Urban 
Nate Civilian Civilian Urban 
Edith Civilian Civilian (Former 
Military) 
Urban 
 
Data Collection 
 Data collection was directed by a semi-structured interview guide that allowed for a 
degree of latitude for respondents to elaborate on key topics pertaining to risk in their supply 
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chain and the thought processes they used to identify risks as important. Prompts were used to 
elicit further details and actual experiences were obtained when practical and their inclusion 
progressed naturally from the interview topic and content. 
 The interview guide can be found at Appendix A. Each interview lasted between 30 and 
60 minutes. After receiving permission and recording the interview, post-interview verbatim 
transcripts were created by the lead researcher, yielding 155 pages for analysis. 
 Purposive sampling (Maxwell, 1996) allowed the researcher to access a broad range of 
respondents, taking into account facility size (based on bed count, an industry standard for 
stratification of facilities) and type, whether military or civilian. Further, as recommended by 
Manuj and Pohlen (2012), participants were selected who “fit the context, had visibility over part 
or the entire phenomenon, were knowledgeable, willing to participate, and experienced with, and 
engaged in the phenomenon being studied” (p. 793). Grounded theory tenets propose that data 
collection continues until theoretical saturation is obtained (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Various 
authors have indicated possible stopping points, such as McCracken (1988), who suggested eight 
interviews may be appropriate. To obtain saturation a total of fifteen interviews were conducted 
for this research, although saturation was indicated after twelve interviews. Saturation 
determination was made when at least one common theme emerged as significantly present 
among most respondents.  
 
Data Coding and Analysis 
 Coding followed the guidelines of Glaser (1978, 1988, 2002) in that the codes developed 
naturally from the text . A Glaserian approach allowed the formation of codes and 
conceptualizations to develop without pre-ordained categorizations used to order responses. Each 
transcript was examined line-by-line and by paragraph to identify relevant responses to the 
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interview questions and explore themes. When a relevant response was identified, it was 
assigned a descriptive code to briefly summarize the concept contained in the respondent’s 
words. When appropriate, due to the complexity of a response, researcher memos were 
developed to clarify the reason for assignment of a code. During the transcript reviews and 
during subsequent case analyses, codes continued to be developed and assigned in an iterative 
manner. Where applicable, codes were grouped together under a more general umbrella concept 
as iterative analysis continued. When individual case analysis was complete, textual analysis of 
coded passages across cases was conducted to identify similarities and generate a higher level of 
contextualization.   
 Constant comparison between codes developed in discussions of Low-Probability High-
Impact discussions was conducted until multiple themes emerged that added understanding to 
risk management approaches of the managers. Although constant comparison was conducted 
from the initial coding iteration, identifiable themes did not appear until approximately the 
twelfth interview. Additional interviews continued to support the initial findings as the constant 
comparison technique continued to identify other cross case similarities. 
 
Research Trustworthiness 
 A goal of trustworthiness is to allow the reader to ultimately form similar conclusions as 
the researcher through examination of the evidence presented (Randall and Mello, 2012). This is 
accomplished when the researcher ensures multiple criteria are met that confirm the validity of 
the research findings. The criteria used in this research and how they were applied to this study 
are provided in Table 48.  
Table 48: Qualitative Trustworthiness Criteria 
Trustworthiness Definition* Applied in this Study 
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Criteria* 
Credibility Extent to which results appear 
to be acceptable 
representations of the findings 
Feedback was solicited from respondents based 
on preliminary findings. Interviews were 
conducted over a ten month period with small, 
medium and large facilities. 
Transferability Extent to which the findings 
may transfer to other contexts 
Participants were selected based on purposive 
sampling across US based civilian and military 
facilities and represented diversity in size and 
service region (urban and rural). 
Dependability Extent to which findings are 
unique to time and place; the 
stability of the explanations 
Respondents were able to provide answers and 
examples encompassing both current and 
historical perspectives. Responses possessed 
surety of tone and content.  
Confirmability Extent to which interpretations 
are the result of the 
participants and phenomenon 
and not to researcher bias 
Confirmatory textual analysis was conducted to 
verify interpretations. Extensive quotes were 
identified to support conclusions. 
Integrity Extent to which findings are 
the result of misinterpretation 
or evasion by the participants 
Interviewees were assured of anonymity and 
exclusion from analysis of identified passages. A 
professional atmosphere and interviewee 
preparation were utilized from initial contact 
through interview completion 
Understanding Extent to which theory makes 
sense to participants 
Interviewees were provided an initial summary of 
findings and confirmed that results matched their 
experiences.  
Generality Comprehensiveness of 
construct development 
Interviews were easily conducted within the 
allotted time and allowed ample time for 
respondents to elaborate extensively without 
time pressure to formulate responses. 
* Based on Thomas 2012. Criteria and definitions adapted from Flint et al. 2002, p.106; Flint and Mentzer 2000; Strauss and Corbin 
1990; Hirschman 1986; and Lincoln and Guba 1985 
 
 
Study 2 Qualitative Findings 
There has been little research with a focus on risk management in healthcare supply 
chains although general risk management in business (Mehr and Hedges, 1963, Bettis, 1982, 
Omenn et al., 1997) and supply chain (Smelzer and Siford, 1998, Juttner et al., 2003, Talluri et 
al., 2013) has received attention in the recent past. The lack of field specific information in 
healthcare supply chain provides an opportunity for exploratory research to understand aspects of 
how healthcare supply chain managers approach risk and if there are factors that are unique to 
the field. As an exploratory study, no theoretical foundation was used as a framework during the 
development of the research protocol (Glaser, 1992, 2002) in order to reduce potential researcher 
bias based on preconceptions derived from a specific theoretical lens. Study 2 explored the 
causes and motivations that impact healthcare supply chain manager choices regarding risk 
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management at their facilities. 
Prior to the interview, managers were asked to provide responses on a 2x2 risk map, 
indicating their four to six most critical supply chain risks (Figure 14). The semi-structured 
interview focused on those risks on the bottom right quadrant, generally regarded as Low 
Probability, High Impact risks. Respondents were not made aware of this focus prior to 
completion of the risk map or the semi-structured interview, nor were they provided guidance 
regarding the scope of High Impact. Rather the goal was to understand these concepts as 
understood individually by each respondent in their unique circumstance. The following analysis 
discusses the main results of the interviews, based upon the flow of the interview protocol.  
 
Figure 14: Supply Chain Risk Map 
 
Patients not customers as a cultural focus  
Only one respondent, Nancy, mentioned culture specifically as having a focus on patient 
care, “Our culture tends to be very collaborative and patient centered, very safety oriented and 
so I think that relationship management is maybe more important.” However, patient-
centeredness was a recurring theme across most all respondents and although not mentioned as a 
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within case theme, can be considered as a cross-case theme that is shared among interviewees 
and is ingrained into and guides their activities and choices. Organizational culture in healthcare 
has been discussed by Scott et al., (2003) and encompasses “a combination of organizational 
psychology, social psychology, and social anthropology” (p. 924) and this focus is evident with 
the frequent mention of patient-centeredness. However, it must be noted that several managers 
acknowledged that the patient is not the customer in the supply chain transaction, but their health 
outcome is deemed intricately entwined with the activities of the supply chain manager. The 
doctors, nurses and other health practitioners are the customers of the supply chain manager and 
at times there can be a contentious relationship. 
Ken indirectly described the patient-centered culture this way while discussing the effect 
of improved operations on the staff: 
“It allows them [clinical staff] to focus on other issues now, that they get to look at, 
because ultimately at the end of the day it's not about what Ken does, it's not about what 
the logistics team does, it's about patients. And it's about patient care. And ultimately, 
and I share that at every newcomers orientation, ultimately at the end of the day it's not 
about people walking about in lab coats and stethoscopes in their pockets, it's about 
people walking in the front door pushing a baby carriage or stroller in the worst 
moments of their lives needing care, and that's what were here to provide.” 
 
 This type of focus is described by Mentzer et al., (2001) as an extended supply chain, 
where there is a focus on the customer’s customer, as part of the overall strategy. To achieve the 
greatest value, all members of the healthcare supply chain should focus on optimization of the 
“overall activities of firms working together to create bundles of goods and services” without 
“maximizing the interests of one player” (Burns et al., 2002, p.9). However, there is often 
friction between the supply chain manager and the customer, described as medical providers, as 
well as enablers such as management. Examples of these were noted by respondents and the 
subsequent results were noted as well and are described as appropriate below. 
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 The interview began with a general discussion of risks present in the manager’s daily 
thoughts to gauge where the daily focus of their efforts may lie and the constant inputs they face 
when also considering more extreme risks that are both low frequency but with potentially 
serious to catastrophic consequence. They then provided an elaboration of the importance of 
those risks, and what actions had been taken in mitigation. 
 
Pressing Risks in Daily Thoughts 
 The variety of responses was reflective of the broad size and geographic dispersion of the 
facilities and included risks that were perceived to emanate both internally and externally.  
“The biggest risk to us though is really, I feel the greatest risk is just that change in the 
reimbursement of healthcare. We’re seeing some very interesting changes in the way, 
with the Affordable Care Act, you just dump 4 million more people into the system that 
aren't paying for their care and they're putting the burden on the states, the states don't 
really have any money, so we have to become very lean at what we do.” – Evan 
 
“It’s just amazing being in the civilian sector compared to the military. There was just so 
much money that was just being left on the table. They weren't billing for things that they 
could if you know what I'm saying. He [the new CFO] has hardwired that. Obviously the 
more money he brings in the better. It makes me look good when it comes to supply 
expense ratios to net patient revenue. But, that being said, we are able to recapitalize the 
organization, if you look at it from a Moody's or a bond level, you could have a great 
checking account, you can have great expenses, but if your facilities are archaic and not 
current in terms of construction and equipment and stuff, the bond guys are going to look 
the other way – the bond guys will say "You guys aren't going to be around very long 
because you're not perpetuating the future of your organization." – Tony 
 
 Daily concerns also include the use of time. In organizations that may have to contend 
with becoming more lean, as mentioned by Evan, time is also an area where increasing demands 
are placed upon management for supply chain performance as demands are simultaneously 
placed upon management’s limited capacity to perform work. This was exemplified in a 
comment by Nate who manages the supply chain for a large regional academic children’s 
hospital. "I'm going to work on the capital budget today, I'm going to meet with this person to do 
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that, then I hear there is a mandatory Ebola presentation and that all gets blown away. I'm 
surprised I got into your conversation here.” Yet, not only do managers have more demands 
placed upon their time, Nate also discussed the other requirements to be in the supply chain 
position “In supply chain now you had better be flexible, you'd better have a wide breadth of 
skills because you don't quite know who you're going to be talking to or what you're going to be 
doing next.” Yet the pressing need for time-consuming, necessary tasks also extends to staff, 
which is often limited. One of Nate’s few staff members has two roles. One is to manage the 
bone and tissue bank and the other is recall management where: 
“He spends about five hours of his eight hour day - So we subscribe to a recall service 
called ECRI, we are also looking around for a more robust system than that - the number 
of recalls have exponentially increased over the last five years. I've been here for nine 
years and I used to get one or two recalls a month you know for the OR and the Cath 
Lab. We probably get, I'm going to say, 5 to 10 recalls a week now.”  
Although Nate understands the importance of managing recalls, he further comments on the 
overall lack of influence he has, “because I think that's a huge risk and a disruption, if somebody 
doesn't do something about it.” 
 Another area where managers have a lack of influence is the weather, as noted by both 
Patricia, located in the US Southwest and Norman, located in the US Northeast. For Patricia, the 
weather was noted as a particularly important seasonal disruption as the hospital runs on a very 
strict just-in-time replenishment model where bad weather may impact both delivery of supplies 
and the ability of staff to report for work “If we don't have supplies, we can't provide direct 
patient care through our clinical staff. Not having staff to do the job, we have no one to push it 
out.” Patricia’s hospital is currently mitigating this by establishing a restocking solution that both 
reduces supplies on hand, “we stock a lot of inventory here, which is not the best way to have 
velocity management” and enables faster replenishment of the wards should there be delays by 
“implementing the low unit of measure . . .  under our prime vendor contract . . . so that 
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even if you have delays, we've taken out the element, or the procedure of having to 
process everything and having to break it down and segregating and getting it out. Those 
are already palletized and segregated. Which even if it came in at nine, we could still get 
it out. Even as fast as we did before.” 
 
 Norman’s challenge in the Northeast includes more seasonally predictable events such as 
flooding, ice storms and high winds. They remain daily worries between October and March 
when those events affect transportation routes between the hospital and the vendor depot. What 
is routinely a two hour drive can be greatly disrupted. 
“All my stuff gets to me through those major interstates. We get some really bad winter 
ice storms. So they shut-they close the interstates. Like the . . .  Turnpike is usually the 
first one that closes. My warehouse for supplies - I have a small one on campus for my 
pandemic now, that's just something I've added in the last year because of the problem 
we've had over the last 10 years. So Cardinal has a distribution center - it's a two-hour 
drive on a pretty day but, you know, we get hammered with hurricanes on the east coast 
and, depending on winds, they've closed parts of the Turnpike because it has these raised 
bridges and stuff. Really bad winds and rain can cause it. But, then by January - 
February is ice storms, they close it too. . . Ice storms I really don't worry about them too 
much in November. I start worrying about them in December and by March I stop 
worrying about them.”  
 
Yet as Edith’s facility in the North Central US has developed their risk management 
plans, they have separated their supply planning between imminent and predictable risks with the 
goal of placing the right supplies in proximity to where they will be needed if there is time to 
communicate the need: 
“So we developed stocking plans against the individual risk events. Snow storms, 
tornadoes, dam bursting, all the different risk events that we identified, and we correlated 
those back to a specific supply list. So that when we looked at tornadoes we said what 
would we expect our community hospitals to do? For the most part they're going to triage 
and transport. They're going to stabilize the patient, do basic, basic stabilization of the 
patient, and they're going to transport to our main hospital. So, that's how we went about 
creating our supply list.” 
 
 Communication was cited as both a daily concern as well as a daily means to mitigate 
concerns. On the positive side, communication regarding finance helps to recover previously 
unavailable revenue and removes pressure caused by falling reimbursements as described by 
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Tony’s relationship with the Chief Financial Officer regarding approaches to routine contract 
servicing,  
“I would say from a finance perspective, this organization has never been in as great of 
shape. But, the collaboration with the CFO and my team is just amazing. Just in the, what 
I call the purchased services market, in negotiating and renegotiating contracts and 
having him ask questions and or sign the contract, we easily pocketed half a million to 
three quarters of a million in savings in the last twenty four months as an example.” 
 
Tony also mentioned the benefit of working and communicating together in an incident 
control center as key and exemplified when real-world concerns entered into a crisis drill. 
“We just did a mass casualty drill. We've done two or three since I've been here. I would 
say the last one that we did was the more efficiently, effectively, commanded and 
controlled - because of communication. We had verbal-everybody was in the same room. 
When I think of communication it's like the whole package. Communication up and down 
the chain as it relates to whatever the issue is that's going on. It doesn't matter whether 
it's a mass casualty drill, or a power outage which, actually, during the mass casualty 
drill, a construction worker on the sixth floor in the East wing managed to shut off the 
water to the sprinkler system which in turn shut off the air handlers to the entire hospital. 
Yet, we were still able to work through that because of good communication and keep the 
drill going and get the air handlers back online.” 
 
 Yet poor communication frustrates efforts of supply chain managers such as Pamela, who 
expressed frustration with departments working around centrally mandated standardizations to 
procure physician preference items that become dead stock when the provider fails to use the 
standardized and procured item and instead arranges an alternate procurement method.  
“The shops will do a special order around it and get what they wanted originally 
anyway. . . I think, we tend to waste funds on these mandated, standardized items that no 
one uses. Either they expire, or I think it's just a fund waste . . . because we get stuck with 
these items and then they expire or we have to figure out some way to get dispersed 
across the region.” 
 
Ken further points out that standardizations add another level of complications when 
vendors subsequently change catalogs and remove items, 
“It is typical healthcare supply chain management, so as new products are introduced 
into prime vendor catalogs, we may, we may not know about those changes to the catalog 
at the time their changed, or worse yet the biggest risk we see is that we find out about it 
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when we try to submit an order for an item that we already know is there and the product 
number has changed. So, that's a significant risk for us.” 
 
 
Mapping Risks of Low Probability – High Impact 
 
 To focus risk management thought, respondents were asked to complete a two 
dimensional risk management matrix based on the probability of an event occurring to impact 
their supply chain and the subsequent business impact. This approach allowed for self-selection 
of topics that would be discussed based upon each individual hospital’s circumstances. 
Additionally, this approach removed any potential bias introduced by a researcher suggested risk 
topic that may be perceived differently by various hospitals.  The topic of discussion therefore 
was standardized by probability and impact due to its placement in a specific quadrant. 
 Drivers that caused supply chain managers to consider risks in this quadrant included, for 
Linda, requirements of the Joint Commission. The Joint Commission is the major accrediting 
body for healthcare facilities in the US. Laurie, who works in a geographically isolated facility 
where attracting providers is difficult, placed purchase of major equipment and subsequent non-
utilization due to lack of staff as a risk as it ties up capital with no subsequent return. Ron, who 
works in a military facility based his response on previous training and considered the question 
this way: 
“What I was thinking? - What’s the absolute worst case scenario? Having participated in 
NORTHCOM - US Army North - exercises, I know what they prepare for. They prepare 
for these 10 kiloton nuclear detonations in major population nodes. So, that's the 
scenario that ran through my head, because that's the scenario that we kind of walk 
through when we do these exercises. 
 
 Nate couples previous experience preparing for a pandemic threat with his perception of 
the weakness of the current healthcare supply chain: 
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“We found ourselves in a backorder situation pretty quick and having to bring in special 
supplies. So since then we now keep three months of supplies for PPE [personal 
protective equipment] items at our local warehouse, just in case we do have another bad 
flu season. You get an outbreak, you get a pandemic, and you can go through whatever 
supplies that that pandemic-whatever you need to address that pandemic with - you can 
run out pretty quick. Because whatever hits you, it's hitting at least the local if not the 
regional hospitals as well, and as I mentioned before, the supply chain is so thin, any 
significant hiccup or spike in demand just wipes it out.” 
 
 Nancy extended the daily patient focus onto the critical issue driving her thoughts 
relating to high impact – low probability risks “The thing that's in front of you is “How are we 
going to meet our patient demand?” Everybody's got their eye on that ball.” Laurie provided 
more specific guidance regarding the importance of the patient in driving risk in this quadrant, 
“It wasn't catastrophic because it wasn't loss of life. So, catastrophic to me is loss of life, serious 
or medium [impacts] are more financial and business concerns.” Donald, Ron, Nancy, Tony and 
Nate all expressed the importance of managing risk, as failure would negatively impact patient 
care. “We would not be able to provide care here. We would have to shut patient care facilities 
after we exhausted the stock on hand.” stated Ron.   
Others were driven by historical experiences. Evan referred to a ‘once every ten years’ 
ice storm that happened a mere three years after the first one he experienced and it made quite an 
impact on his thinking as  
“Our kitchen was running out of food. We were trying to feed the patients, but I've got 
750 employees that were stuck at the hospital that we had to feed three meals a day and 
find places for them to sleep. Just all of the logistics of that was a very high risk and 
something that you want to be able to deal with but, I don't know that you're ever 
completely prepared.” 
 
Donald, who works in a medium sized rural hospital has weathered a snowstorm but noted 
“The snowstorms - we had a double snowstorm and it so happened we were six days 
without a supply delivery out here. It took a lot of - I have some great buyers who have 
years and years of experience - we got by because we figured out what we could use 
instead of what was being requested and we found - we took places where our par levels 
may not have been set exactly right, where we had an excess we just redistributed 
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throughout the hospital. We got by with what we needed. It was a tough six days, the last 
day was pretty tough but we did get by. So we did experience that.”  
 
Nate expressed concerns about hurricanes as “being in Florida, every year it's a constant, 
real scenario, where we can get hit by a hurricane.” 
Nate also noted impacts in this quadrant will be tied to operational capability, ability to 
attract business and customer perception, especially in high profile contagion-centered 
disruptions. Overall though,  
“Like more or less with Katrina. We'd be recovering from that for a long time. A 
pandemic, only because of the seriousness, one, of the supplies, but also, if we look at 
what's happening with the Texas hospital where they treated the Ebola patient, it's almost 
a ghost town there now. They lost 70% of their business. So, depending on how the 
pandemic plays out, it could actually scare away business. All of your elective 
procedures are going to get canceled and, if people have a choice of where they want to 
go, they're going to avoid your hospital if they feel like it's a central place for treating a 
serious illness.”  
 
   Tony, who manages the supply chain for a large, 500+ bed hospital, with a yearly 
Emergency Department throughput of over 200,000 patients felt the risk was tied to the volume 
of business and  
“The technology aspect, the higher risk I put on there, was more than that we're so tied, 
whether it be communications, ordering, to some EDI transactions, to everything else 
that if our information systems, our payroll systems, everything else takes a hit we are in 
a much worse situation, believe it or not, then a hurricane.” 
 
 
 
 
 
External Influences 
 A final factor mentioned when discussing why a manager felt risk was present in the 
supply chain was external influences. Some reasons included trying to prevent items from ending 
up in the local black market according to Ken who works in a small rural military facility, 
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“Every one of these little widgets that we use in a healthcare environment is worth 
something on the street. And, whether it's a syringe or a vacutainers, somebody wants 
that somewhere because they can be used to do anything. One of the problems that we 
have here in […] is drug use. So you can imagine that there is a high demand for things 
like syringes and vacutainers. You see where I'm going with that. I believe tubing even 
for example.” 
 
The pressing external factor was manmade disaster preparedness for Norman who works in a 
midsized rural academic facility. 
“We have a huge emergency preparedness effort because we're so close to [the nuclear 
power plant]. Because we’re the - that's not true there's a couple of hospitals that are 
closer but we’re the trauma center that's the closest big trauma center to it. So to me, I'm 
going to tell you that the probability is, I think, very low, smaller than the sabotage.” 
 
While Edith, who manages the supply chain for a large multi-hospital system was aware of the 
requirements of accreditation. 
 “There’s a requirement by the Joint Commission to do a risk management assessment. 
So we've taken that risk management assessment and we've put it into a quad matrix, kind 
of like what you've done, and we developed a series of questions that were specific to 
supply chain and we correlated the risk event with the supply chain’s ability to respond.” 
 
 
Barriers and enablers 
 Moderators to activities and their outcomes have been recognized in some circumstances 
as the negative effect of supervisors on performance outcomes (Escrig-Tena et al., 2005; Samson 
and Terziovski, 1999). Several respondents expressed frustration with their ability to attain 
higher levels of risk management maturity due to these influences. Linda works in a small 
hospital that is collocated with an extended care facility of 100+ beds in a rural location. 
Although she would like to improve, her time is often limited by other pressing needs and she 
realizes the limitations of her supervisor as well. 
“I report to the CEO who may not know all of the various figures that are in front of me 
and they may not understand supply chain. They know enough about it, but they don't 
understand cause and effect when it comes to ordering, etc. I think that's, that is kind of a 
barrier for me.” 
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Evan has the good fortune of having worked with an exceptional CEO, however he also 
recognizes that there are other senior leaders with different goals.  
“But, everybody needs to understand that we all have the same goal. And that's to make 
sure that you take care of that person laying in that bed and sometimes even the C-suites 
are the stumbling blocks. They're more concerned about keeping everybody else happy, 
and they still view the supply chain as just "Hopefully what I want you just go buy it" and 
that's not the case anymore. They've got to be willing to listen and participate.” 
 
Other managers felt it was the unwillingness of employees in general to change. Patricia, who 
works for a large military hospital near an urban area notes:  
“People are creatures of habit and it's hard to get them to be receptive to change. When 
you start looking at new options and new programs and things that would save time, 
money, personnel, paper all these different things, you usually get some feedback on them 
or resistance on them that says "we been doing it this way all the time, why do we need to 
change?" 
 
This was echoed more colorfully by Tony who works at a large urban hospital “I think that we've 
got to get past some of the old guard. Again, we still have some old ways of thinking, if you want 
to call it stinking thinking. I think we need to move forward.” Tony further recognized that some 
of the effective change can also happen at lower levels of administration as well:  
“I think we're getting the right players to the right seat at the table and subsequently 
getting these types of issues and topics put together. We’re at the point where people with 
the C’s in front of their name really don't need to be at the table because you've got really 
qualified and capable leaders at the AVP, director and manager level.” 
 
Tony’s facility recently hired a new Head of Security and a new Chief of Public Health and both 
have brought change and innovation that Tony feels is beneficial to removing the ‘stinking 
thinking’ barriers that were noted. 
 Stan, however, faces a different problem as the will to improve is present, but, being in a 
medium sized hospital facing revenue reductions, the means are unavailable: 
“When you lack resources in the supply chain it is the same way, it limits what you can 
do. We could be better automated, EDI and some of those options that are available 
209 
 
 
maybe to a larger facility aren't to us because the cost - it's too cost prohibitive. We can't 
afford it, we just don't have those kind of resources. We’re looking at hits to our bottom 
line and reduced reimbursement and everything is being looked at to try to control cost. 
Some of these things are having adverse effects.” 
 
His view seemed to echo that of a recent conference presentation he attended. 
 
“One of the presentations was from one of the AHRMM presenters, actually a chief 
operating officer for a healthcare company, who said you're looking at whatever you're 
getting paid today you're looking at between 14 to 20% less within five years or so. It's 
hard to drive that much money out of the supply chain, which has been working for a 
long time to keep costs down through GPO's and all of the things that we do. My view on 
it is that the last big pot of money that someone is looking for out there in the healthcare 
sector is with the manufacturers.” 
 
 Respondents described numerous barriers to attaining higher levels of risk management 
maturity while other respondents described the same items as enablers. Some of these, such as 
managerial support or financial resources were highly variable and ranged from full support of 
senior management to senior hospital managers who are unsure of supply chain’s function. 
Likewise, where hospitals exceeded financial performance goals there were opportunities to 
invest in supply chain enablers while financially troubled facilities were unable to obtain 
resources perceived as beneficial due to economic constraints. 
 
 
 
Summary of Qualitative Study Two Results 
 
To date there is little known research designed to understand the complex influences 
encountered by healthcare supply chain managers as they determine their risk management 
approach, although risk management as a field has been examined globally from a financial and 
economic perspective for many years. This study produced some interesting perspectives of the 
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healthcare supply chain manager and the motivation for improvement of supply chain risk 
performance. The first theme is of the managerial focus on the extended downstream supply 
chain, with the main focus on the customer’s customer; in the case of hospitals this is the patient 
of the healthcare provider. The healthcare provider, while understood as a critical component of 
patient care and the customer of the supply chain manager, is less often seen as a collaborative 
partner and often seen as a barrier. While physicians have long held a position of great stature 
and influence in a healthcare supply chain, the ability to provide to these customers any ordered 
supply or equipment has been moderated due to recent reductions in operating margins and a 
renewed focus on overall hospital financial performance (Burns, 2001, McKone-Sweet, 2005). 
 The second theme is communication between levels of the supply chain. Respondents 
described active communication both one level higher, to their supplier/ distributor and one level 
lower, to the providers, with influences from management regarding financial issues and 
dedicated patient-care concerns as a self-imposed moderator. In facilities where communication 
seemed improved there was greater satisfaction with the current risk management level of the 
supply chain. In facilities where there were financial, communication and staffing challenges the 
supply chain managers overall expressed greater frustration with the level of risk management 
maturity. The theme implied a lack of effective integration and communication within the 
hospital-customer relationship, which has similarly been described by Chen et al., (2013) as 
knowledge exchange in their examination of supplier-hospital relationships. A recent report also 
noted that 14% of hospital C-suite and material managers felt lack of integration throughout the 
continuum of care had the second highest impact on the supply chain, behind cost saving goals 
of the facility (Premier, 2013).  Clinical integration misalignment with the supply chain was 
expressed as a source of much frustration. Problematic is that the clinicians are the next 
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downstream customer who often are less inclined to collaboration when that collaboration is seen 
as contravalent to improved patient outcomes. These relational aspects of trust, understanding, 
collaboration and unity of effort occur at all sizes of facilities that were examined and may serve 
as moderators to achieving desired levels of risk management maturity. These aspects and an 
integrated discussion of Study 1 and Study 2 results will be presented in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
Chapter Outline 
 
 This chapter reviews the findings from this research. The first section describes the 
overall contributions from Study One and Study Two in light of Chapter 1 contributions. The 
next section discusses the contributions from Study One and discusses the implications from 
non-support of the hypotheses as well as the findings regarding similarities among healthcare 
supply chain managers in regards to their Executive Style and theoretical and managerial 
implicatons. The third section discusses findings from the exploratory qualitative Study Two as 
well as a discussion of the relevant theoretical and managerial implications. Finally, implications 
from a combined review of both studies is presented as well as limitations of the study and future 
research opportunities. Table 49 provides an overview of all results. 
 
Table 49: Recap of Results 
Research Objective Hypotheses Hypothesis Supported? Implication 
Investigate how a 
healthcare supply chain 
manager’s Executive 
Style impacts their 
approach to risk 
management. 
H1a: The Maestro style is negatively associated 
with Level I SCRM maturity 
H1b: The Maestro style is positively associated 
with Level II SCRM maturity 
H1c: The Maestro style is positively associated 
with Level III SCRM maturity 
H1d: The Maestro style is positively associated 
with Level IV SCRM maturity. 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
The overall lack of support for this objective 
indicates that although managers and firms 
may desire an increased level of risk 
management maturity, there may either be 
no linkage found through the foundational 
ES attributes or moderators may exert a 
greater influence, masking any managerial 
influence. In part, the overall low maturity 
levels in healthcare supply chain risk 
management may indicate a larger systemic 
effect from an unidentified source. A large 
percentage of managers who expressed 
greater acceptance of uncertainty, which 
supports long-term relationship building, 
seems at odds with internal, transactional 
maturity level attainment. 
H2a: The Leader style is negatively associated 
with Level I SCRM maturity. 
H2b: The Leader style is positively associated 
with Level II SCRM maturity. 
H2c: The Leader style is positively associated 
with Level III SCRM maturity. 
H2d: The Leader style is negatively associated 
with Level IV SCRM maturity. 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
H3a: The Manager style is negatively 
associated with Level I SCRM maturity. 
H3b: The Manager style is positively associated 
with Level II SCRM maturity. 
H3c: The Manager style is negatively associated 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
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with Level III SCRM maturity. 
H3d: The Manager style is negatively 
associated with Level IV SCRM maturity. 
 
 
No 
H4a: The Producer style is positively associated 
with Level I SCRM maturity. 
H4b: The Producer style is positively associated 
with Level II SCRM maturity. 
H4c: The Producer style is negatively 
associated with Level III SCRM maturity. 
H4d: The Producer style is negatively 
associated with Level IVSCRM maturity. 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
Examine and discover 
the complex influences 
encountered by supply 
chain managers as they 
determine their risk 
management approach. 
Exploratory Study 
 Healthcare supply chain managers face a 
myriad set of challenges when faced with 
understanding and reacting to risks. Often 
these are related to specific conditions 
within their hospital. However, a consistent 
focus on the patient is identified as a 
continued and robust motivation for 
decision-making, although moderating 
influences are recognized as well. These 
moderating influences may be a factor that 
leads to overall reduction in maturity levels 
among all hospitals. 
Investigate if healthcare 
supply chain managers 
possess similar or 
dissimilar Executive 
Styles. 
Exploratory 
 Although no linkage was recognized 
between ES and RM maturity levels, large 
populations of both executive styles and 
maturity level clusters were identified. 
Knowledge of these managerial and risk 
attributes allows for further investigation as 
to potential causes. 
 
 
 
Overall Dissertation Contributions 
 
This research sought to contribute to the understanding of Executive Style impact in 
healthcare supply chain risk management as well as risk management maturity clustering within 
US based hospital supply chains (Table 50). Chapter 1 discussed multiple contributions this 
research was designed to achieve. The first was to deepen the understanding and boundaries of 
the relationship between Executive Style and risk management, as there is limited research where 
behavioral attributes are linked to operations (Davis and Golicic, 2012; Fawcett and Waller, 
2012) under the umbrella of Contingency Theory. The second was to explore the relationship 
between management styles and healthcare supply chain risk management through an 
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understanding of decision making, as managers are key to implementing a hospital’s risk 
management strategy. The third contribution was to develop themes and topics to foster future 
behavioral, operational or integrative research in support of interdisciplinary theory building 
including taxonomy or typology development A fourth contribution was to demonstrate the value 
of multiple method research as a means to provide a more broad and deep understanding of 
managerial behavior and outcomes. 
One additional area where a contribution may be made is in the study of misalignment. 
As Hakonsson et al., (2012) noted “misalignment leads to opportunity losses for the firm” 
(p.196). Collective results from Study One and Study Two may indicate potential misalignment 
and open opportunities to understand how managerial attributes may be best aligned to support 
increased achievement of risk management maturity levels in support of firm strategy.   
Table 50: Contributions 
Contribution Study 
1. Adds to limited research focused on 
behavior and operations 
Study One 
Study Two 
2.  Explores the relationship between 
management style and risk management 
decision making 
Study Two 
3. Develops themes and topics to support 
future research in behavioral supply chain 
management 
Study Two  
4. Demonstrates the value of multiple 
method studies, not commonly used in 
supply chain research 
Study One (Survey) 
Study Two (Semi-structured interview) 
5. Highlights the challenge of misalignment 
between managerial traits and operational 
performance  
Study One 
 
Study One Research Contribution and Implications 
A review of behavioral and operational literature from a variety of disciplines indicated 
that managerial behavior traits have an impact on firm operations. As many firms are unique, 
often there are multiple types of individuals who may lead within the organization. However, 
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Fiedler (1965) noted that understanding a manager’s style and type may help place a manager in 
the best position to capitalize on those attributes and noted there is a relationship between certain 
traits and business conditions. Burton and Obel (2004) conducted research using Contingency 
Theory that supported this concept and developed an extensive contingency model of 
organizations that analyzed multiple facets of strategic influence, including leadership or 
managerial style. Hakonsson et al., (2012) built upon Burton and Obel to identify opportunities 
between fit and firm strategy that led to improved financial performance in their longitudinal 
study. Hakonsson found misfits produced worse financial results over time while manager/ 
strategy combinations that fit well produced improved financial performance over time. 
Study One may have identified some of the challenges facing healthcare operations that 
desire to achieve greater levels of risk management maturity in that while some organizations 
were members of the higher levels of maturity the majority of hospital supply chains experience 
clustering indicating immaturity as indicated by the cluster variables.  
 
Risk Management Maturity Clusters in Healthcare 
Risk management maturity levels have been previously identified (Hillson, 1997, 
IACCM, 2003, Simchi-Levi et al., 2013) across broad industry categories and indicate a firm’s 
attainment of levels of RM competency across seven key areas. These include risk governance, 
flexibility and redundancy, between-partner alignment, upstream and downstream integration, 
internal business function alignment and integration, complexity management and data, 
modeling and analytics capabilities (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013). Greater levels of maturity, which 
support increased post-disruption resilience and improved financial performance (Simchi-Levi et 
al., 2013) must build upon lower levels to be most effective (Oliveira et al., 2012). 
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Internal consistency of the variable groupings were examined with Cronbach’s alpha 
score, a measure of overall scale reliability. Only Level III/ Cluster 3 achieved an acceptable 
score of >.70, when all respondents were examined. Cluster 4 as measured across all 
respondents, as well Clusters 2 and 3 as measured by Cluster respondents, achieved marginal 
scores of >.6, considered potentially acceptable for exploratory studies (Robinson et al., 1991). 
These score differences may be indicative of the role that these variables have in defining 
groupings based on similarities of response (as measured by Euclidean distances during the 
cluster analysis), rather than a measure of an underlying concept. The differences between the 
groupings of the Simchi-Levi et al., (2013) levels and the healthcare SC clusters indicates that 
across professional fields there are differences in how SC managers approach risk management 
and group their activities. Of note was the difference in Cronbach alpha strength of the Cluster 4 
respondents when compared to the Simchi-Levi et al., (2013) scores. This was unexpected as the 
first three Level/ Cluster comparison scores were similar and increased from Level I/ Cluster 1 to 
Level III/Cluster 3 with a subsequent reduction in alpha for level IV. Although not grouped 
initially as a conceptual scale, as the variables were grouped by the cluster process, they may 
warrant additional research to understand if they actually possess additional scale qualities. 
Overall statistical significance between the Simchi-Levi et al., (2013) RM maturity levels 
and the healthcare RM Maturity clusters, as assessed during the canonical correlation analysis 
and developed in this research, was assessed as strong, however this significance may have been 
influenced by the presence of collinearity of variables that were present in each matching 
canonical variate.  The practical significance, therefor, between the variates developed from the 
groups of variables that formed each grouping was assessed as weak, given the strength of 
certain individual variables to drive the scores higher. This weakness indicates a difference in the 
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variate measures at each of the four levels that were compared. This distinction is important as it 
indicates a general difference in the attributes measured by each variate across both the base RM 
maturity model and the clusters from this study. Of note is the disproportional grouping of 
healthcare supply chain respondents at the lowest maturity levels where the base RM maturity 
model possessed a more normal distribution among the four levels.  
Two healthcare supply chain risk management clusters were disproportionately aligned 
with the lowest single risk management level identified in the literature. In healthcare, RM 
Cluster one grouped 44.3% respondents on the variables where respondents employed ‘ad-hoc 
risk management processes’ and possessed the ability to ‘absorb limited volatility around 
standard functional input parameters’. Cluster two grouped 28.3% of respondents around the 
variables of having ‘no visibility into changes outside their functional domain’ and ‘no planning 
of redundancy buffers towards potential disruptions’. While individual respondents may employ 
characteristics found in higher levels of maturity, these cluster variables were found to be the 
most closely aligned when all respondents were analyzed. Cluster three respondents, 24.6%, 
were the most varied across multiple maturity levels, possessing qualities from buffer planning 
and redundancy as well as flexibility, as defined by Simchi-Levi et al., (2013). Cluster three 
respondents noted the use of ‘basic risk governance processes’ as well as ‘segmenting their risk 
strategies’ and ‘investing in flexibility of processes, products, plants and capacity’, considered 
among the higher maturity characteristics. 
Cluster four was the smallest of the clusters with 2.7% (n=5) of respondents. These cases 
clustered around three variables, ‘the use of sensors and predictors to proactively position 
response mechanisms’, ‘partner resilience monitoring’ and ‘ managing pressure away from weak 
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partners in the value chain’, the last two variables beginning to extend RM practices into a more 
complex relationship with a partner.  
The unexpected result of the cluster analysis of risk management maturity levels in 
hospital supply chains may be indicative of challenges being faced within healthcare supply 
chains. The majority of respondents, 72.6%, clustered in the lowest tier identified by several 
researchers. This may indicate an ongoing and embedded fragility of an ability to recover from a 
severe disruption event, although routine operations may mask this from being apparent. This 
lack of recovery predisposition is understandable as severe disruptions which may test a supply 
chain’s resiliency are less likely to occur and the threat may be less recognizable.  
 
Executive Styles in Healthcare Supply Chains 
Described by Hakonsson et al., (2012), executives may be classified into one of four 
styles based upon their level of uncertainty avoidance and their preference for delegation. 
Maestro style respondents represented 27.8% of respondents. The minority of respondents, 7%, 
identified as Leader style managers who are more accepting of risk and simultaneously prefer to 
delegate. Previous research has indicated that greater acceptance of risks provides the 
opportunity to develop long term relationships, which have been identified as necessary when 
achieving higher levels of maturity (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013). Overall, 34.8% of respondents 
indicated a preference to accept greater risk, and potentially support long-term relationships with 
supply chain partners. However, attainment of expected increased levels of RM maturity were 
not found. Hakonsson et al., (2012) noted in their study that executive style alignment with firm 
strategy improved longitudinal financial performance. Hospital strategy data was not collected 
for this study, however future research may wish to explore this relationship and how outcomes 
derive when there is a fit as well as when there is a mis-fit between ES and hospital strategy. The 
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largest group of respondents identified as the Manager style, indicating a preference to avoid 
uncertainty in favor of short term stability. The second largest group, again the Maestro style 
indicated a strong preference among most SC managers to not delegate tasks.  
 
Executive Style and Risk Management Maturity Levels 
In general, the numbers of managers who support lower levels of delegation stands in 
contrast to the achievement of greater levels of risk management maturity as indicated by the 
reduced number of respondents in both clusters three and four. This lack of alignment may 
provide insight into the challenges faced by managers in achieving higher maturity levels in the 
face of their strong attribute for uncertainty avoidance.   
 
Theoretical Implications 
 Contingency Theory notes that best fits between leadership styles and organizational 
processes and procedures may be identifiable within certain industries. To that end, in healthcare 
supply chain management, there seems to be a preponderance of a managerial style that prefers 
greater acceptance of risk. This was described by Singhal and Singhal (2012) as a within industry 
fit and echoes earlier work of Fiedler (1965) who identified managerial fit within a firm as an 
identifiable trait. This fit may be identified as providing a link between the internal operations of 
the firm and external influences as well (Van de Ven and Drazin, 1985). The failure to identify a 
predictable fit between Executive Style and risk management maturity level may require 
additional investigation to confirm or refute as the attribute of high acceptance of risk is present 
yet the overwhelming low level of maturity clustering may indicate systemic barriers are present 
or a different measurement protocol may be warranted.  
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Additionally, lack of support for the hypotheses may indicate that there is not a direct 
relationship between these managerial traits and risk management maturity levels. While certain 
traits will be present in all managers at a measurable level, operationalization of a complex 
function, as risk management can be described, may require other inputs to aid in prediction.  
 
Managerial Implications 
 Hospitals that wish to attain greater levels of risk management maturity may already have 
a key component hired and in the correct position of responsibility based in part on the high level 
of delegation avoidance. However, there may be barriers to be removed to allow supply chain 
managers to implement the necessary processes and procedures to reach those higher levels of 
maturity, such as an ability to accept greater levels of risk and become more Maestro like.  
Gattorna (1998) asserted that understanding a manager’s style serves as an aid to determine gaps 
in managerial capabilities (i.e. risk management). The misalignment evident as so many 
healthcare supply chains cluster at the lowest levels of risk management maturity may serve as 
an indicator worth noting prior to a severe disruption. Additionally, the moderation effect of 
other influences may affect the overall low RM maturity level in spite of the individual 
manager’s willingness to accept risk. Hospitals may wish to explore what these barriers are to 
mitigate their influence and attain greater resilience to supply chain shocks and disruptions. 
 
Study Two Research Contribution and Implications 
 A stated goal of Study Two was to understand if there are specific factors and 
interactions that impact a healthcare supply chain manager’s ability to implement risk 
management processes and procedures. Qualitative studies have the ability to provide increased 
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nuance and depth where quantitative research cannot (McGrath, 1982). Specifically, the study 
uncovered complex influences encountered by healthcare supply chain managers as they 
determined their risk management approach and allowed the opportunity to explore respondent 
provided stories in more detail. 
 
Theoretical Implications 
 Study Two began with no set theoretical foundation as a reference point. As little 
qualitative research has been published regarding healthcare supply chain management, there has 
been little opportunity for theory to emerge from previous research. As a result, the use of 
grounded theory methodology provided the opportunity to develop categories of responses based 
on case interviews. A goal is to understand the foundational underpinnings for supply chain risk 
management activities of healthcare supply chain managers. Results offered some insight into 
the barriers that supply chain managers face in hospitals. Further, it identified the patient as a 
strong core customer focal point that underpins supply chain management thought, located two 
tiers downstream. This relationship and the influences surrounding it are recognized in 
practitioner literature, however academic research has conducted scant testing of this relationship 
and has not developed it further. 
 
Managerial Implications 
  There are several important implications for managers that wish to consider RM and RM 
improvement that stem from Study Two. Managers across all sized facilities faced minor 
disruptions from frequent short-term re-taskings during their day. These were often described as 
disruptive and in a more strategic context may be an indirect barrier to developing longer termed 
relationships, both internally and externally, that may support greater levels of risk management 
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maturity. Communication was noted as both an enabler and barrier, yet the common thread was 
the interdepartmental nature of the relationship. When the relationship was favorable, benefits 
were recognized. When the relationship was strained, improvement efforts were frustrated and 
led to poor performance and perceived increased waste.  
  Another realization is that the presence of personnel in key positions may be a barrier, in 
line with Forrester’s (1965) assertion that personnel matter. Several respondents expressed 
frustration in interaction with intrafirm personality misalignments that produced suboptimal risk 
management outcomes. 
Combined Research Implications 
The appropriateness of paired methods to explore the questions of Executive Style and 
healthcare supply chain risk management are shown as appropriate as they sought “to examine 
different, but complementary, aspects of the same phenomenon” (Davis, et al. 2011, p. 469). 
Support for inclusion of quantitative research as part of the mixed methodology approach is 
shown by the unique structure of risk management clustering found in Study One. This 
uniqueness is an area which has not been observed in prior research, nor has research sought to 
understand the differences between risk management maturity levels in healthcare supply chains 
compared to risk management maturity levels found in multi-industrial global supply chains, 
although the healthcare supply chain has been acknowledged for its uniqueness (Schneller and 
Smeltzer, 2006; Chang And Wittemore, 2008; McFadden et al, 2009). Study Two allowed the 
researcher the opportunity, through qualitative means, to understand the complex interactions 
facing supply chain managers who occupy multiple levels of maturity and develop the 
foundation for understanding the foundations of maturity clusters. Additionally, discussions of 
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barriers and enablers from Study Two may direct practitioners and academics to explore 
solutions with greater focus which may be an interesting implication for management. 
Each Study was designed to be independent of the other, with neither one informing nor 
driving decision making in the other method. Of note from Study One is the prevalence of very 
low maturity level clusters where respondents operate their risk management procedures very 
rudimentarily. Analyzed in conjunction with Study Two’s interviews there seems to be 
significant desire for movement to greater levels of maturity; supply chain managers were 
readily able to identify, define, and articulate the most severe threats they faced, as self-defined 
by catastrophic impact, yet also recognized the multiple barriers they also faced. The Study Two 
finding that managers were generally willing to advance their supply chain to greater risk 
management capabilities is supported by the Study One Executive Style attribute reflected in the 
majority of respondents as a willingness to accept uncertainty. However, the barrier or barriers 
were briefly discussed in Study Two, yet there may be additional influences that affect 
managerial risk management decision making. 
Future discussion may benefit from consideration of where optimal healthcare supply 
chain maturity may be positioned within the four clusters developed here. Ultimately, each 
facility will make a determination as to the appropriate level of risk it is both willing to accept 
and manage as the hospital executes its strategy. Most hospitals cluster predominately at the 
lowest levels of maturity. However, during several interviews, respondents indicated both an 
understanding and a desire to improve their maturity level while simultaneously acknowledging 
barriers.  
The US Department of Health and Human Services notes in a recent policy bulletin that 
“health centers must have risk management policies and procedures in place that proactively and 
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continually identify and plan for potential and actual risks to the health center in terms of its 
facilities, staff, clients/patients, financial, clinical, and organizational well-being” (HHS, 2007, p. 
5). Proactive planning is a quality present in higher levels of RM maturity in both the Simchi-
Levi et al. (2013) model as well as clusters developed in this research. However, ROI for 
activities that lead to an avoided disruptive event are difficult to assess and may be areas where 
additional education of senior policy makers would be beneficial to reduce the financial and 
execution barriers mentioned during the interview portion.  
Several activities found in Cluster 3 are common in many business portfolios and may 
provide an initial first step toward obtaining higher levels of maturity and avoiding or mitigating 
the effects of disruptive events. Specifically these include the presence of a) basic risk 
governance plans, b) business continuity planning, c) segmentation of risk strategies among 
various risk pools and d) investing in flexibility, such as flexible processes, products and 
capacity. Other variables in Cluster 3 may require additional capital and strategic investment in 
staff, equipment or expertise, however, given the strength of the reliability score (.701) these 
attributes may be indicative of a stronger RM position for a healthcare firm. 
Healthcare firms may have varying levels of risk acceptance based on multiple factors to 
include geography, historical prevalence of disruptive events and insurance exposure factors. 
Where possible, these firms should seek to incorporate proactive risk management measures 
found in Cluster 3. The activities in Clusters 1 and 2 are mostly indicative of an absence of effort 
(i.e. ‘no planning’, ‘no visibility’) or limited capability (‘ad-hoc processes’, ‘can only absorb 
limited volatility’). Incorporation of Cluster 3 activities that require little additional expense may 
serve to overcome financial hurdles mentioned by some interview respondents, and are often 
recognized as positive businesses practices. As noted by Simchi-Levi et al., (2013) increased RM 
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maturity allows for increased post-disruption financial and operational resilience and this 
capability of RM should be recognized throughout healthcare firm. 
Research Limitations 
 There are several limitations to this research, although use of a multiple method design 
sought to minimize these weaknesses. The three-horned dilemma proposed by McGrath (1982) 
states that within any research design choices must be made that will maximize realism, 
precision or generalizability, but choices made to strengthen one aspect will incur weakness in 
other aspects. Through selection of multiple methods to concurrently explore the research 
questions this dissertation has sought to address precision through the use of a survey 
methodology and realism through the use of a semi-structured interview methodology.  
 The first limitation is the research was conducted in a single field of study within the 
United States. Although it built upon work of Hakonsson et al., (2012), Burton and Obel, (1998, 
2004), and Fiedler, (1965), the generalizability to other organizations is limited. However, the 
findings may lead other organizations to use similar methods to increase perception of risk 
management maturity within their own firm or industry through cluster analyses.  
 Through focus on the healthcare supply chain manager as the main subject of interest, 
research may have only provided a single facet to the complex combinations of relationships, 
resources and motivations in both multiple upstream and downstream supply chain partners that 
may affect overall risk management maturity. Understanding these forces will allow for a more 
complete understanding of dyadic and multiple relationships that exist in the supply chain.  
Additionally, risk management maturity of partners was not examined. As supply chains by 
design span two or more firms and several variables in Study One implicitly involve other firms, 
understanding partner status and impact may be appropriate. 
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Another limitation is the sample size in Study One, particularly following cluster 
formation, where risk management cluster four members were few (n=5). This small sample size 
may be of concern regarding actual cluster membership of variables. A larger sample size may 
increase the power of any clustering solution to determine appropriate cases for cluster 
membership as any cluster methodology will form clusters, a known limitation of the method. 
Future Research Directions 
 One potential area for future research includes developing an understanding of the 
barriers that stand between a supply chain manager’s willingness to accept uncertainty in their 
interactions, desire to achieve greater levels of risk management maturity and potential 
moderators. While some success was described through the cooperation with the CFO as Tony 
described in Study Two, the opportunities to partner with external partners beyond the hospital, 
either upstream or downstream present opportunities for improvement in comprehensive supply 
chain operations.   
 Future research may also compare respondent cluster membership based on bed size, 
military/ civilian status as well as years of experience as they impact maturity. Understanding the 
influences of upstream and downstream supply chain partners on a firm’s risk management 
maturity level may yield insight into how a hospital attains a particular level. Additionally, it 
allows for comparisons of barriers and enablers of partners and may yield insight to areas where 
collaborative efforts may provide improved risk management benefit across two or more supply 
chain partners. This future research may include both behavioral attributes of the key supply 
chain partner employees but also barriers, enablers and opportunities for partnering that lead to 
improved risk management maturity for the subject firms.  
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APPENDIX A 
Interview Protocol 
 
Opening 
 
Introductions of interviewer and interview participant. 
Overview of purpose of the study. 
Confidentiality assurance. 
Permission to audiotape. 
 
Demographic data 
 
Title of interview participants. 
Job history. 
Organizational structure. 
Background on organization, industry. 
How many employees are direct reports? 
 
Lines of inquiry 
 
1) What do you see as some of the most pressing risks to your supply chain that you deal 
with regularly?  
a. Why are these the most important?  
b. What, if any, action been taken to address them? 
 
2) What do you see as some of the most pressing factors that influence the way you 
think about (Identified High Impact-Low Probability Risk)? 
a. What are some of the factors that impact that (High Impact-Low Probability) 
risk? 
i. What makes it risky? 
b. If the item/ capability/ resource was totally unavailable, what would be the 
result? 
i. How would you mitigate the impact? 
c. Can you talk a little bit about how you think about this risk in this category? 
d. What occurs in your thought process to arrive at this risk in this category?  
 
3) What do you see as some of the most pressing factors that influence the way you 
think about (Identified Low Impact-High Probability Risk)? 
a. What are some of the factors that impact that (Low Impact-High Probability) 
risk? 
i. What makes it risky? 
b. If the item/ capability/ resource was totally unavailable, what would be the 
result? 
i. How would you mitigate the impact? 
c. Can you talk a little bit about how you think about this risk in this category? 
d. What occurs in your thought process to arrive at this risk in this category? 
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4) Thinking about your experiences with risk, what are some of the barriers that keep 
you from becoming more mature in risk management capabilities? 
 
5) Would you like to be at a different level of risk management maturity? If so, what are 
some of the barriers you feel you face?  
 
6) How would you describe your management style? (ES) 
 
7) Do you feel your managerial style changed when/since you began working here? (ES) 
Please explain. 
 
Can I follow up with you if I have a further questions or if there is a serious disruption to your 
supply chain? With the information I’ve gathered from you, knowing what actually happens in a 
serious disruption would provide important data for myself and other researchers. Finally, do you 
have anything you want to bring up or ask about before we finish the interview? 
 
Adapted from Manuj and Mentzer (2008); McCracken (1988); Kvale (1999) 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Initial survey cover letter 
 
 
Good Morning, 
 
    I am an AHRMM member and US Army Medical Service Corps Officer who has begun the 
challenging task of data collection for my dissertation and I would like to ask for your assistance. 
 
     My research pertains to managerial styles of healthcare supply chain managers and how these 
managers approach risk in their supply chain. As you know, risk management is currently an 
active topic in the healthcare supply chain field and therefore particularly relevant. The study 
involves a brief online survey lasting about 15-20 minutes. 
 
    I would be more than happy to discuss the research topic or the methodology if you have 
questions. My number is 912-678-5478. Participants who wish to receive a copy of the results 
later this summer can provide their e-mail information at the end of the survey. 
 
   Thank you for your careful consideration of my request and I hope you choose to participate. 
  
Follow this link to the Survey: 
Take the Survey 
Or copy and paste the URL below into your internet browser: 
https://georgiasouthern.co1.qualtrics.com/SE/?Q_SS=bjwImwvQDgJnSzb_2fLnOEmRwUtwDu
5&_=1 
 
Major Stephen R. Spulick 
Doctoral Candidate 
US Army Medical Department 
 
Department of Logistics and Supply Chain Management 
College of Business Administration 
Georgia Southern University 
Statesboro, GA   30458 
Phone:  912-678-5478 
ss06232@georgiasouthern.edu 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Follow up survey cover letter (Wave 2) 
 
 
Good Afternoon, 
 
    I reached out previously this summer to help with my dissertation research. The survey period 
is coming to a close and I would like to appeal for 10-15 minutes of your time once again, for 
those who have not previously participated. Briefly, I am a 70K US Army Medical Service 
Corps Officer currently participating in a Long Term Health Education and Training program for 
the US Army and this research is designed to better understand the relationship between 
managers and supply chain risk management. 
 
     My research pertains to leadership styles of healthcare supply chain managers and how these 
managers approach risk in their supply chain. As you know, risk management is currently an 
active topic in the healthcare supply chain field and therefore particularly relevant. The study 
involves a brief online survey that you can complete at your convenience. 
 
    I would be more than happy to discuss the research topic or the methodology if you have any 
questions or concerns. My number is 912-678-5478. Participants who wish to receive a copy of 
the results later this summer can provide their e-mail information at the end of the survey. 
 
   Thank you for your careful consideration of my request and I hope you choose to participate. 
 
The research has received IRB approval from Georgia Southern University, # H14139. The lead 
researcher has obtained NIH Certificate # 934468 'Protecting Human Research Participants'. 
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APPENDIX D 
 
Normality Plots of Survey Variables 
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Risk Management Maturity Normality Plots 
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APPENDIX E 
 
Descriptive Statistics of Survey variables 
 
 
Descriptives 
 Statistic Std. Error 
Uncert Avoidance Burton 
Weight 
Mean 
3.33213 .025418 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 3.28199  
Upper Bound 3.38227  
5% Trimmed Mean 3.32414  
Median 3.27857  
Variance .121  
Std. Deviation .347585  
Minimum 2.579  
Maximum 4.414  
Range 1.836  
Interquartile Range .446  
Skewness .500 .178 
Kurtosis .041 .354 
Mgr Pref Long-Term 
Decisions Burton Weight 
Mean 3.00545 .022888 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 2.96030  
Upper Bound 3.05060  
5% Trimmed Mean 3.00138  
Median 3.00000  
Variance .098  
Std. Deviation .312987  
Minimum 2.250  
Maximum 3.750  
Range 1.500  
Interquartile Range .429  
Skewness .160 .178 
Kurtosis -.025 .354 
SolHumanProb Mean 4.32 .052 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 4.22  
Upper Bound 4.42  
5% Trimmed Mean 4.36  
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Median 4.00  
Variance .499  
Std. Deviation .706  
Minimum 2  
Maximum 5  
Range 3  
Interquartile Range 1  
Skewness -.640 .178 
Kurtosis -.415 .354 
StimulCoopDivisions Mean 4.32 .048 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 4.23  
Upper Bound 4.41  
5% Trimmed Mean 4.36  
Median 4.00  
Variance .423  
Std. Deviation .651  
Minimum 3  
Maximum 5  
Range 2  
Interquartile Range 1  
Skewness -.434 .178 
Kurtosis -.708 .354 
FormIdeasVisions Mean 4.32811 .04902 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 4.23140  
Upper Bound 4.42482  
5% Trimmed Mean 4.36867  
Median 4.00000  
Variance .449  
Std. Deviation .67035  
Minimum 2.00000  
Maximum 5.30937  
Range 3.30937  
Interquartile Range 1.00000  
Skewness -.589 .178 
Kurtosis -.200 .354 
Daytodayguidance Mean 3.17 .064 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 3.05  
Upper Bound 3.30  
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5% Trimmed Mean 3.13  
Median 3.00  
Variance .756  
Std. Deviation .869  
Minimum 2  
Maximum 5  
Range 3  
Interquartile Range 1  
Skewness .306 .178 
Kurtosis -.599 .354 
DevNewRoutMethods Mean 
3.82967 
.0538595822774
92 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 3.72342  
Upper Bound 3.93593  
5% Trimmed Mean 3.85145  
Median 4.00000  
Variance .542  
Std. Deviation .736518  
Minimum 2.00000  
Maximum 5.14990  
Range 3.14990  
Interquartile Range 1.00000  
Skewness -.286 .178 
Kurtosis -.054 .354 
GovEconDecisions Mean 4.16579 .06015 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 4.04712  
Upper Bound 4.28448  
5% Trimmed Mean 4.23764  
Median 4.00000  
Variance .677  
Std. Deviation .82259  
Minimum 2.00000  
Maximum 5.00000  
Range 3.00000  
Interquartile Range 1.00000  
Skewness -.844 .178 
Kurtosis .291 .354 
CertaintRulesFollowed Mean 3.91 .058 
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95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 3.80  
Upper Bound 4.03  
5% Trimmed Mean 3.95  
Median 4.00  
Variance .638  
Std. Deviation .799  
Minimum 2  
Maximum 5  
Range 3  
Interquartile Range 1  
Skewness -.357 .178 
Kurtosis -.328 .354 
DecisionBasedDetailInfo Mean 4.09 .044 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 4.00  
Upper Bound 4.17  
5% Trimmed Mean 4.10  
Median 4.00  
Variance .369  
Std. Deviation .607  
Minimum 3  
Maximum 5  
Range 2  
Interquartile Range 0  
Skewness -.042 .178 
Kurtosis -.293 .354 
WaitSeebeforeaction Mean 3.04 .047 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 2.94  
Upper Bound 3.13  
5% Trimmed Mean 3.03  
Median 3.00  
Variance .413  
Std. Deviation .642  
Minimum 2  
Maximum 5  
Range 3  
Interquartile Range 0  
Skewness .213 .178 
Kurtosis .174 .354 
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MinimizeBizRiskStandardise
d 
Mean 3.59 .072 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 3.45  
Upper Bound 3.73  
5% Trimmed Mean 3.58  
Median 3.00  
Variance .964  
Std. Deviation .982  
Minimum 1  
Maximum 5  
Range 4  
Interquartile Range 2  
Skewness .491 .178 
Kurtosis -.778 .354 
Mgmnt Pref to Motiv through 
Control Burton Weight 
Mean 2.94397 .032599 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 2.87966  
Upper Bound 3.00828  
5% Trimmed Mean 2.96044  
Median 3.00000  
Variance .199  
Std. Deviation .44578  
Minimum 1.000  
Maximum 3.750  
Range 2.750  
Interquartile Range .625  
Skewness -.659 .178 
Kurtosis 1.209 .354 
MgmntControlsLeadEmpFol
Rules 
Mean 3.85677 .07043 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 3.71781  
Upper Bound 3.99573  
5% Trimmed Mean 3.92018  
Median 4.00000  
Variance .928  
Std. Deviation .963232  
Minimum 1.00000  
Maximum 5.00000  
Range 4.00000  
Interquartile Range 2.00000  
Skewness -.765 .178 
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Kurtosis .353 .354 
MgmntControlsNonLeadEmp
FolRules 
Mean 3.85819 .06877 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 3.72258  
Upper Bound 3.99386  
5% Trimmed Mean 3.91581  
Median 4.00000  
Variance .884  
Std. Deviation .940453  
Minimum 1.00000  
Maximum 5.00000  
Range 4.00000  
Interquartile Range 2.00000  
Skewness -.690 .178 
Kurtosis .218 .354 
MgmntControlsLeadEmpRch
Expect 
Mean 3.97167 .07252 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 3.82858  
Upper Bound 4.11476  
5% Trimmed Mean 4.04190  
Median 4.00000  
Variance .984  
Std. Deviation .991825  
Minimum 1.00000  
Maximum 5.00000  
Range 4.00000  
Interquartile Range 2.00000  
Skewness -.838 .178 
Kurtosis .152 .354 
MgmntControlsNonLeadEmp
RchExpect 
Mean 3.87143 .069462 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 3.73440  
Upper Bound 4.00847  
5% Trimmed Mean 3.92459  
Median 4.00000  
Variance .902  
Std. Deviation .949880  
Minimum 1.00000  
Maximum 5.00000  
Range 4.00000  
Interquartile Range 2.00000  
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Skewness -.690 .178 
Kurtosis -.010 .354 
MgmntUsesRsltBasedMotivat
ionLeadEmp 
Mean 4.10606 .059206 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 3.98926  
Upper Bound 4.22286  
5% Trimmed Mean 4.18528  
Median 4.00000  
Variance .656  
Std. Deviation .809632  
Minimum 1.00000  
Maximum 5.00000  
Range 4.00000  
Interquartile Range 1.00000  
Skewness -1.178 .178 
Kurtosis 2.179 .354 
MgmntUsesRsltBasedMotivat
ionNonLeadEmp 
Mean 3.88762 .066708 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 3.75602  
Upper Bound 4.01922  
5% Trimmed Mean 3.94851  
Median 4.00000  
Variance .832  
Std. Deviation .912222  
Minimum 1.00000  
Maximum 5.00000  
Range 4.00000  
Interquartile Range .000000  
Skewness -.935 .178 
Kurtosis .820 .354 
UseAdHomRMProcess Mean 3.16835 .065590 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 3.03896  
Upper Bound 3.29775  
5% Trimmed Mean 3.20500  
Median 3.00000  
Variance .805  
Std. Deviation .896940  
Minimum 1.00000  
Maximum 5.00000  
Range 4.00000  
285 
 
 
Interquartile Range 1.00000  
Skewness -.485 .178 
Kurtosis -.460 .354 
NoVisOutsideOurDomain Mean 2.76015 .07079 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 2.62048  
Upper Bound 2.89981  
5% Trimmed Mean 2.75340  
Median 3.00000  
Variance .937  
Std. Deviation .96812  
Minimum 1.00000  
Maximum 5.00000  
Range 4.00000  
Interquartile Range 2.00000  
Skewness .350 .178 
Kurtosis -.687 .354 
NoPlannedRedundforDisrupt Mean 
2.57068 
.0641304110097
87 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 2.44416  
Upper Bound 2.69719  
5% Trimmed Mean 2.56071  
Median 2.00000  
Variance .769  
Std. Deviation .87697  
Minimum 1.00000  
Maximum 5.00000  
Range 4.00000  
Interquartile Range 1.00000  
Skewness .616 .178 
Kurtosis -.233 .354 
OnlyAbsorbLimitVolatility Mean 3.26125 .06300 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 3.13695  
Upper Bound 3.38555  
5% Trimmed Mean 3.27326  
Median 3.00000  
Variance .742  
Std. Deviation .86160  
Minimum 1.00000  
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Maximum 5.00000  
Range 4.00000  
Interquartile Range 1.00000  
Skewness -.388 .178 
Kurtosis -.538 .354 
RedundBasedXfuncCommon
Plan 
Mean 3.14722 .06829 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 3.01249  
Upper Bound 3.28194  
5% Trimmed Mean 3.21116  
Median 3.00000  
Variance .872  
Std. Deviation .93386  
Minimum -.00893  
Maximum 5.00000  
Range 5.00893  
Interquartile Range 1.46040  
Skewness -.698 .178 
Kurtosis -.133 .354 
BasicRskGovisUsed Mean 3.47005 .05890 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 3.35384  
Upper Bound 3.58626  
5% Trimmed Mean 3.52822  
Median 4.00000  
Variance .649  
Std. Deviation .805533  
Minimum 1.00000  
Maximum 5.00000  
Range 4.00000  
Interquartile Range 1.00000  
Skewness -1.119 .178 
Kurtosis .950 .354 
NoVistoOutsideChangesand
Patterns 
Mean 2.59051 .06906 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 2.45426  
Upper Bound 2.72677  
5% Trimmed Mean 2.58196  
Median 2.00000  
Variance .892  
Std. Deviation .94449  
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Minimum 1.00000  
Maximum 5.00000  
Range 4.00000  
Interquartile Range 1.00000  
Skewness .466 .178 
Kurtosis -.604 .354 
UseSensorsandPredictorstoP
ositResp 
Mean 3.02900 .06773 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 2.89537  
Upper Bound 3.16262  
5% Trimmed Mean 3.07589  
Median 3.00000  
Variance .858  
Std. Deviation .926261  
Minimum 1.00000  
Maximum 5.00000  
Range 4.00000  
Interquartile Range 2.00000  
Skewness -.392 .178 
Kurtosis -.712 .354 
HaveBCPlans Mean 3.79929 .06022 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 3.68047  
Upper Bound 3.91811  
5% Trimmed Mean 3.85080  
Median 4.00000  
Variance .678  
Std. Deviation .82362  
Minimum 1.00000  
Maximum 5.00000  
Range 4.00000  
Interquartile Range .00000  
Skewness -1.076 .178 
Kurtosis 1.632 .354 
MonitorPartnersSCResilience Mean 3.13701 .072910 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 2.99317  
Upper Bound 3.28085  
5% Trimmed Mean 3.15491  
Median 3.00000  
Variance .994  
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Std. Deviation .99703  
Minimum 1.00000  
Maximum 5.00000  
Range 4.00000  
Interquartile Range 2.00000  
Skewness -.300 .178 
Kurtosis -.909 .354 
EmployQuantRM Mean 3.21632 .06480 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 3.08848  
Upper Bound 3.34416  
5% Trimmed Mean 3.26523  
Median 3.00000  
Variance .785  
Std. Deviation .88615  
Minimum 1.00000  
Maximum 5.00000  
Range 4.00000  
Interquartile Range 1.00000  
Skewness -.633 .178 
Kurtosis -.529 .354 
InvestinFlexibility Mean 3.31444 .06881 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 3.17868  
Upper Bound 3.45020  
5% Trimmed Mean 3.34344  
Median 4.00000  
Variance .886  
Std. Deviation .94102  
Minimum 1.00000  
Maximum 5.00000  
Range 4.00000  
Interquartile Range 1.00000  
Skewness -.628 .178 
Kurtosis -.496 .354 
MovePresfromWeakPartners Mean 3.26717 .06066 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 3.14749  
Upper Bound 3.38685  
5% Trimmed Mean 3.29452  
Median 3.00000  
289 
 
 
Variance .688  
Std. Deviation .82958  
Minimum 1.00000  
Maximum 5.00000  
Range 4.00000  
Interquartile Range 1.00000  
Skewness -.507 .178 
Kurtosis -.134 .354 
RiskStrategyisSegmented Mean 3.25176 .06063 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 3.13213  
Upper Bound 3.37139  
5% Trimmed Mean 3.31063  
Median 3.00000  
Variance .688  
Std. Deviation .82923  
Minimum 1.0000  
Maximum 5.0000  
Range 4.00000  
Interquartile Range 1.00000  
Skewness -.802 .178 
Kurtosis .498 .354 
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APPENDIX F 
Tests of Normality of Survey Variables 
 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Uncert Avoidance Burton 
Weight 
.077 187 .009 .977 187 .004 
Mgr Pref Long-Term 
Decisions Burton Weight 
.090 187 .001 .981 187 .012 
SolHumanProb .286 187 .000 .779 187 .000 
StimulCoopDivisions .274 187 .000 .768 187 .000 
FormIdeasVisions .275 187 .000 .782 187 .000 
Daytodayguidance .241 187 .000 .865 187 .000 
DevNewRoutMethods .297 187 .000 .838 187 .000 
GovEconDecisions .249 187 .000 .806 187 .000 
CertaintRulesFollowed .265 187 .000 .849 187 .000 
DecisionBasedDetailInfo .326 187 .000 .768 187 .000 
WaitSeebeforeaction .320 187 .000 .792 187 .000 
MinimizeBizRiskStandardise
d 
.415 187 .000 .645 187 .000 
Mgmnt Pref to Motiv through 
Control Burton Weight 
.112 187 .000 .965 187 .000 
MgmntControlsLeadEmpFol
Rules 
.254 187 .000 .862 187 .000 
MgmntControlsNonLeadEmp
FolRules 
.255 187 .000 .863 187 .000 
MgmntControlsLeadEmpRch
Expect 
.239 187 .000 .844 187 .000 
MgmntControlsNonLeadEmp
RchExpect 
.265 187 .000 .859 187 .000 
MgmntUsesRsltBasedMotiva
tionLeadEmp 
.304 187 .000 .779 187 .000 
MgmntUsesRsltBasedMotiva
tionNonLeadEmp 
.308 187 .000 .828 187 .000 
UseAdHomRMProcess .240 187 .000 .863 187 .000 
NoVisOutsideOurDomain .254 187 .000 .877 187 .000 
NoPlannedRedundforDisrupt .309 187 .000 .837 187 .000 
OnlyAbsorbLimitVolatility .254 187 .000 .861 187 .000 
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RedundBasedXfuncCommon
Plan 
.258 187 .000 .843 187 .000 
BasicRskGovisUsed .344 187 .000 .768 187 .000 
NoVistoOutsideChangesand
Patterns 
.296 187 .000 .857 187 .000 
UseSensorsandPredictorsto
PositResp 
.216 187 .000 .866 187 .000 
HaveBCPlans .356 187 .000 .789 187 .000 
MonitorPartnersSCResilienc
e 
.256 187 .000 .868 187 .000 
EmployQuantRM .277 187 .000 .827 187 .000 
InvestinFlexibility .307 187 .000 .831 187 .000 
MovePresfromWeakPartners .245 187 .000 .857 187 .000 
RiskStrategyisSegmented .244 187 .000 .828 187 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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APPENDIX G 
 
Descriptive Statistics Four Cluster Hierarchical Solution 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Ward Method N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
1 reflsqrtAdHoc_Pref 46 .00 2.24 1.4344 .31103 
reflsqrttNo_Outsid_Vis 46 1.41 2.24 1.8477 .25655 
reflsqrtMat_No_Redund 46 1.00 2.24 1.6691 .29265 
reflsqrtOnly_Std_Disrpt 46 1.00 1.73 1.4659 .21854 
refllogRedund_XFunc_Plan 46 .30 .70 .5259 .13140 
refllogBasic_Risk 46 .30 .70 .4422 .13887 
refllogNo_Vis_Change_Out 46 .00 .70 .4869 .15199 
reflsqrtMat_Sensors_Resp 46 1.41 2.24 1.9195 .23615 
refllogHave_BCPlans 46 .00 .70 .4187 .15096 
reflsqrtKnow_Supp_Resil 46 1.41 2.24 1.9169 .20972 
refllogQuant_RM 46 .30 .70 .5059 .13303 
refllogFlx_Process 46 .30 .70 .5021 .13637 
reflsqrtMov_Pres_Weak 46 1.41 2.24 1.6945 .25501 
refllog_Segment_Rsk_Strat 46 .00 .70 .4117 .14079 
Valid N (listwise) 46     
2 reflsqrtAdHoc_Pref 27 1.73 2.24 1.9270 .16885 
reflsqrttNo_Outsid_Vis 27 1.41 2.24 1.7062 .23230 
reflsqrtMat_No_Redund 27 1.00 2.00 1.6034 .24716 
reflsqrtOnly_Std_Disrpt 27 1.00 2.24 1.6202 .28584 
refllogRedund_XFunc_Plan 27 .30 .70 .4830 .13673 
refllogBasic_Risk 27 .30 .70 .4431 .14316 
refllogNo_Vis_Change_Out 27 .30 .60 .4247 .12983 
reflsqrtMat_Sensors_Resp 27 1.41 2.24 1.8128 .22117 
refllogHave_BCPlans 27 .00 .60 .3067 .15668 
reflsqrtKnow_Supp_Resil 27 1.41 2.24 1.8959 .19134 
refllogQuant_RM 27 .30 .70 .4450 .13723 
refllogFlx_Process 27 .30 .70 .4311 .14556 
reflsqrtMov_Pres_Weak 27 1.41 2.00 1.8673 .18155 
refllog_Segment_Rsk_Strat 27 .30 .70 .4487 .12444 
Valid N (listwise) 27     
3 reflsqrtAdHoc_Pref 43 1.41 2.00 1.6870 .19685 
293 
 
 
reflsqrttNo_Outsid_Vis 43 1.41 2.24 1.7435 .23366 
reflsqrtMat_No_Redund 43 1.41 2.00 1.7442 .22792 
reflsqrtOnly_Std_Disrpt 43 1.00 2.00 1.6353 .21864 
refllogRedund_XFunc_Plan 43 .30 .60 .4203 .09810 
refllogBasic_Risk 43 .00 .48 .3526 .11580 
refllogNo_Vis_Change_Out 43 .00 .60 .4167 .14545 
reflsqrtMat_Sensors_Resp 43 1.41 2.00 1.6648 .20836 
refllogHave_BCPlans 43 .00 .60 .3268 .14258 
reflsqrtKnow_Supp_Resil 43 1.00 1.73 1.5228 .17461 
refllogQuant_RM 43 .30 .60 .4045 .11431 
refllogFlx_Process 43 .00 .70 .3623 .15214 
reflsqrtMov_Pres_Weak 43 1.41 2.00 1.5535 .17088 
refllog_Segment_Rsk_Strat 43 .30 .60 .4121 .10039 
Valid N (listwise) 43     
4 reflsqrtAdHoc_Pref 68 1.41 2.24 1.6778 .26114 
reflsqrttNo_Outsid_Vis 68 1.00 1.73 1.3954 .19702 
reflsqrtMat_No_Redund 68 1.00 1.73 1.3968 .18655 
reflsqrtOnly_Std_Disrpt 68 1.41 2.24 1.7472 .25652 
refllogRedund_XFunc_Plan 68 .00 .60 .3532 .11684 
refllogBasic_Risk 68 .00 .60 .3399 .10402 
refllogNo_Vis_Change_Out 68 .00 .60 .2679 .13872 
reflsqrtMat_Sensors_Resp 68 1.00 2.00 1.5292 .21081 
refllogHave_BCPlans 68 .00 .48 .2291 .14313 
reflsqrtKnow_Supp_Resil 68 1.00 2.24 1.4886 .28196 
refllogQuant_RM 68 .00 .60 .3679 .12276 
refllogFlx_Process 68 .00 .60 .3487 .13475 
reflsqrtMov_Pres_Weak 68 1.00 2.00 1.5591 .23505 
refllog_Segment_Rsk_Strat 68 .00 .70 .4221 .13172 
Valid N (listwise) 68     
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APPENDIX H 
 
 Cross-tabulation of Demographic Variables for Missing Value Analysis 
 
 
YrsSCExp 
 Total <1 1-4 5-8 9-12 13-16 17-20 >20 
Missing 
SysMis 
DelegUncert Present Count 177 1 6 21 22 26 18 73 10 
Percent 94.7 100.0 100.0 95.5 95.7 96.3 85.7 94.8 100.0 
Missing % SysMis 5.3 .0 .0 4.5 4.3 3.7 14.3 5.2 .0 
YrsHCSCExp Present Count 177 1 6 22 23 27 21 77 0 
Percent 94.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 .0 
Missing % SysMis 5.3 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 100.0 
CurrentPosition Present Count 177 1 6 22 23 27 21 77 0 
Percent 94.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 .0 
Missing % SysMis 5.3 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 100.0 
DisruptionExperience Present Count 122 0 6 16 16 19 15 50 0 
Percent 65.2 .0 100.0 72.7 69.6 70.4 71.4 64.9 .0 
Missing % SysMis 34.8 100.0 .0 27.3 30.4 29.6 28.6 35.1 100.0 
FacilityBedSize Present Count 177 1 6 22 23 27 21 77 0 
Percent 94.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 .0 
Missing % SysMis 5.3 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 100.0 
BranchofService Present Count 58 0 5 12 11 15 10 5 0 
Percent 31.0 .0 83.3 54.5 47.8 55.6 47.6 6.5 .0 
Missing % SysMis 69.0 100.0 16.7 45.5 52.2 44.4 52.4 93.5 100.0 
Indicator variables with less than 5% missing are not displayed. 
 
 
YrsHCSCExp 
 Total <1 1-4 5-8 9-12 13-16 17-20 >20 
Missing 
SysMis 
DelegUncert Present Count 177 1 11 31 26 22 15 61 10 
Percent 94.7 100.0 100.0 93.9 92.9 95.7 83.3 96.8 100.0 
Missing % SysMis 5.3 .0 .0 6.1 7.1 4.3 16.7 3.2 .0 
YrsSCExp Present Count 177 1 11 33 28 23 18 63 0 
Percent 94.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 .0 
Missing % SysMis 5.3 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 100.0 
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CurrentPosition Present Count 177 1 11 33 28 23 18 63 0 
Percent 94.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 .0 
Missing % SysMis 5.3 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 100.0 
DisruptionExperience Present Count 122 0 7 24 23 14 14 40 0 
Percent 65.2 .0 63.6 72.7 82.1 60.9 77.8 63.5 .0 
Missing % SysMis 34.8 100.0 36.4 27.3 17.9 39.1 22.2 36.5 100.0 
FacilityBedSize Present Count 177 1 11 33 28 23 18 63 0 
Percent 94.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 .0 
Missing % SysMis 5.3 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 100.0 
BranchofService Present Count 58 0 6 14 14 12 8 4 0 
Percent 31.0 .0 54.5 42.4 50.0 52.2 44.4 6.3 .0 
Missing % SysMis 69.0 100.0 45.5 57.6 50.0 47.8 55.6 93.7 100.0 
Indicator variables with less than 5% missing are not displayed. 
 
 
Current Position 
 Total 
Front Line Manager/ 
Supervisor 
Mid-Level Mgr/ 
Department Mgr 
Senior Mgr/ C-
Suite 
Missing 
SysMis 
DelegUncert Present Count 177 4 96 67 10 
Percent 94.7 100.0 94.1 94.4 100.0 
Missing % 
SysMis 
5.3 .0 5.9 5.6 .0 
YrsSCExp Present Count 177 4 102 71 0 
Percent 94.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 .0 
Missing % 
SysMis 
5.3 .0 .0 .0 100.0 
YrsHCSCExp Present Count 177 4 102 71 0 
Percent 94.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 .0 
Missing % 
SysMis 
5.3 .0 .0 .0 100.0 
DisruptionExperience Present Count 122 4 71 47 0 
Percent 65.2 100.0 69.6 66.2 .0 
Missing % 
SysMis 
34.8 .0 30.4 33.8 100.0 
FacilityBedSize Present Count 177 4 102 71 0 
Percent 94.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 .0 
Missing % 
SysMis 
5.3 .0 .0 .0 100.0 
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DisruptionExperience 
 Total Yes No 
Missing 
SysMis 
DelegUncert Present Count 177 25 87 65 
Percent 94.7 86.2 93.5 100.0 
Missing % SysMis 5.3 13.8 6.5 .0 
YrsSCExp Present Count 177 29 93 55 
Percent 94.7 100.0 100.0 84.6 
Missing % SysMis 5.3 .0 .0 15.4 
YrsHCSCExp Present Count 177 29 93 55 
Percent 94.7 100.0 100.0 84.6 
Missing % SysMis 5.3 .0 .0 15.4 
CurrentPosition Present Count 177 29 93 55 
Percent 94.7 100.0 100.0 84.6 
Missing % SysMis 5.3 .0 .0 15.4 
FacilityBedSize Present Count 177 29 93 55 
Percent 94.7 100.0 100.0 84.6 
Missing % SysMis 5.3 .0 .0 15.4 
BranchofService Present Count 58 17 41 0 
Percent 31.0 58.6 44.1 .0 
Missing % SysMis 69.0 41.4 55.9 100.0 
Indicator variables with less than 5% missing are not displayed. 
 
 
BranchofService Present Count 58 2 34 22 0 
Percent 31.0 50.0 33.3 31.0 .0 
Missing % 
SysMis 
69.0 50.0 66.7 69.0 100.0 
Indicator variables with less than 5% missing are not displayed. 
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FacilityBedSize 
 Total 6-24 25-49 50-99 100-199 200-299 300-399 400-499 >500 N/A 
Missing 
SysMis 
DelegUncert Present Count 177 5 15 15 22 17 14 9 43 27 10 
Percent 94.7 71.4 100.0 93.8 95.7 100.0 87.5 100.0 93.5 96.4 100.0 
Missing % SysMis 5.3 28.6 .0 6.3 4.3 .0 12.5 .0 6.5 3.6 .0 
YrsSCExp Present Count 177 7 15 16 23 17 16 9 46 28 0 
Percent 94.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 .0 
Missing % SysMis 5.3 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 100.0 
YrsHCSCExp Present Count 177 7 15 16 23 17 16 9 46 28 0 
Percent 94.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 .0 
Missing % SysMis 5.3 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 100.0 
CurrentPosition Present Count 177 7 15 16 23 17 16 9 46 28 0 
Percent 94.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 .0 
Missing % SysMis 5.3 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 100.0 
DisruptionExperience Present Count 122 6 11 13 16 8 11 4 27 26 0 
Percent 65.2 85.7 73.3 81.3 69.6 47.1 68.8 44.4 58.7 92.9 .0 
Missing % SysMis 34.8 14.3 26.7 18.8 30.4 52.9 31.3 55.6 41.3 7.1 100.0 
BranchofService Present Count 58 6 6 7 7 3 2 0 2 25 0 
Percent 31.0 85.7 40.0 43.8 30.4 17.6 12.5 .0 4.3 89.3 .0 
Missing % SysMis 69.0 14.3 60.0 56.3 69.6 82.4 87.5 100.0 95.7 10.7 100.0 
Indicator variables with less than 5% missing are not displayed. 
298 
 
 
 
 
BranchofService 
 Total USAF USA USN 
Missing 
SysMis 
DelegUncert Present Count 177 1 45 8 123 
Percent 94.7 100.0 93.8 88.9 95.3 
Missing % SysMis 5.3 .0 6.3 11.1 4.7 
YrsSCExp Present Count 177 1 48 9 119 
Percent 94.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 92.2 
Missing % SysMis 5.3 .0 .0 .0 7.8 
YrsHCSCExp Present Count 177 1 48 9 119 
Percent 94.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 92.2 
Missing % SysMis 5.3 .0 .0 .0 7.8 
CurrentPosition Present Count 177 1 48 9 119 
Percent 94.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 92.2 
Missing % SysMis 5.3 .0 .0 .0 7.8 
DisruptionExperience Present Count 122 1 48 9 64 
Percent 65.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 49.6 
Missing % SysMis 34.8 .0 .0 .0 50.4 
FacilityBedSize Present Count 177 1 48 9 119 
Percent 94.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 92.2 
Missing % SysMis 5.3 .0 .0 .0 7.8 
Indicator variables with less than 5% missing are not displayed. 
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APPENDIX I 
ITEM-TO-TOTAL CORRELATIONS OF RM MATURITY LEVELS AND CLUSTERS 
 
 
RM Level I 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Cronbach's Alpha 
if Item Deleted 
UseAdHomRMProcess .194 .398 
OnlyAbsorbLimitVolatility .276 .256 
NoVisOutsideOurDomain_Sqrt .278 .340 
NoPlannedRedundforDisrupt_S
qrt 
.371 .309 
 
 
RM Level II 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Cronbach's Alpha 
if Item Deleted 
RedundBasedXfuncCommonPl
an 
.406 .406 
BasicRskGovisUsed .400 .427 
RevCodeNoVisOutsideChgPatt
ern 
.319 .549 
 
 
 
RM Level III 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Cronbach's Alpha 
if Item Deleted 
UseSensorsandPredictorstoPosi
tResp 
.494 .662 
HaveBCPlans .480 .670 
MonitorPartnersSCResilience .557 .622 
EmployQuantRM .493 .662 
 
 
RM Level IV 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Cronbach's Alpha 
if Item Deleted 
InvestinFlexibility .212 -.096a 
MovePresfromWeakPartners .188 .002 
RiskStrategyisSegmented -.026 .449 
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a. The value is negative due to a negative average covariance 
among items. This violates reliability model assumptions. You 
may want to check item codings. 
 
 
HC Cluster 1 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Cronbach's Alpha 
if Item Deleted 
UseAdHomRMProcess .149 . 
OnlyAbsorbLimitVolatility .149 . 
 
 
HC Cluster 2 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Cronbach's Alpha 
if Item Deleted 
RecodeNoVisOutsideChgPatter
n 
.439 . 
ReCodeNoVisOutsideDomain .439 . 
 
 
 
HC Cluster 3 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Cronbach's Alpha 
if Item Deleted 
RedundBasedXfuncCommonPl
an 
.458 .605 
BasicRskGovisUsed .601 .562 
HaveBCPlans .182 .676 
EmployQuantRM .576 .569 
InvestinFlexibility .336 .644 
RiskStrategyisSegmented .247 .666 
ReCodeNoVisOutsideDomain .261 .660 
 
 
HC Cluster 4 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Cronbach's Alpha 
if Item Deleted 
UseSensorsandPredictorstoPosi
tResp 
.423 .525 
MonitorPartnersSCResilience .481 .437 
MovePresfromWeakPartners .385 .577 
 
